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SECRET SOCIETIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

The Rosicrucians, their Rites and Mysteries. By Hargrave Jennings. London, 1870.

The Mystic Tie. By A. G. Mackey, M D., author of *A Lexicon of Freemasonry.* Charleston, 1849.

History of the Internationale. From the French of Edmund Villetards. By Susan M. Day. New Haven, 1874.

The Secret History of the Fenian Conspiracy. By John Rutherford. 2 vols. 1877.

"Qui male agit odit lucem et non venit ad lucem, ut non arguantur opera ejus."
EVANG. S. JOANNIS, III., 19.

OF all dreary and unsatisfactory reading—and there is a great deal of it in the world—the most confounding, from sheer lack of both facts and ideas, is that of the various rituals, manuals, keys, and histories of the different secret societies, from those of the fraternity of Masonry down to the pamphlets which profess to tell us as much as the uninitiated may know of—let us say—the Ancient Order of Foresters. Every sane man, who has attempted such literature, will agree with us in saying that it is but a dead waste of words and unintelligible illustrations. The two books whose titles are placed first at the head of this article are simply model instances of the fact which we assert, since the reader may carefully peruse them from cover to cover without gathering a single idea, whether about the institutions concerned or any other subject in the heavens above, in the earth beneath, or in the un-

derlying waters. M. Villetards gives us some few facts about the Internationale; but the proportion, not indeed of sack, but of sour wine, to bread, is overwhelming. On the other hand, the story of Fenian fraud is ably and trustworthily narrated by Mr. Rutherford, who has really expended more pains on the wretched theme than it deserves.

There are few things that strike the mind of the reflecting sectarian with more astonishment than the disciplinary position which the Church holds and has, for the last two centuries, maintained, touching the secret societies or brotherhoods which, more especially during the present century, have grown up, flourished for a time, and in many instances disappeared like foul fungi on a muck-heap. He sees that, for the most part, there is no attempt on the part of his own sect to interfere with his present or to prevent his future membership in any of them. If already a member, he finds that many of his prominent co-religionists—that many elders, deacons, wardens, vestrymen, etc., of the different congregations in his neighborhood are members of the Masonic Order, of the Odd Fellows' lodge, of the Red Men's wigwam; that they belong to the Knights of Pythias, the Good Fellows, the Sons of Light, the Brethren of the Morning Star, the X. Y. Z., or whatever may be the absurd designations with which they trick themselves. It is very likely that, when he joins one of these himself, he sees nothing wrong in the "principles" which he hears explained to him in a very shadowy way at his initiation. Most likely, the whole thing strikes him as vague, unsatisfactory, and wanting in definiteness. He will very probably express some such thoughts to a brother member, who invariably tells him that he will receive more light on attaining a higher degree—that the full effulgence of information is only to be imparted in the Grand Lodge, or even, that he has already received a vast influx of knowledge which it will require time and study on his part properly to assimilate. Do as he may, the poor honest fellow never receives the promised "light," though he ascend even to the thirty-third degree in quest of it. In point of fact, he has become a member of the fraternity just as young lawyers and physicians are sometimes said to have joined a fashionable or influential sect, *i. e.*, for the purpose of establishing a *clientèle*. He is a shopkeeper, and is told that by becoming *one of them*, he will secure the custom of the members. He thinks of being a candidate for political preferment, and shrewdly calculates that the lodge influence will be invaluable. In any case, so far as he knows, and after a membership of years, there is really nothing wrong mooted in the lodge, or resulting from the transactions therein. We have supposed him a somewhat thoughtful man, and he wonders in his own mind why it is that he finds no Cath-

olics there. Ah, yes! There is one in the lodge. He has every reason to think that Brother Casey is a Catholic. But he finds cause to change his mind when, in reporting upon a candidate, said Brother Casey, as chairman of the investigating committee, states that the proposed neophyte—against whom objection had been made as a Catholic—furnished irrefragable proofs, together with his own personal assurances, that he had not "for years darkened a church door."

It may then be for the benefit of those still without the pale of the Church, whether members of such associations or not, to explain her position with regard to these secret societies—why that position has been assumed, and what these associations either are or are liable to become both in principle and in practice. Perhaps there are even some within the Church, who will feel interested in a full and fair exposition of the matter, that they may be the better able to assign reason for some apparent anomalies which have certainly occasioned much unfavorable comment among sectarians, and in some instances uneasiness among Catholics, both in our own country and elsewhere. For the non-Catholic it is absolutely necessary, in understanding this subject, that he begin by striving to appreciate what is so difficult for the Protestant mind fully to realize, *i. e.*, that the Catholic Church is not local, is not a sect, and does not legislate simply for a little locality, but for the world; that there is no country in which she has not her adherents, and that the lines of states, kingdoms, and empires, are to her as though they did not exist. She existed before any of them, and expects to outlast them all. She knows and will know nothing of a National Church in the Protestant sense. Her discipline may vary, and that as little as possible, but she must, in *faith* and *morals*, be like her Master, "the same yesterday, to-day, and forever."

We propose no impossibility, and it would be sheerly out of question in this article to treat *seriatim* of each one of the too numerous, yet constantly uprising, societies which already exist. New ones are almost daily making their advent into this world of ours, and our own country seems to be their stamping-ground *par excellence*. Their general features, as to aim and practice, are sufficiently well known to the observant who have never belonged to any of them, while their specific features or final aims (admitting them to have any such) are, it is believed, known to such a small number of the members, that but few, whether interns or externs, lay any stress upon them, save in the case of those that, like *La Jacquerie* in France, the *Tugendbund* in Germany, the Italian *Carbonari*, or the lately deceased *Fenianism* (whose means were principally gathered in our own country), have a professed political and insurrectionary aim.

Without any doubt the most respectable of these societies existing in this country at the present day, is that of the Freemasons. In applying the adjective "respectable" to a society condemned by the Church, we refer solely to its antiquity, its action hitherto in the United States, its numbers, its extension, and the repute of its members among their fellow-citizens. *So far as this country is concerned,* it may be rated as a purely beneficial institution (will the reader be pleased not to confound this adjective with *beneficent*), for although it passed, in the early part of this century, through the ordeal of a very heated series of state canvasses, and even of a presidential campaign, yet nothing whatever was definitely proved against it, beyond its secrecy and oath-bound nature—at least nothing that would, in the eye of the civil law, prove it to militate against the good of religion or of the body politic. We leave in abeyance the oath by which its members were charged with binding themselves under most hideous imprecations: "*never to reveal, and ever to conceal the crimes of a brother Master Mason, murder and treason alone excepted, and these at my option,*" since it was not absolutely proven that such was, in distinct terms, their oath; while it was made sufficiently manifest to all persons accustomed to weigh evidence, that if the Masons took such obligation, they certainly did not abide by it. It is true its members did at that time as Masons descend into the political arena, but they could not then have done otherwise. They were essentially under persecution, and were obliged to defend themselves by their votes against the ostracism to which their opponents endeavored to subject them. The anti-Masonic party was a claptrap political organization, at the head of which were, for the most part, a set of demagogues without any principles, who would fain have ridden into power on the whirlwind of indignation which they had excited against the Masons by means of a set of stories many, at least, of which were manufactured out of the whole cloth. Founded on falsehood, that party speedily came to an end, and the Masons have never since been a unit politically on any single question that has come before the country, merely taking sides like other citizens, and just as diversely. During the recent war, they frequently presented, in one and the same Lodge, all the phases of Copperhead, War Democrat, Democrat, Republican, Unionist, and "*Truly Loyal.*" Before that time, and within the memory of this generation, when the country was stirred by the "Know-nothing" cry, we are well-informed of Masons in the same town voting as Whigs, while others (brethren) voted for the Know-nothing or for the Democratic candidate. So that, whatever Masons may be or have been in other countries, they have hitherto been with us in no sense a political organization.

But, however innocent its aims may appear to be *in this country*, Freemasonry falls, and falls deservedly, under the high condemnation of the Church, since its members profess to hold, and do hold, fellowship with the Freemasons of Europe. While we write, it is authoritatively announced that the Grand Orient of France (comprising, if not the largest, certainly the most influential, Masonic jurisdiction in the world) has decided to strip the institution of the only flimsy rag of claim to religion that it ever possessed, viz., the belief in the existence of Deity. So far as Continental Europe is concerned, this is but the enactment of an *ex post facto* law. It remains to be seen whether even this will have the effect of opening the eyes of the members in our own country to the real nature of the fearful down-grade toward which they evermore tend from the day of their initiation. In condemning the institution, the Church had other reasons quite ample for Catholics; and had there even been no other reason, this final and almost necessary result would be enough to prove her clear foresight in utterly anathematizing it. Surely even such Protestants as still believe in a Supreme Being will henceforth hesitate to defile themselves with the contamination of such fellowship. Admitting, then, that Freemasonry has not, as yet, in our own country, committed any overt act of wrong, and we certainly cannot prove the reverse; still, the organization here is affiliated with foreign organizations of the same name, which have been and are daily doing gross wrong. In short, our Freemasons play the role of A. O. H. to the Mollie Maguires of the European Continent.

We certainly do not overstate the fact, when we say that the vast majority of Masons in our country practically deem the Lodge "*a good enough religion*" for themselves; and we recall vividly to mind the sensible and prudent words of the late Archbishop Spalding, of Baltimore, who answered a Mason's letter asking why the Catholic Church condemns the Order, by saying: "*This is done for many valid reasons, chief among which is the fact that Masonry is the very best human and natural counterfeit, aiming to supersede our divinely revealed and supernatural religion.*"

Freemasons contend and teach by their ritual that the Order owes its origin to the building of King Solomon's temple, and they weave together rather a pretty, though utterly futile tale about the murder of one of their Grand Masters while that structure was as yet unfinished. Of course this is very absurd, and an archæologist will readily perceive their whole ritual and instructions, from the degree of Entered Apprentice up to the very highest conferred, to teem with ill-assorted patchwork, incongruities, and anachronisms, which take away from it all claim to historical credence. The most reasonable supposition is, that the workmen and architects who

built those splendid temples of the middle ages, being necessitated to pass from country to country, as means or material for continuing a given building failed, or as it became necessary to stop, so that the portion last erected might thoroughly settle, were obliged to invent some sort of signs, grips, passwords, etc., by which, when they should individually meet another body of operative masons, they might not only secure employment, but the employment and wages to which their skill entitled them. Hence the names of the various degrees of the Blue Lodge, the whole ritual of which is filled with denominations taken from the stonemasons' handicraft. To these words they now strive to attribute a hidden, mysterious, and allegorical meaning, but the attempt is an utter failure, and had but the effect of moving our derision, until we found some of the later and more advanced German philosophers seriously attempt to deduce sun and moon myths from the ordinary nursery rhymes and tales. It was sufficiently ludicrous when learned men "with a bee in the bonnet," undertook to allegorize the Iliad and Odyssey—mirth-provoking, but withal a little painful, when they would have us believe that the sacred cow of the Brahmans impersonated the vital principle; but these erudite professors had not attained the superlative of babbling idiocy, till they informed us that Jack and the Bean-stalk, Little Johnnie Horner, Hey-diddle-diddle, and their foreign counterparts, involve abstruse doctrinal allusions to the all-pervading essence. The inanities of Freemasonry are as nothing to this!

We should be travelling beyond the record did we say that all the other secret societies of our country have been distinctly modelled, to a greater or less extent, upon Freemasonry. Of some among them we cannot speak for lack of information, but so far as our inquiry has extended, that is about the statement of the case. With some changes in the titles of the officers, always in the sesquipedalian direction, more or less (especially *more*) unintelligible humbug in the ritual, a change of some sort in the idiotic regalia, and some modifications of the oaths, fees, ceremonies of initiation and advancement, any one of these, perhaps harmless, certainly stupid, societies will be found very much like any other, and all of them bearing plainly the earmarks of Masonry. The only feature that is of any practical avail in any of them is on the beneficial, or, if you please, the mutually helpful side, which might readily exist without any of the secrecy, oaths, tawdry regalia, or ridiculous ritual. Every man joining them, however, is liable to find, to his cost, that he has taken to himself a master in the shape of every single member. But he is once there. It is much easier to get in than to get out, however galling be the yoke. He might have staid outside and had friends among the members, but he cannot leave

them without making every member an enemy. How, if he be a sensible man, he will endure, as officer to go through with, or as member to witness, from night to night all that solemn tomfoolery which so soon becomes monotonous, palls on the tongue, and causes the stomach to gag, is more than we have ever been able to comprehend.

Meantime, they grow in number, even more rapidly than the sects of Protestantism, which seems now to be so rapidly sinking into infidelism as not to have even the energy of exfoliation. Some member who has been an officer in one, fails of re-election, his merits are not recognized to his satisfaction, he gets, from any cause, under a cloud, a Kilkenny-cat fight is waged (you have all seen this sort of thing in a church choir). He withdraws, suggests a new institution, descants on its benefits as glibly as a life insurance agent, gets adherents, forms a ritual, devises regalia, a charter is procured for a Grand Lodge, subordinate Lodges are formed, our friend is, of course, the Most Worshipful Grand Master, or Most Eminent Grand Panjandrum, devotes himself to the propagation of the new order, and it is a poor affair, indeed, if he does not make out of it some repute among the brethren and a fair salary. It will be worth the reader's while, as indicating the kind of men who devote themselves to this business, to notice, when he sees in his newspaper the next announcement of an election of Grand Officers, in any of them at random, how few of the men with half the letters of the alphabet strung before and after their names, are known even to the obscurest kind of fame. Our own experience has been, on inquiring further about them, that they were almost universally quite as undistinguished at home as abroad.

What is it, then, that the Church does condemn? What are the documents, and what reasons are assigned for the condemnation? For the proper and full answering of these questions a very cursory historical sketch is necessary.

Though Clement V., in 1312, suppressed the Order of Knights Templar (Milites Templi), yet he distinctly states, in the Bull, that he does not pronounce a definitive sentence as to the guilt of the members touching the charges alleged against them; which guilt he avers not to have been proved. He suppresses them solely "*to prevent the farther growth of a monstrous scandal, and for the greater good of Christendom.*" And, as the Templars were, in their day, one of the most celebrated and powerful military orders of Christendom, a glance at the history of this Order, its rise, its professed object, its progress, its departure from its original aim, its rapid corruption, and its fall, will not be out of place, as giving us an idea of the natural course of a successful secret order. We say *successful*, because all such institutions, or at least most of them,

are tolerably pure in their inception, proposing to themselves some object, valuable in itself, which seems either impossible or difficult of attainment, except by the agencies that they intend to set to work. While poor, they remain pure. But success, its resultant wealth, the abandonment of the original aim or its extinction by the progress of the world, have invariably—all history being the proof—produced in them great laxity, not to say corruption. When once wealth has crept in, or through lapse of time and change of circumstances, the object for which they were founded has ceased to exist, the inevitable tendency is to keep their wealth by hook or crook, to allegorize and refine upon their object, to pretend work where there is none to do; and as Satan is said always to find mischief for the idle, it would seem to be impossible for the members to keep on terms with the rest of civil or ecclesiastical society.

About the year 1117, two pious French knights undertook to accompany and protect such pilgrims as desired to pass between Joppa and Jerusalem. They made a vow to that effect. Influenced by zeal for the object,—a very necessary one in those days,—seven other knights soon joined them; and the nine were then admitted to the three monastic vows, with the additional one of defending the Holy Sepulchre. It is said that the first two knights were so poor as to have been obliged to ride upon one horse, a fact which seems to be commemorated on their seals, many of which are still to be seen in the museums of Europe. They were granted a house and an armory in Jerusalem by Baldwin II., then king. Ten years afterwards St. Bernard, of Clairvaux, framed a set of rules for the Order, which rules were approved by Pope Honorius II. Their object was a noble one, and for some ten or fifteen years they lived in full pursuance of their object and strict conformity with their vows and rules. Many Knights applied for admission, the Templars became wealthy, the Order began to claim sovereignty, to be designated as sovereign; the Knights contended that they owed no allegiance to any Prince, that their houses and lands should be free from taxation; that bishops and other ordinaries had no jurisdiction over, and were entitled to no tithes from them, and that their churches and cemeteries were not subject to interdict. Wealthy people became affiliated to them in order to enjoy the same exemptions. They had not yet wholly forfeited the good name acquired by the noble services they had rendered the Christian pilgrims and the good cause in Palestine. They grew to be many thousands in number, establishing numerous "provinces" in the Orient and throughout Europe. Matthew of Paris says that in the thirteenth century they possessed over nine thousand manors in Europe alone. Already in 1146, St. Bernard, and Hugues des Païens, one of the two original founders, perceiving that the mem-

bers have swerved from their original aim and from their vows, vainly exhort them to return to both. Soon they cease entirely from their duty of protecting pilgrims; being more bent on extending their privileges and adding to their possessions, they are found constantly at feud with all the other orders, and more especially with the rival military Order of the Knights Hospitaller. By an underhand bargain they cause the failure of the sixth crusade under the Emperor Frederic II.; they make private treaties with the Saracens to secure their own possessions in the East. They are believed to be corrupt, are known to be powerful and wealthy, and the temporal princes of Europe, headed by Philip the Fair, have long desired their destruction. Charges against them are lodged at Rome, and the Pope institutes an inquiry into their orthodoxy and morality, both bitterly impugned. Meantime their estates have been seized by the various rulers within whose dominions they were; and the Grand Master, Jacques de Molay, with all the members of the Order in France, are seized and cast into prison. The example is imitated. Hundreds of Templars are everywhere executed under color of law. As above stated, the Pope suppressed them; but Philip, not content with their mere suppression as an Order, burned at the stake in 1314 Jacques de Molay, with many of the other dignitaries of the Order. Their property, for which they had lost character and reputation, was seized by the civil rulers, a very little of it being transferred to the Hospitallers; and the great Order of the Knights Templar at once ceased to exist in all Europe, save in Portugal, where, under the sham name of "Knights of Christ," it has continued to drag out a dieaway existence; the principal reason for which, at the present day, seems to be that it furnishes the Portuguese monarch with a cheap way of making fools with money believe themselves noble, so far as ribbon and a title will accomplish that end. There still seem to be people in the world that believe in those things. Shame, that the name of the Saviour of mankind should be employed in such a contemptible and silly transaction!

As to what are nowadays called Knights Templar; something bearing that title has been attached to Masonry, or rather the name with a caricature of the devices, etc., has been assumed by a branch of the Masonic fraternity. Those that now bear the name in this country have much less connection with the real Knights Templar, whether in the original aim, in belief, or in practice, than they have with the Daimios of Japan, or had with the nobles of Aurung-Zebe. It may be said, however, that there is little good, little ill with them: and if it delights any set of grown men to deck themselves out with millinery and titles to which they have no earthly claim,—a soapboiler to mount an imitation chasuble and call

himself Most Excellent Grand High Priest, or a cigar-vender to don a sham helmet and bogus cuirass, giving himself the pseudonym of Most Serene Lord Seneschal, there is no law but the law of taste and truth against it. But these are laws to which people of that grade of intellect cannot properly be expected to be amenable. We submit, however, that the little *gamins* of the street who bestride a lath and fancy themselves cavalrymen are respectable by comparison.

Now, if within the Church, and in days when Christendom and Catholicity were synonymous, this was the natural, as it has been the historical course of a successful secret order, what is to be expected of such an institution outside the Church,—composed of persons of all creeds, or no creed at all,—especially in these days, when knowledge is so much increased, and the love of many has waxed so cold? It will either be successful, and then its aim will be to multiply and increase its power, to crush out its rivals, to form an *imperium in imperio* within the Church or State, till people rise, if not in arms, at least in indignation against it; or it will (the object that called it into being no longer existing) dwindle along, a form without substance and useless for all purposes but annoyance, of which there is enough in the nature of things, without our voluntarily superadding to the sum.

If these institutions had the grace, or the sense—their object having been accomplished—to become extinct, to *efface themselves*, as the French say, all would be well. But the one thing which they seem unable to comprehend, and which no lesson of history can impress upon them, is the desirableness under such circumstances of "stepping down and out." There is always the excuse of property to be kept and managed. Once in office, men never will of themselves give up power; and there always exists the temptation to apply themselves to something else which does not need their organization, but which will serve as an excuse for maintaining the *status quo*.

The Catholic Church condemns every society, the initiation into which is accompanied by an oath, the terms of which are unknown to the affiant, or which (whether previously known or not) bind him to obey all future commands of its officers or to keep secret as against legitimate authority any crime committed by individual members or attempted by the society.[1] She also condemns all those secret societies which propose to themselves anything against the Church or the civil government, whether they exact an oath of their candidates or not. The Church is not a revolutionist.[2]

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[1] Koning, Comp. Theol. Mor., Cap. De Juram., p. 162.
[2] Acta et Decreta. Conc. Balt. Plen. ii., Tit. xii., p. 263.

The theological principle is, that an oath, to be licit, must have three requisites, viz., *truth*, *judgment*, and *justice;* and the second of these is explained to mean, that the oath should be taken *with discretion, prudence, consideration, and reverence—not without necessity or just cause.*[1] The application of the specific terms of the principle and its explanation to the points of the first clause in the above definition are so patent that the wayfaring man, though a fool, cannot err therein. As to the second clause, is there any one who does not see that he can be no Catholic, who not only will not hear, but works against the Church? Does not common sense and common honesty teach us that political changes, if desirable, ought to be wrought aboveboard and in the light of day?

The first papal Bull on the subject is that *In eminenti* issued in 1738 by Clement XII., in which is condemned the society of Freemasons, wheresoever existing, and under what name soever it might be known, under penalty of *ipso facto* excommunication to the individual who should enter, assist, propagate, or protect any such lodge. Freemasons would seem to have been numerous on the Continent of Europe about that time, and to have busied themselves about political matters; for, soon after the accession of Benedict XIV., he found himself obliged, in 1751, to confirm the Bull of his predecessor, which he did by republication *totidem verbis;* assigning, at the same time, the causes for his action, and enucleating with great care, the reasons which rendered necessary the prohibition of the society of Freemasons; all of which reasons are equally cogent to us at the present day, if we except such as only apply to countries where the Civil or Roman Law prevails; which, of course, are inapplicable to us who live under the Saxon or Common Law. Since that time, special societies, mostly political, have been condemned by name, usually on an appeal to Rome against the Ordinary; but, *the theological principle and statement given above will apply everywhere, whatever be the name of the society or association in question.*

So solicitous, however, is the Church for the largest liberty of her children, consistent with sound faith and practice, that she lays no bar in the way of those societies of workmen, tradesmen, or laborers, which propose to themselves no other aim than that of mutual protection and assistance; while she insists that this mutual protection must be carried out *with due regard to the rights of others.* And, lest false or inaccurate information, or the prejudices of localities or persons, might by chance deceive well-meaning pastors, the Holy See enjoins that, *in the case of any difficulty in the application of any of the decrees on this subject, recourse must at once*

[1] Kenrick, Theol. Mor. De Sec. Præcepto, n. 60.

be had to Rome for a solution of the difficulty. The Fathers of the second Plenary Council of Baltimore have therefore decreed, that "in future no one in these States, of whatsoever ecclesiastical rank or dignity, shall condemn by name any society, unless it be beyond all doubt, that said society is among those comprehended in the Pontifical Constitutions as applied by the Sacred College of Inquisition."

So long as men shall exist, there must in the nature of things be partnerships, societies, co-operations, and alliances among individuals, just as surely as there must be political parties in the State: and there is no objection to these partnerships, associations, etc., on the one hand; just as, on the other, there is, perhaps an absolute, and certainly a moral and historical necessity for the existence of divergent political parties. The objection to the former is only, when, in addition to their secrecy, the members are obliged to take a rash oath, that may, in addition, be an intrinsically wicked one. In this case, they are either simply ridiculous, or are aiming at a bad end by worse means. We do not object to the existence of a political party, however strenuously we may oppose its principles, so long as its adherents are ready to discuss measures and views openly and aboveboard. It is only when the so-called party is either so much ashamed or afraid of publicity as to issue its dark mandates from the secret recesses of "*Sam*," like the Know-nothings, that we deem it deserving of no quarter.

It must surely be on the principle "*Omne ignotum pro magnifico*," that many of our friends, more especially European clergymen, are inclined to lay so much stress on the secret societies of this country, and to attribute so much importance to them. While all of them are liable to be abused to a very bad end either against the State or the Church, still that has, in this country, never yet happened, nor is it likely to take place. If there were but *one* such society, and that very numerous, it would be very apt to play the tyrant. If there were but *two*, both strong in numbers and means, they would infallibly engage in an, at least figuratively, internecine struggle. But there are *hundreds* of them. No man can belong to more than three or four, and those who tackle so many have speedy cause to repent it; they are non-affiliated among themselves. They have essentially no aim; or, if they have, there are so few that know that aim as to make it practically amount to nothing. If we subtract from the whole number those which are but beneficial societies, with a good deal more tinsel than necessary—those that serve merely as a mode of killing an evening in the week for men not of the reading persuasion—those whose sole purpose of being is to allow the members to appear as frequently as possible sporting their banners, collars, rosettes, and aprons in procession;

you may count the remainder on your fingers. Let us again eliminate from the membership of all, those who join from pure inanition of mind—those who have done so to have a ready and plausible excuse for passing an evening away from home—and those more sensible ones, who seldom or never attend the meetings, or, if they do, mentally anathematize the silliness of the whole thing—together with those who had their little axe to grind by joining the society, and have that implement now in prime order—you will, in this country at least, find very few indeed who are ready to take for granted and to carry out any and every behest, were the Lodge even to issue such commands. The whole thing is like the bugbear of "British gold," in the lavish use of which, even in this country, many persons are very apt to believe. We must confess having been often surprised at the craven fear of such societies expressed by men whom we know to be in other respects both sensible and estimable. Essentially the same thing is seen in the fear and even horror which most Protestants entertain of the Jesuits, whom we know to be so harmless.

It is our personal opinion that, but for the exaggerated importance lent in the minds of sectarians to the public, or godless, school system, by the impression (which they got from Catholics) that, in establishing and maintaining these schools, they were inflicting a deadly blow upon the Church, they would long since have seen through the injustice, both to us and to themselves—the insufficiency of this irreligious education as a moral restraint—the incompetency of the State for the task of education—and would ere this have given up and abolished the system as an expensive blunder and failure. And just as Protestants exaggerate to the last extent the power and influence of the Jesuits, of whom few of them have any clearer idea than that conveyed by Eugene Sue's *Wandering Jew*, so we, at least in the United States, lay too much stress on the power and influence of some stupid—if you please—and ridiculous associations, merely because they are secret, while we are probably thereby the unwitting causes why they, having gotten a false idea of their own importance, multiply and pullulate so wondrously in this age and country.

The wrong is not that they actually do or have done harm, so much as that *they are at any time capable, in malignant hands, of being twisted to the most nefarious purposes.* When the Popes have specifically condemned and prohibited a given society, it has invariably been because such society had been used for the furtherance of bad ends; but the laying down of the general principles of theology on the subject is what the people need *hic et nunc.* Nothing is easier for such society than to change its name in countries where it is desirable to inveigle ignorant or ill-instructed Catholics

into membership. We know that very soon after the confirmation and renewal, by Pope Benedict, of the bull of Pope Clement against the Masonic fraternity, the lodges of that Order began to be talked of under the title of *Carbonari*, to be again condemned under that name, and to assume various other guises or denominations for the purpose of evading the law, and to lay birdlime for candidates.

Of course, there have been, and no doubt there still are, even in this country, some few of such organizations which, from their very inception, have been simply bad, maliciously bad—bad, with malice prepense, and of which, the conception being in sin, the shape could be but that of iniquity. Such was, *e. g.*, the "Society of the Knights of the Golden Star," a filibustering institution, propagated mostly in the Southern States, for the purpose of stealing in general any attainable territory in Central America—more especially Nicaragua. The very proper execution, by hanging, of the arch-filibuster, Walker, somewhat staggered the association, and the late war gave it a final quietus, it being no longer desirable to annex land at the South for the extension of what used to be termed "*the peculiar institution.*" We well remember being called upon by an agent of said society with an offer of bonds which were to be paid in full, with a bonus of ten acres of land for every dollar advanced, the final settlement to take place so soon as Nicaragua should have been seized. We are very sorry to add, and it is a significant commentary upon the ideas of right and wrong that sometimes pervade a Protestant, a church-going, and an otherwise chivalrous community, that, in the special vicinity referred to, large numbers of these bonds were taken. This was, simply and plainly, to render one's self an accomplice, before the fact, in a highway robbery accompanied by murder; nor was it any the less criminal in intention because of failure in the execution. A Protestant minister, in a late number of the *American Church Review*, feelingly, but rather ludicrously, laments that "*you cross the ocean and have much edifying conversation with a devout Christian gentleman, and as you approach New York he consults you about the surest method of cheating the Custom House, a circumstance which actually happened to myself.*" To us it seems that he might readily have accounted for such a little circumstance happening to the adherent of a creed which has abolished confession, with its concomitant restitution, from the list of sacraments. But we must, at present, attend to the secret societies.

The ostensible cardinal principle of the "Internationale" is war against capital, with incidental war against the capitalist; and though its success has in this country, hitherto, been very slight, this has not been so much because we have not abundance of the

raw material, quite ready to take fire when the match is properly applied (witness the "strikes" of last year), as because its foreign, and more particularly its French, origin, is antipathetic to our proletariat. These latter have a vague, but still a deepseated notion that there is something untrustworthy, and more or less tinged with atheism about every French panacea for the ills of labor. Like a great many other Americans who regard Paris as France, and who fancy themselves speaking authoritatively of French morals and manners when they only know the Rue St. Honoré, the Quartier Latin, and the Jardin Mabille, so that class of our people who would otherwise have been tempted (we say not whether by fancied or real grievances) to attach themselves to the Internationale, invariably fancy that the actions of the rabble of Paris, Lyons, and Marseilles, are a fair reflex of the feeling and principle of the whole French nation. How false this view is we need not here undertake to argue. It is on this account that our laboring classes in general entertain a strenuous distrust of a people whom they imagine to be at once so unsteady in religion, and so fluctuating, politically, as the French. They could not, perchance, stand an examination on the French revolution of the last century, but they have, among hands, heard and read enough about it to dread anything from that source. For similar reasons it has been far from successful in England, where every effort was made to establish it. It exists there, though by no means swaying such power as in France, Belgium, Italy, or even in Germany. It plainly comes under the ban of the Church; and there is certainly among its prominent men, so far as we have been able to discern, no single person who lays any claim to being a believer in Revelation, still less a practical Christian.

The best information within our reach leads us to believe that Socialism or Communism (they are one and the same), meaning thereby that doctrine which aims at a community of goods and the abolition of private property, is not represented by any general society or association, the members of which hold secret sessions and are bound by the solemnity of an oath. Neither is there anything wrong in mooting the question of socialism, apart from the manifest folly of attempting that which can never be carried out on a national scale while human nature remains what it is. Individual socialistic societies have, in various parts of the United States, attained a high degree of material success; witness, the Shakers of Lebanon, New York, and the Rappists, at Economy, Pennsylvania. No man will pretend to deny that many communities of the primitive Christians practically carried out the views of life, labor, and property which are now stigmatized as *socialistic*. The word has become, to a certain extent, discredited, if not stigmatized, owing to

the wicked vagaries of many maintainers, and the absurdities of nearly all the followers of the doctrine. As Shakspeare remarks of another word, "it was an excellent good word before it was ill-sorted." All men know that the members of the various orders of the Church either do, or ought to, possess their goods in common, and can own no private property. The Socialists openly advocate their principles in this country by public meetings, and by means of the press, publishing, within the United States alone, fourteen papers in German, six in English, one in French, and one in Swedish. Of their doctrines, Germany, strangely enough, is the stronghold, where Socialistic members sit in the Reichstag, and maintain, often with marked ability, the views of Saint Simon and Fourier. But it must be admitted that Christians, particularly Catholic Christians, instinctively steer clear of them. And here let us remark, incidentally, as an item of information, that it is a mistake to suppose that the *Commune* which came to deserved grief at Paris, in 1871, had anything whatever to do with the doctrine of Socialism or Communism, a mistake which we correct, first, because it is so common, and second, because it is only just to give "even the devil his due." The misapprehension arises from the fact that the then combatants and murderers of the Archbishop and hostages, fought under the name of the *Commune*, *i. e.*, the corporate, municipal independence of the city. Of the seventy, then comprising the so-called government, but seven were communists in the sense of desiring either community of goods or abolition of private property. The Socialistic theory, while meeting more favor here than the Internationale, is, after all, largely confined to natives of the European continent now domiciled here, commanding little attention from the American and Saxon, and none at all from the Celtic element of our people.

Fain would we be able to say as much of Fenianism. Unfortunately, this is just the phase of folly and criminality combined which knaves have found successful in duping Irishmen and Irishwomen out of their hard-earned money; since, so far as can be made out, the Fenian leaders (Heaven save the mark!) never had any other aim than that of living lavishly and amassing money at the expense of their silly victims. Contemptible as is the "theme of petty roguery and vanity on the one side, and of silly enthusiasm on the other," perhaps it may be well to give a short sketch of this same Fenianism, as being in itself the best *reductio ad absurdum* of the modern, secret, oath-bound, political conspiracy. We call it conspiracy, but it was, in reality, a mere pretence at conspiracy; and the genuine article is respectable compared with "the absurd raids into Canada, the shillelah-fights in the vicinity of Irish police stations, and the sporadic assassinations, which constitute the whole

external history of Fenianism." Its inner history is simply that of the average life insurance company or savings bank. It was a ring, in which exceedingly cheap Tweeds stole the cash—an army in which every officer who was not a dupe deserved a much more uncomplimentary name, and where no officer rated lower than a colonel.

Now the heartless oppression and cruelties inflicted for centuries by the English government upon the Catholics of Ireland, have driven into the very marrow of the Catholics of that country an undying hatred of England and a readiness, at any time, to sacrifice life and property for the purpose of driving the English from their fair land. Well knowing the strength of this feeling, bold scoundrels as well as small knaves, mistaken friends of Ireland as well as secret enemies, have again and again taken advantage of it, the former two classes to gain for themselves power or money, while the ill-balanced and worse-advised friends have been easily seduced into insurrection, apparently assisted as they were by the secret enemies, who foresaw that the abortive rebellion would but have the effect of riveting more closely the Saxon chains on an already bleeding and prostrate country. In every case the Irish people have suffered bitterly for attempted and simulated insurrection. Thus, the Society of United Irishmen, composed of Catholics and men of all sects but the Anglican, though intended for good, was the cause of exceeding misery. At the time of the formation of that association, Irish Catholics were in a far better condition than they had been for many centuries. Scarcely was the society in existence, when the British government literally permeated it with spies and informers—a race of which Ireland has been unfortunately far too prolific, for a reason very conclusively assigned by a writer in the January number of this REVIEW over the signature M. F. S. Indeed, we have now indisputable proofs that many who held posts of honor and trust among the United Irishmen, were in the pay of the Castle at Dublin, and Daniel O'Connell has clearly shown that the then Secretary, Lord Castlereagh, clandestinely urged on the organization to the outbreak of 1798, knowing full well that the best argument in favor of the nefarious Act of Union, then in contemplation, and effected in 1800, would be this revolutionary attempt conjoined with its foreseen failure. The *émeute* of the noble, brave, but misguided, Emmet, in 1803, was only less disastrous because formed on a smaller scale.

That clear-sighted statesman, O'Connell, who seems to have been the first, as he certainly was the last man able to unite the Irish politically for their own good, was consistently, constantly, and utterly opposed to every secret scheme, plan, or society, for ameliorating the condition of the Catholic population. Yet we see

how thoroughly he succeeded, by open agitation, in finally securing Catholic Emancipation, while he, himself, always stated that his greatest obstacles during the contest for that noble end came from the incendiarisms, the robberies, and murders, perpetrated by the Ribbonmen and other secret organizations, crimes which served at least as a pretence to make the English feign a belief that the Catholics were unfit for emancipation.

Soon afterward, and while O'Connell was laboring to band together, in the face of day, Irishmen of all classes and creeds for the purpose of demanding a repeal of the fraudulent and meretricious "Union," there sprang up, of course, the invariable political curse of the Irishman, disunion in the camp. Up started suddenly a party known as "Young Irelanders," who openly opposed the Liberator, and demanded to be at once led to the fray, claiming to have hundreds of thousands enrolled under their secret bywords. They affirmed themselves affiliated with all the other underground societies of Ireland—asserted that when they gave the signal all the others would rise like magic, muster, march, fight, and lead Ireland to victory and freedom. The leading Young Irelanders were buncombe speakers of the most pronounced type, and as sensational newspaper writers or romancers they could hardly be excelled this side of that pit where dwells the archprogenitor of mendacity. They filled the newspapers with praises of their own valor, military skill, and preparedness for the campaign. To such an extent had they occupied the press that when a canard reached New York about a victorious battle at Slievnaman (afterwards called Slievgammon), even staid clergymen in New York attended a public meeting promptly convened to raise funds, subscribed with the rest of the overheated patriots, and one of them offered five hundred dollars to buy shields for the warriors.

The next European intelligence, however, brought word that the vaunted victory existed only at the end of the lying pen of a reporter, and that the grand rebellion of the Young Irelanders had been brought to an ignominious though not a premature end, by two constables, who captured the prominent commanding generals in a cabbage-garden near Ballingarry.

The nucleus of Fenianism was an obscure local club somewhere in the south of Ireland, known as the "*Phœnix*," and it owes whatever of rapid growth it had to the strong feeling of antagonism excited in the minds of prominent men of our own country, by the very exceptionable and unfriendly course pursued, both by the English people and by the British Government, in the matter of the Trent, the Alabama, and, in general, wherever there was a chance to betray dislike toward the Government of the United States, during our late war. Irishmen (and our armies teemed with them) were

very quick to perceive this state of feeling. Officers high in the army and in the civil departments, promptly determined to avail themselves of Irish hatred to England—a factor that always exists—both to recruit the army and to raise throughout the country a strong anti-English sentiment. It was hinted by prominent friends of the administration, that, at the close of the war, our Government would have to square accounts with England—that the friends of Ireland might count on liberal aid toward securing her freedom—that guns, ammunition, and ships of war no longer in use could readily be procured. Now Irishmen are somewhat mercurial, and those of them who have no particular responsibilities, are not given to scrutinizing very closely the grounds for such hints and promises. Consequently, reports of the good will of the Government were widely circulated and credulously swallowed. Then began the Fenian collections, the issue of sham bonds, and it is currently believed that within two years over $5,000,000 were garnered or squandered. Emissaries were sent to Ireland. A model Irish Republic was set up in New York city, a pseudo-government, with President, Senate, and House of Representatives, was installed and held regular sessions. The Treasury Department, at least, worked thoroughly, until the invariable Irish plague of disunion burst out, and lo! there were two model Irish Republics, before either had a rood of land to govern. But "they were as like as peas to peas," and there were knaves at the head of each. Houses at large rents (one of them a brown-stone front at $12,000 per annum) were occupied and served as splendid club-houses for the officials of the new Republics.

Then, the very disreputable scandal connected with the disruption made it necessary to do something in order to keep the subscriptions in flow; and so, it was bruited abroad that an expedition had been sent out. In point of fact, a small fore and aft schooner did wander for some time off the coast of Maine. She was supposed to have some Fenians and some howitzers on board; but where she proposed to land, or what it was intended to do after she got there, has always been of the haziest. Most of all does it seem to have been cloudy to the officers (of whom she, of course, carried a redundancy), unless indeed the intention, from the outset, was to be taken. If this was the plan, it was faithfully carried out, for the vessel was taken without a shot by United States authorities.

Some time elapsed. The spirit that dictated our own "on to Richmond" cry began to ferment, expressing itself to the effect that something must be done, if supplies were expected to continue. A land expedition was set on foot against Canada, and actually crossed into the Dominion not far from the Falls of Ni-

agara. A few murders, a couple of days' robbery, an arrant failure, and a flight for dear life were the only results.

However disheartening all this, it did not extinguish either the patriotism or the credulity of the Irish. After a considerable lapse of time, another land expedition left New York city, reached the Vermont frontier near St. Albans, and the poor dupes crossed the border. But their general and his staff prudently swaggered about from hotel to hotel in that town, till conveniently or obligingly taken away by the United States authorities. The army (?) lived on alms for a few days, till arrangements were made by our Government for their transportation back to New York. And this was the end of that famous army, without army-chest, commissariat, means of transport, or anything else that an army needs, except officers; with which article it was (like another army of modern times) exuberantly supplied. Thus disappeared that invading host which had been for months announced with great flourish of newspaper trumpets as about to take Canada, by way of episode while on the march for Ireland.

Yet after all this, officers and agents of this transparent sham continued to live for years on the subscriptions of their gulled dupes; and when the game of Fenianism had been thoroughly played out, when the almost exhaustless wells of Irish kindliness and generosity ceased to flow at the call of the Fenians, a new name has been selected, and appeals are now made by an unblushing "leader" in behalf of what he calls the "Skirmishing Fund," which is but another dodge of these *professional Irish patriots*, men so long accustomed to fatten on the credulity of their countrymen, that the duty of earning an honest livelihood has long ceased to present itself to their minds, and their consciences are seared as with a hot iron. Their newest prospectus gives us no more accurate information as to their plans (if plans there be, beyond getting money), than that *agents are to be constantly on the alert to annoy England and give her no rest.* Some scoundrel in New York pockets the cash, and there is no doubt but that considerable means are still extracted from foolish Irishmen and credulous servant girls. The business pays or it would not be pursued. But as to Fenianism in general, it may be said that "the rascals have at last been found out by the dupes;" and the only Fenians that now remain are the aspirants for green clothes and cheap colonelcies, who will never hurt either England or anybody else, save such as may intrust them with money. It needs not to be said that the principle above laid down by the Church (even without express prohibition by name) should have sufficed to keep Catholics out of the society. But there are many very ignorant Catholics, and many who will not give up that name, even when they have long abandoned

all that makes the name valuable. So that even when Fenianism was formally condemed by the late Pontiff Pius IX., many wrong-headed people, still claiming to be Catholics, became members or contributed to swell its funds. It really never did and probably never was intended, by the ringleaders, to do anything but batten on the petty cash beguiled from the often ignorant and almost always kindly Irish people.

A review article on secret societies, however necessarily cursory, would be utterly incomplete, more especially in this country, did it pass by in silence a certain organization which has of late years loomed into most discreditable prominence, by its connection, or at any rate the juxtaposition of its name, with the murders and assassinations which had rendered the coal regions of Pennsylvania a very pandemonium. We refer to the "Ancient Order of Hibernians," better known to the general public under the name of the "Mollie Maguires;" but in excessively bad odor with reputable people, under any guise it may adopt. It is the more necessary to say something on this subject, because, in the case of this society, the strange anomaly has frequently been presented, that in the one of two adjoining dioceses, a member of this institution was refused absolution unless he would promise to sever his connection with the Order; while in the other, and but a few miles off, lodges of A. O. H. went in procession to the church, with full regalia, banners, and music. There is no use in blinking the facts. They exist patent for all to see, and are known of all men. Protestants have been scandalized, and many Catholics have been shamed by their inability to account for the discrepancy. It existed and should not have existed. We shall first explain very briefly what is known of the thing itself.

This A. O. H. would seem to be in essence *Fenianism*, without the salient external extravagances of the latter. But, instead of the ridiculous toggery of Fenianism and its dagger of lath, the A. O. H. seems to carry rifle, revolver, and bowie-knife. Great pains have been taken to wash the association clear of connection with the Mollie Maguires; but, the common sense of the community, to say nothing of the actual knowledge of those who followed the testimony given during the late trials in the coal regions, must indignantly spurn the attempt as not only an utter failure, but as a supererogatory work of unblushing impudence.

Its rulers are a little clique who meet in England, Ireland, and Scotland (alternately in each) to decide in secret what is to be done, and to determine the quarterly password, which in their *argot* they call "goods." Said "goods" are sent quarterly by an agent to New York. He delivers the "goods" to the member accredited for the purpose, collects the funds due from all subordinate lodges

in this country, and conveys them "home," nominally to swell the amounts hereafter to be used in overthrowing the English Government!!! All this came out quite clearly during the trials of the murderous Mollie Maguires; and also that there are quite a number of such lodges all over the United States. It did, to be sure, come out with equal clearness, on the same trials, *that the vast majority of the members really know nothing about the organization, but think that in joining they are merely contributing money for the liberation of Ireland,* which to the average Irishman (if he believes the tale) is quite enough. So far as the writer has been able to discover, oaths are not a condition of admission for the ordinary contributing members, and are only exacted of the members of a "ring within a ring," such as was that in the coal regions. Hence it is, that clergymen have often been deceived in regard to the nature of the Order; since they are assured with great and evident sincerity, that there are neither secret oaths nor oaths of secrecy required for membership. The men who take and those who administer the oaths never come near a priest themselves; but they know fully the value of a money-contributing element, which is largely found among those who would not join the society were there any oaths of secrecy required; and the leaders purposely keep these poor fellows in the dark as to their aims and doings.

But, we do not wish to be understood as putting in a plea for the extension of a fool's pardon to clergymen. There never was any ground for mistaking the nature of the Order, or any reason to suppose for a moment that it was exempted from the general Papal condemnation of all and sundry its *confrères*, the secret, oath-bound societies of the world. If less were possible there would be still less now, since the judicial trials of its murderous members in Pennsylvania. The truth is that individual clergymen have shown themselves quite too willing to be deceived or to pretend that they were so. They were about to have a church dedication, and an invitation to the A. O. H. was sure to bring the lodge, with banners flying, and a dollar per man toward the payment of the church debt. A church fair was about to take place, and some article—an Irish flag, or what not—is put up to be voted for. The members of the A. O. H., pleased with the quasi recognition, were offered books, which they filled liberally; and thus the temporary and temporal interests of a congregation were allowed to override the prohibition of the vicar of God!

It may very reasonably be asked, why are Irishmen so ready to join these societies, condemned as they are by the Church which they profess to love so much? To this the answer is fourfold. 1. A great many clergymen take more pains in getting up stylish sermons, than they do in explaining practical points of dogma and

morals. Many again explain the catechism with great care, who never mention, nay, perhaps do not know the existence of any of the recent decisions of Rome, some of which touch the individual Catholic quite as closely as any point of morals or practice in the catechism. 2. An Irishman who, to gain favor with his employer, or from a notion of "fashion," or simply because he has become wealthy, has abandoned the Church of his fathers, is usually of all human beings the most hard-headed, hard-hearted, the most disagreeable, and the least amenable to reason. Such he remains until the coming of that final day when, penitent and broken, with death staring him in the face, he becomes once more humanized in the presence of the priest of God. It is of this class, while still hardened against the Church, that the officers, those who know the secrets of Mollie Maguirism and the rest of the *isms* and clandestine institutions, are made. 3. The Irish, in general, have deeply implanted in them and dating from those times when there existed neither law nor justice for Catholics, a hereditary feeling prompting them to wild, lawless revenge. It is a legacy left them by the massacre of Drogheda, the broken treaty of Limerick, the confiscated lands of their ancestors, and the Penal laws. It is not Christian; but it is human nature, and human nature is not yet a perfect institution. It is only God Himself that can freely and fully forgive. 4. All of the Secret Orders that stand any show to catch the Irish, invariably put forth the deceptive cry of a spurious patriotism, by which the Irishman is peculiarly liable to be caught, on account of the bitter wrongs, sorrows, and hardships that he and his have endured in behalf of their country. He cannot yet be made to see that patriotism, so called, is but a pagan virtue at best, and is always the watchword by which tyrants and knaves have caused dupes to rally to their standards. The Irishman is not alone in being fooled by this pretentious sham, yclept *patriotism.*

Your plausible, smirking, smiling man, who says "I'll see you to-morrow," and puts off everything—whom you cannot bring readily to the definite point of a *Yes* or a *No*, is not one with whom it is possible to do much or successful business. So in matters of right or wrong, the wishy-washy style that says nothing compactly and distinctly, will not answer any purpose. "This is right and must be done," is distinct and intelligible. Equally so is "That is wrong and must not be done under pain of sin." Anything that shuffles between these is nonsense, or worse. The people ask for bread and a stone is given them. In the matter at issue what the people want to know and what they should have compactly set forth to them is, on what clear and intelligible principle they shall be enabled to judge what they may do as Catholics, and what they must leave undone. In our country, Catholics like other people

live in communities, where interest, curiosity, urgency, and example all tempt them strongly to enter some of the various "*brotherhoods.*" To such an extent has this pest permeated the country that there is not a trade or business but has its Union—not a profession without its municipal, county, and state association—there are political rings in every city and State; while perhaps the most corrupt of all has its seat at Washington. The very bootblacks of our streets are banded together, and woe betide the poor boy not in the ring, who shall attempt to earn a surreptitious dime without having paid footing to some Head Centre or other! The educated, and those who have time and leisure, can readily find out what is the right and what the wrong in the matter; and if they go wrong they do so with their eyes open, knowing the consequences. Almighty God left to man his free-will; and if those who know the right, choose to sin against light, our skirts are clear and our consciences free from responsibility. But all, whether rich or poor, educated or ignorant, with leisure or without, have a right to know from the priests of the Church what is wrong and what is right. It is a portion of our solemn du'y to tell them this, wherever and whenever, in any new phase, faith or morals are endangered, and in the matter before us, as in all others, this explication should be, not *per ambages*, but in direct manly words, such as become God's priest and the sacred trust committed to him.

Theoretically there is no wrong whatever in a simple combination of workmen for the purpose of preventing an undue lowering of the price of their labor, or for the purpose of gathering funds to support their fellow-workmen, should a "*strike*" become necessary. The wrong begins the moment such associations attempt by intimidation or actual violence to prevent other workmen from accepting what wages they please. *Rattening* is wholly wrong and unjustifiable; *Picketing* is just as fair and honorable as would be the insertion of an advertisement in the morning paper, or the placarding of a handbill to the same effect. If a number of fanatics choose to make a set—let us say against the hotel or restaurant-keepers,—the latter not only have the right to combine for their own protection, but the law of self-defence requires them to do so. When railroad officials combine to keep up or to raise rates of transportation, shippers and forwarders will soon band together against them; but the tendency of all such combinations always is *in pejus ruere*, and those who commenced with a good enough object soon superadd others, get charters, administer oaths, and become, *e.g.*, "Grangers." In fact, while (if in any) certainly in a country like ours, there ought to be no necessity for such extrajudicial oaths and combinations to carry out economic reforms, and while we are unable to see any valid cause for them, deeming it much better, in

every case, to let public opinion and its concomitant law work out the problem, still there is absolutely no harm in the combination of two, ten, or two hundred men, who mutually agree not to sell a given article in which they traffic for less than a given price. Of course, in that case, there is just as little wrong in the agreement of any number *not* to give that price. Equally can there be no harm in merely beneficial societies; but those that are simply such need no such oaths nor any envelopment of mystery, any more than does an ordinary business partnership. It is, however, always fair and reasonable, as well as accordant with experience, to suspect that such of them as present an appearance of mystery, and especially such as exact an oath of secrecy, contain or may involve something more than appears on the surface. In that case the Catholic may rest assured that the wire-pullers either have already in operation, or intend soon to set in vogue, some scheme of their own; and it is sure to be one in which the conscientious Catholic cannot safely join. Nothing is truer than that truth seeks the light, and that craft and falsehood shun it. "A burnt bairn dreads the fire;" and Catholics, of whom many have been trapped by these institutions, should dread being singed.

We had before commencing this article requested a very learned priest and theologian of the Society of Jesus, to put together on paper a summary of the doctrine, special decisions, and discipline of the Church on this subject. Though the response came when the article was almost completed, and too late to be incorporated into the body of this dissertation, yet the paper is so succinct and concise, covering the whole ground so thoroughly, and withal so intelligibly, that it is deemed proper to insert it here in that Father's words as an appendix or complement. It will be difficult to find in any one book the doctrine of the Church *circa Societates Secretas* so immediately and fully brought under the eyes and home to the mind; and we strongly recommend its perusal to the clergy of these States.

Supplementum ad Notata.

1°. Per *Sectas* in Pontificiis Constitutionibus intelliguntur eæ omnes, quæ adversus Ecclesiam vel Gubernium sibi aliquid proponunt. (S. U. Inqu., 5 Aug. 1846.) Itaque quæcumque, sive contra Ecclesiam tantum, sive tantum contra legitimas potestates aliquid moliuntur, *sectæ* sunt. Secta *Massonica* et *Carbonaria* dividuntur in multas alias clandestinas et manifestas sectas diversis nominibus nuncupatas, et omnes tendunt ad eundem scopum, id est contra Ecclesiam Catholicam et civiles legitimas potestates; ideo comprehenduntur sub hac excommunicatione secta *Fenianorum* ut declaravit S. Congr. U. Inquisitionis, 12 Jan-

uarii, 1870, secta *Mazziniana, Societas emancipatrix ab Ecclesia Romana Catholica, Societates Biblicæ, Clerico liberales*, et aliæ hujusmodi.

2°. Contra Ecclesiam aliquid moliri est quidvis struere, docere, suadere, quod ab ejus doctrina, disciplina, regiminis forma alienum est. Nec refert, 1° quo nomine vocentur sive collegia, sive conventicula, coetus, etc. (Clem. XII. c, *In Eminenti*, 28 Apr. 1738, § 2): nec, 2° quo modo machinentur palam ne an secreto (Pius IX. Alloc. *Multiplices inter*, 25 Sept. 1865): immo hodie cum ampliusnon sint occultæ, nihil interest utrum *exigant vel non exigant a suis asseclis juramentum de secreto servando* (S. U. Inqu, 5 Aug. 1846): nec demum 3°, utrum Principes, Reges, etc., eas tolerent, foveant; quia hoc non mutat earum naturam.

3°. Hic articulus tres comprehendit veluti personarum classes, nempe: 1°, qui sectis nomen dant: 2°, qui qualemcumque eis favorem præstant, quæ verba patent latissime juxta citatam Constitutionem Clem. XII., § 5, id est qui eis præbent *consilium, auxilium palam aut in occulto, directe vel indirecte, per se vel per alios;* qui eas in suis ædibus receptant, occultant, seu *commoditatem faciunt ut alicubi convocentur;* qui alios hortantur, suadent ut hujusmodi societatibus *adscribantur, adnumerentur, seu intersint, vel ipsas quomodolibet juvent ac foveant:* 3°, qui non denuntiant coryphæos earum ac duces.

4°. Denunciatio facienda est Inquisitori vel Ordinario, et in Missionibus Vicario vel Præfecto Apostolico (S. Poenit, 10 Febr. 1871), intra 30 dies a die scientiæ hujus obligationis, vel si aliquod obstiterit impedimentum, et hoc sublato, sub pœna excommunicationis latæ sententiæ de quâ hic facienda est. Ita S. U. Inqu., *loc cit.*

5°. Non ideo cessat obligatio denuntiandi, quod eorum nomina per libros et ephemerides passim legantur; quia ut melius cognoscantur evulgari debent quantum fieri potest. (S. U. Inqu., 1 Febr. 1871). Item nihil interest utrum denuncianda ipse audierit, viderit, an acceperit ab aliis (S. U. Inqu., *loc. cit.*) fide dignis (S. Alph. I., IV., 254); vel utrum hæc probare queat (ex prop. 5ª damn. ab Alex. VII.); vel jam alius denuntiaverit (Ferr.). Nec excusat regulariter incommodum grave (intellige si non sit revera grave tam pro se, quam pro suis parentibus), nec quod sciverit denuncianda sub secreto commisso (S. Alph. l. IV., 248, 49, 50).

6°. Verum cessat obligatio denuntiandi, 1°, quamdiu quis eam per se facere nequit (Ferr. n. 54): vel 2°, quin seipsum prodat (Fel. Potest. n. 248): vel 3° si nulla omnino sit spes punitionis, id est quando certo scitur, vel probabiliter creditur, nullum remedium adhibendum fore a Prælato, facta denunciatione; nullus enim obligatur ad opus inutile. Ita Bonac., tom. 1, de Denunciat. punc. 1, § 4, n. 3.

Q. An ille, qui culpabiliter denuntiare neglexerit, atque proinde excommunicationem Romano Pontifici simpliciter reservatam incurrit, absolvi passit a quovis Confessario, postquam, licet excommunicatione incursa, oneri denuntiandi tandem satisfecerit?

R. Affirmative: quia excommunicatio reservata durat *donec denuntiaverit* juxta verba Articuli: ergo facta denuntiatione, ipso facto cessat reservatio excommunicationis incursæ.

7°. Quamvis von sit obligatio denuntiandi sub hac excommunicatione complices seu simplices sectarios; attamen adest præceptum eos denuntiandi. Leo enim XII., epist. *quo graviora mala*, ait: *Nec absolutionem deinceps impetrare poterit, nisi denuntiatis antea complicibus, vel saltem juramento emisso de iis quamprimum denuntiandis.*

Q. Utrum nomen dantes sectis incurrant hanc excommunicationem, si ignorent societates hujusmodi aliquid revera moliri contra Ecclesiam, vel legitimas potestates?

R. Negative, si ignorent quod illa societas sit ab Ecclesia prohibita sub censura; quia absque cognitione hujusmodi non adest contumacia. Attamen peccant si clam et cum juramento hoc faciant propter periculum patrandi malum. Nostris temporibus facillime potest dari casus in permultis societatibus, quæ sub variis honestis nominibus, puta *di mutuo soccorso, di scienziati*, etc., efformantur. Quare cœtus operariorum ob suas utilitates coeuntium licitos esse per se, sed propter arcanum res periculo plena est.

Q. An habendi sunt ut vetiti cœtus illi, qui profitentur se nihil moliri contra Religionem vel civilem Rempublicam, et nihilominus occultum ineunt fœdus juramento firmatum?

R. Affirmative. Constat ex declaratione S. Pœnit, die 21 Aug. 1850. Interrogata enim S. Congr. respondit: *Cœtus illos in Bullis Pontificiis comprehendi.*

8°. Proscripta est a Pio IX. sequens propositio: *Constitutiones Apostolicæ, quibus damnantur clandestinæ societates sive in eis exigatur, sive non exigatur juramentum de secreto servando, earumque asseclæ, et fautores anathemate mulctantur, nullam vim habent in illis orbis regionibus, ubi ejusmodi aggregationes tolerantur a civili Gubernio.* Encycl. *Quanta Cura*, die 8 Dec. 1864.

SPIRITUALISM *versus* MATERIALISM.

THE REAL STATE OF THE QUESTION.

Principles of Mental Physiology, with their application to the training and discipline of the mind, and the study of its morbid conditions. By William B. Carpenter, M.D., LL.D., F.R.S., F.L S., F.G.S. Register of the University of London, Corresponding Member of the Institute of France, and of the American Philosophical Society, etc., etc. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1877.

IF distinguished honors, and a long array of scholarly titles, could guarantee to their possessor a real eminence in true philosophy proportionate to the estimate in which such honors and titles are commonly held, we ought to have in Dr. Carpenter's work one of the most valuable contributions to the literature of this century. He is a man of more than European reputation, of wonderfully varied culture, untiring industry, large experience, deep reflection; and the carefully prepared results of his intellectual labors are entitled to the respectful consideration of all his readers. His long microscopical, anatomical, and physiological researches have culminated in a work of a different character, wherein conjecture largely displaces demonstration; and assumptions are freely set forth with all the gravity that becomes a statement of acknowledged primitive facts. Would that these physical researches had been supplemented by as adequate a metaphysical one, and we had not been pained at the sight of great and ineffectual struggles to cross unaided the ocean that separates the material from the immaterial, physiological from psychological science. With the eye of flesh the spiritual, the intellectual, cannot be traced; and materialistic thought is not competent for the understanding of all that we discern in human nature, even of some principal phases with which we are most familiar. Of this fact Dr. Carpenter seems to be at times most conscious, but his possession of little very precise thought other than physical disables him from properly grasping his new subject of *mind*. He commences the investigation of this from his own best-known standpoint, physiology, and does not seem to know why it does not fully command the field. Certain facts of organic science are collated, and a dissection of the human mind is attempted with the aim of fitting its parts to these facts. This is both a vain effort and a logical mistake. The subordinating of mental to physical science violates the logical rules of evidence by a false supposition, which is an assumption that physical laws are the laws, and the only laws, of psychology; they, in

their government of common matter, being well known, whilst in their government of mind, an obscure matter, they are less known. This error is radical, for the psychological facts of our internal experience, being entirely removed from the sphere of sensation, and manifested solely by conscious sensibility, are quite as apparent and as indubitably evidenced as any of our known physical facts. Indeed they are better evidenced, for the facts of consciousness are never mediate, unreal, or mistakable, and are so rigidly primitive that they cannot be made subject to any other evidence whatever, whether of our senses, our memory, or of our reason. *A fortiori* they cannot be subject to our inductions.

These truths are apparent to Dr. Carpenter himself, for he refers (page 11) to "the direct testimony of our own consciousness, which is to us the most certain of realities." The reason for this highest degree of certainty is, however, not fully stated, and is probably not possessed, is certainly not possessed, for it would be well if the fact were remembered throughout the work. Dr. Carpenter has paused just before going too far, and is arrested in his materialistic path by a conscious revelation of things whose existence is most clear from this other point of view. The stand is changed from the physiological to the psychological, from the organic to the conscious, and is most logically done; but the author does not indicate his own logic. It is the more easy to abandon it without comment. In the "Preface to the fourth edition" he contradistinguishes two activities, the *automatic* and the *purposive*, and upon the testimony of his infallible consciousness he announces the existence of a principle that, not being automatic, is purposive, and by which the direction of human activity is modified. The *direction* of human activity is here specified as being within the will, not the activity itself; and this is to accord with the false theory of unconscious cerebration, to be later referred to. *Purposive* intervention is the influx of intelligent free will, whilst *automatism*, applied to the mental man, would mean that the acts of his intelligence and will are only cerebral perfectings of impressions made more or less remotely upon his exterior, cosmical perfectings by cosmical forces of cosmical impressions. The author's reasonings here are orthodox and conclusive. He dwells upon the ideas that are symbolized by such expressions as *choice*, *self-direction*, *purpose*, *effort*, *self-control*, *necessity*, *freedom*, *right*, *wrong*, *duty*, *ought*, *avoid*, *responsibility*, etc., which are universal amongst men, and which are the expressions of invariable experience as well as universal conviction that mankind are intelligent, free, and subject to moral law. He concludes the preface most rationally with the observation that he cannot anticipate the time when these expressions will cease to have the meaning we at present attach to them, and when we shall

treat each other as mere automata, who cannot do anything but what is done, nor help doing anything and everything that we do. He might have added that this conviction is shared by the very men against whom he argues, which fact is proved by their strictly conforming their calculations and their conduct to it, in every detail. Their common thought is productive of rational results. It is when they strive the hardest that they accomplish the least, for they get more and more astray at every effort; and it is when they think the most intensely that they show all men to possess common sense except philosophers.

To feel the value of conscious testimony is not, however, to know the nature of it, and a want of this knowledge bewilders every man who deeply thinks without possessing it. Dr. Carpenter's train of thought has never led him to this knowledge, hence the forced efforts to explain his subject that are not entirely devoid of contradiction. Had he met with, and pondered well, that revelation of sound philosophy which manifests consciousness as a spiritual sensibility, he would in time have come to so recognize it, and would have perceived that a sensibility which feels *directly*, without instrumental means, is strictly primitive and has no room for error, since subject and object are in immediate contact. Without this revelation, and regarding consciousness as some kind of a physical mystery of an unknown nature, he holds, nevertheless, regardless of logic, that conscious testimony must be held, *as it seems to him*, of higher account than rational deductions; that it constitutes a "base of verification" to which all our logical triangulations are to be worked back; and that no fact of consciousness can be disproved save by the contradiction afforded by some other primary cognition of *superior validity*. Here is a true statement dressed up in scientific confusion, and without a reason given to support it. There is always found amongst physical psychologists a general indistinctness of perception regarding the human faculties, an absence of scientific definitions, and Dr. Carpenter is not an exception to the rule. There is less of these, however, with him than with any other thinker of his class, for his acumen and intelligence are of a rare order, his reachings after truth sometimes far and admirable, and the narrow field of his co-workers in the same line is quite insufficient to contain him. It is not seldom that he breaks vigorously through the hedge of materialistic conceptions that confines it; and then, when he grapples as it were alone with new mysteries that face him, it is sad to reflect that his metaphysical training has not been had in the proper school.

The confusion that attends the conception of consciousness extends also to those of *idea* and *intellect*, these terms being constantly misused. The latter seems to be regarded as an exercising

of that function only which we know to be its highest, *reasoning*, without descending below this. *Idea* and *judgment* are in other spheres. But a true conception of *idea* occasionally scintillates so pure and bright that we long to see it fixed, yet it disappears like a meteor in the darkness. There seems to be an irresistible tendency to fall back into a most obscure and strained explanation, and if there is difficulty in following the author through this it must be confessed that the blame is his. No one then need deem himself dull if he fails to be persuaded, or to clearly understand all of chapter sixth, for the precise meaning, if always attained, must be most laboriously delved out. *Idea*, instead of being described as an intellectual abstraction or a synthesis of abstractions, is termed a thing which, standing apart from an *immediate* experience, appears as the product of a process that is the climax of a reaction between the exterior and the Ego, and whose lower stages are *sensation* and *perception*. This process, or *ideation*, is an activity of which we seem to be justified in considering the cerebrum the organ; and the operations of this (activity), which were at first prompted by changes in the sensorium, come at length to be independent of such changes, and *survive* by virtue of a singular power of recording ideational changes. The tablet on which the record is made, and the perceiver of it, are not deemed worthy of mention, or are not thought of. Perhaps the author supposes the Ego. In confirmation it is distinctly stated that an idea is not a transformed sensation, this being antecedent, that consequent, and that there is a sensational stimulus which, acting on the cerebrum, excites the changes which give rise to the "ideational form of consciousness." Whatever of physical truth may be embraced in any parts of this statement no one can determine, and all is the purest conjecture. Such assumptions can be made only gratuitously, and on no other ground than as fitting into a psychological theory equally conjectured. There is, moreover, much metaphysical error and confusion. It would seem to be the production of associated imaginings and their repetitions to which such language could better apply, although not with accuracy. The imagination and the intellect seem both to be regarded as organic faculties, and their products somewhat confused. Herein is a fundamental error in the author's metaphysics, as the intellect is not understood to be a purely immaterial potency as to all its functions. Indeed it seems to be the will only, with its moral belongings, all of which seem to be properly appreciated, that has saved Dr. Carpenter from materialism; for his theories concerning consciousness and intellectuation are too vague, unsatisfactory, and false to aid him in the least.

In chapter first the two opposite doctrines of materialism and

spiritualism are set forth, the former of which is well stated and fairly combated; and even Cardinal Manning is quoted somewhat at length as being in accord with the author regarding some fundamental views. The spiritualistic doctrine is, however, badly misstated, and this primary fault, this misconception, may be held accountable for many errors, inaccuracies, and confusions that follow as logically flowing from it. Spiritualism as set forth in paragraph sixth is not tenable, nor is it taught by any profound school of philosophy. We cannot, as it is there stated we do, consider the mind as a separate immaterial entity not dependent upon the body for any condition of its operations otherwise than by the sensible organs as a means of information. The reason is that we require the concurrence of faculties both organic and inorganic to effect our thinking, and it is the complex of both that constitutes the entire human mind. The faculties of external sensibility, imagination, and memory have organs, and their exercise is organic activity; but those of consciousness, will and intellect are purely immaterial, whose subject is the spirit only, not the spirito-corporeal compound. It is the spirit, not the mind, that is a distinct entity, having certain powers of which itself alone is the subject or proprietor, and other faculties which belong to it and the body together as one compound subject. The spirit is not merely connected with the body as its informer, but the two are united as the constitutive elements of one human nature. We hold, however, that when this complex nature is dissolved and its parts separated, each is by its own separate nature capable of separate existence. Any one holding the extreme spiritualistic view set forth by the author would have to stultify himself by confessing the spirits of insane people to be insane spirits. This absurdity is perceived and pointed out on page 8, and the fact of it ought to have suggested to Dr. Carpenter that there must be some other more consistent doctrine taught by the masters of Christian philosophy. This he should have inquired for, in the fulness of earnestness and honesty, before classifying all spiritualists together as holders of the manifestly inconsistent theory that he presents. That he could not be a spiritualist of that order is quite intelligible; and this inability to sincerely profess the only kind of spiritualism known to him, explains the cloudiness that envelops more or less his whole estimate regarding the human mystery. Much of this chapter is clearly thrown away, and if it could be rewritten under true apprehensions, there can be no doubt that the remainder of the work would be vastly modified by the new light cast upon the entire subject. Having to choose between materialism and an untenable alternative, unsatisfied by either, Dr. Carpenter is to be pitied; and it is not to

be wondered at that his conclusions at times tilt against each other, and that there is a want of harmony in his convictions.

The first chapter lays the foundation for the whole superstructure, and its principal error is never entirely out of sight. Amongst others it gives character particularly to chapter eighteenth, on insanity, which is ably written from his standpoint, and gives some results of very accurate analysis. He properly regards insanity as *disease*, which means departure from natural condition; and sanity as absence of disease; stating truly that there may be as many degrees of mental as of bodily departure from normal health. His admission, however, that although the line between the two mental conditions may be practically visible, it cannot be scientifically drawn, is unworthy of a philosopher who has taken such labored pains to explain scientifically his subject, and to give the world at last the true "principles of mental physiology." To fail in this important point is not only a reproach to the holder of the system, but it should remand the system to that vast number of sciences that are incomplete, uncertain, and without value. The dividing line between sanity and insanity is real, for it is between natural mind and mind that is not natural, and there is no reason why science should not define it if the science be accurate and true, that is, fit to be received. To true philosophy the difficulty is not theoretical but practical; the rule is known, but the departures are often too small to be seen until they widen out so far as to reach that degree which is the minimum observable to the particular observer. The author has himself gone very far towards a proper defining, when he says that states of insanity "are all referable either to *excess* or to *deficiency* of normal modes of mental action;" and he progresses further on page 661 with the observation that "the succession of thought becomes incoherent, and the perception of those *relations of ideas* on which all reasoning processes depend being more or less completely obscured." On the next page a completion is nearly reached in the following sentences: "The ordinary links of association appear to be severed:" "There may be no primary disorder of the intellectual faculties, and the insanity may essentially consist in a tendency to disordered emotional excitement which affects the course of thought, and consequently of action, without disturbing the reasoning process in any other way than by supplying wrong materials to them." Here the insane subject is acknowledged to be a rational creature; insanity of mind properly disconnected from the intellectual faculty; the integrity of intellect perceived to be independent of cerebral condition; and the source of error, *wrong materials* for intellectual elaboration, clearly pointed out. There is enough of truth to rightly direct a psychologist in theorizing if he will keep his psychological facts at a proper di-

tance from physical facts, and move on without inducing from one sphere to another, which is, after all, an illogical indulgence in the purest conjecture. All this could not have been thought out at the opening of the subject, or the opening must have been subsequently forgotten, for it is there asserted that the raving madman's reasoning power is utterly gone. It is probable that a keener insight came with more thorough reflection, and this may equally apply to the assertion made on page 667, that in most forms of monomania there is more or less disorder of the ideational process; for this opinion cannot be reconciled with the better one in which he attributes mental disease, not to unsoundness of ideas, but to a severance of the links of their associations. The absence of a direction by the "moral will," that is, intelligent free will, is asserted, and truly asserted, to be a concomitant of marked insanity, but it is not explained which is principal and which is secondary, which cause and which effect. The absence of free will is due to the mental disease, and only follows that degree of disease in which there is not sound practical reasoning, that is, entire logical activity exerted upon proper and regular material with intelligent result. Morality, or freedom, is therefore consequent upon full practical intelligence, and this is why the notably insane are morally irresponsible, and why there are some persons partially responsible who are only partially insane. The degree of responsibility is proportionate to the degree of practical intelligence. A proper separation of the intellectual faculties as spiritual from the imaginative faculty which is organic and associative, would have enlightened this obscure subject and rendered satisfying an article that is not consistent as it stands.

A denial of the distinction just called for is plainly made in the beginning of chapter thirteenth; and it is there assumed as a concluded point that a large part of our intellectual activity, whether it consist in reasoning process or in the exercise of imagination, is essentially automatic and properly describable as the reflex action of the cerebrum. This language, taken in connection with the author's definition (page 260) of the intellect as the *reasoning power*, which definition is immediately undone on the same page, is extremely unsatisfactory, does not contain a proved conclusion drawn from the preceding chapters, and is an unfortunate introduction to such a subject as Unconscious Cerebration, because it is a cool begging of the whole question. A proper recognition of *idea*, *judgment*, and *reasoning* as immaterial products, and all as the products of the immaterial intellect, is the only avoidance of the prevalent error of to-day that so cunningly insinuates itself into the recesses of thinking minds which, not understanding products of spiritual activities to be modifications of the spirit itself, are forced to conceive them as some other kind of vague realities that

subsist alone after they are wrought into existence. If an idea or other intellectual product were something foreign to the spirit, upon which the spirit only looks by means of some kind of a sensible intuition, it would be impossible to regard it as anything but a material entity evolved by material activity, expressed in psychological terms; and the automatic cerebration of it, uninfluenced by will as unfelt in conscious perception, could not be controverted. But this supposition is only a supposition, never a demonstrated fact, and it has no claim to acceptance.

It would seem that there is a clique of scientists determined that the would-be scientific world shall not stagnate, nor even gape long, for a new sensation; that sets a new style now and then in learned phraseology to be adopted by the fashionables. These find it delightful to belong to the modern aristocracy of science, to wear its latest cut, which is to be familiar with language obscure to common men, even if it be not exactly clear to themselves. But it is not safe to leave minds of this class long to their own resources, for they might weary of the sham; hence the novelties, real or apparent, that are introduced from time to time to keep them awake and faithful, and to mark the onward progress of free, unsuperstitious thought. The term "Unconscious Cerebration" is a modernism to conceal old ideas, for there has always been a materialism holding that every thought is something resulting from material change or "cerebration," rather than the activity itself. This theory teaches, but offers no evidence, that even Consciousness is a product and resultant of cerebral change, and that, therefore, since it is the first perception in the scale of knowledge, whatever material movements underlying all mental activity culminate in consciousness, must be themselves unconscious. Hence all the mental changes that we undergo are materially evolved as sudden apparitions, having been elaborated *below the plane of consciousness* during periods of inattention to them. Thus have they established that it is always accomplished results, never mere activities, that are our mental facts. There can be no purer materialism than this, no purer automatism, no purer fatality as to all our thoughts and deeds. The product of cerebration is not described as a *substance;* not, since it issues and stands alone, as an *accident;* a new idea to express the nature of this new *thing* to our apprehension should be furnished by those who pronounce the thing's existence; but they do not furnish it, and it is safe to say that they never will. Here now occurs one of Dr. Carpenter's strangest inconsistencies; for, seemingly oblivious of the sound principle so ably vindicated in his preface, the principle of self-determination, of choice, of freedom of action in man, he yields all the ground that fatalism demands for its firm establishment. There the existence of spiritual morality is upheld upon the indisputable evidence of consciousness;

here the spirit of man is shut out from itself, from its own view, is annihilated, for there is granted no perception of any kind, not even consciousness, that is not the indescribable offspring of some material parturition. It is difficult to account for such inconsistencies unless according to a test that Mr. Tyndall has honestly or incautiously applied to himself, the result of which as thus imparted to us ought, if reflected upon, to undo all the harm that he has done. In the preface to his celebrated Belfast address, speaking of the doctrine of "material atheism," he confesses to having noticed during years of self-observation that it is not in hours of clearness and vigor that it commends itself to his mind, that in the presence of stronger and healthier thought it ever dissolves and disappears, as offering no solution of the mystery in which we dwell and of which we form a part. If, in Mr. Tyndall, the tendency to decline into universal materialism be an illegitimate issue of thought, of thought unwedded to healthiness, why not kindly apply the same test to Dr. Carpenter, by supposing that his oscillations between extremes that are opposite may be indications of his moods of mind; and after him to a great number of other men of doubtful integrity in science? Mr. Tyndall rationally accounts for the vacillations of himself, and doubtless of others, and so remands materialism to its proper place. Bearing this revelation in mind, it is painful to read the learned author's complaint that many metaphysicians, more especially in Britain, regard the doctrine of unconscious cerebration, or automatic thought, as untenable, following which he gives them to understand that it would be wise to reconsider the stand that they have taken. But these men are scholars who see consequences, who are not ready to take the first wrong step that leads to a rejection of morality, religion, and civil order, and who will not assume without evidence what is here demanded, that Consciousness is born of cerebration. They distinguish between an internal perception and its object, as they do between a sensation and its object, and so regard *unconscious mental modification* as contradictory, just as they would regard *insensible aching* as a contradiction. It would be better far for him to give up the gratuitous assumption that is the seed of endless mischief, than be a party to undermining a venerable structure of human faith and hope, and so disabling Christianity, who has proved a fostering mother, civilizing and enlightening mankind, supporting all the members of her family in the inevitable trials of life, easing and consoling their departure from it; and who has furnished her enemies with the very science which they pollute and poison ere they return it perfumed with temptation to her children. Dr. Carpenter would do well to reconsider an advice so rashly, so unfortunately given, and it is to be hoped that in the presence of stronger and healthier thought he will reach this most salutary persuasion.

The positions taken by the author of the work under notice, seeming to favor at one time a belief in the spirituality of man, and at others a contrary belief, according throughout with no settled conviction, suggested the supposition that, as in the self-confessed case of Dr. Tyndall, his falterings and varying views might be attributable to varying moods of mind; but they suggest also the supposition, confirmed by several obvious confusions and unintentional misstatements, that the dividing line between materialism and spiritualism is not distinctly seen. Two troubles are apt to beset every obscure and elaborate research. The first is a want of understanding of all those side facts which are requisite to give a theory support, and show truth to be consistent but with truth; as well as of the principal facts upon which, as a foundation, theory must be laid. The second lies in this, that every deep subject is much covered by extraneous matter apparent to the mind, which is commonly not known to be extraneous, and upon which we fret and tire ourselves in vain endeavors to see clearly. This envelope is generally resolvable either into deceptive appearances, or oftener into mere *relations* which the subject-matter has with other things; all of which must be stripped off before real nakedness can become distinct, and the precise question at issue be stated. With both these troubles Dr. Carpenter has had to contend; he is not familiar with the facts of scientific psychology, and the intercourse of body and spirit is a relation of which he has shown no definite conception.

Two minds may tread together the path of analytic science, side by side, for a long time, and eventually find themselves to have taken diverging courses without having noted the exact point of divergence. One has come to see no reason to doubt that our whole humanity is perishable, and the other has acquired faith that the superior part of our compound being is immortal. This is the final, the most important, the religious aspect of the question, under which the two theories stand out in highest relief; but it is the fruit born of a prior and abstruse investigation whose scope and immediate object were purely and coldly scientific. The issue in hand is not there; it is not religious, although underlying all religion. It is the prior investigation; and in this pursuit we have the scientific materialist and spiritualist plainly stating their difference, one claiming man to be all body and the other contending that he is both body and spirit. Here is an obvious distinction, and it would suffice for a statement of the question if we all fully understood it. But we do not; we must go deeper and learn what *body* means, and what are the nature and functions of *spirit*, according to our best ideas; for without this knowledge the true and precise question is concealed.

Let us set a path along which two minds may journey together,

and observe them on the way. It is the autumn season, and the country is still alive with birds of many kinds. For one day the mild September seems a permanency, and all the happy birds to be here to stay. A few months more roll by, and the land is almost songless. Whole tribes of birds have emigrated to the far South for a genial climate, and only a few remain to brave the rugged winter. Determined apparently by some principle within, each little living thing has governed its movements, and is gone or stays accordingly. The question arises at once to scientific scrutiny: Has each separate determination been a true primary, an entirely new departure of activity; or a continuation of activity, an effect of some preceding cause or series of causes? If it was a true primary the entire action was not *automatic*, and the birds are not true automata according to the scientific meaning of this term. If it was not a true primary it was an effect and the product of efficient causes that had prior existence. Let us grant that some change in the air, the sky, the sun, the light, the vegetation, or the animal itself, has taken place, any of which would be a *cosmical* change, determined by which most birds instinctively took their flight. These changes are so many links in a long chain of physical causes seemingly endless, but really commencing with that one link that touched the hand of Him who made all matter and all potencies that dwell within it; since when cosmical activity has been ceaseless, cosmical effects numerous past conception, by which universal nature has slowly unfolded and become the universe of to-day. A variety of effects have culminated in a specific effect upon each bird, which, blindly impelled by its fears, its feelings, or its appetites, performs its instinctive operations. Here is a pure automatism, inscrutable in its complexity, wonderful in its results, affording beautiful evidence of a high design existing somewhere, and so ordering external and internal nature as to allow the automatic movement to have place.

In the spring these birds return, greeting with joyous songs their ancestral haunts. They pair, they build their nests inimitable by human art, in which they lay their eggs, hatch out their young, feed, wean them, disport awhile, and again depart. In this yet more complex activity is still discerned nothing but obscure cosmical changes, causes and effects, the same chain that we have already seen, whose one first link touches directly one first cause.

The foregoing reflections develop fully an idea, and lead us up to a *genetic* definition of automatism in nature, which we perceive to be determination other than by self. A true self-determination would be free from external causes, and would be above automatism.

Thus far two scientific minds may keep company without difference, and they come to reach that station where humanity is to

be considered. When, however, one looks forward to the end of the investigation, and mutters: "*Automatism still*," and the other exclaims: "*I see something that is above automatism*," it is plain that there is somewhere on the path a point of divergence where they will separate. A momentous question asks: "Where is that point; and what is seen that is above automatism?" The bird has built her nest marvellously well; but she has built it as her progenitors have done before her for countless generations; or, if there have been modifications, these are accidental, not essential, and are traceable to external cosmical variations. There is no improvement as there is no degeneracy. Her race neither advances in enlightenment nor recedes towards barbarism. She follows no *ideal*, has in mind no archetype up to which she works, with sorrow or joy treading upon the heels of failure or success. There is nothing but automatic *instinct* by which the young bird builds her first nest as perfect *of its kind* as any succeeding one, and from this kind to another she cannot pass. She has no semblance of either *science* or *art;* no intellect upon which the existence of these depends. But man has no constructive instinct. He shrinks instinctively from danger, seeks instinctively his pleasure, loves instinctively his child. Nature can safely be relied upon for all these, whether she manifest herself in man or brute; but man can dominate his fear, his appetite for pleasure and his love of offspring, by his free will; subordinate them to his moral duty; and so sublimate himself by heroic self-denial that, in its presence, even the professed fatalist will be borne down by a glow of enthusiastic admiration. The grandeur of free morality asserts itself irresistibly; and the petty theories of fatalism and materialism, like sickly weeds in arid soil, wither beneath the splendor of its noon. Man rears wigwams, huts, houses, palaces, temples, cities; searches out the hidden powers of nature, unveils them, and applies them to gigantic labor too great for hands. He constructs engines, ships, telegraphs to condense the world, and can gird the entire earth with the fiery pulsations of his knowledge. All this is *art*, science, and *civil* art, not instinct; and it grows out of the synthetic power of his *intellect.* He observes the colors and forms of nature, and reproduces them with pencil and brush upon his canvas. He detaches here and there morsels of beauty from nature's repertory, even the expressions of hidden soul, and combines them in pigment or stone to match an *ideal* in his mind, a conceived archetype, producing a new thing of beauty to which no one object in actual existence precisely corresponds. All this is *art, fine* art, not instinct; and all this can his constructive intellect accomplish, wielding his imagination. But he cannot build a bird's nest, nor a honey-comb, for he has not the constructive instinct by which alone they can and *must* be built at the proper time.

The point of divergence is certainly now discernible. One mind has thought out the activity of the human intellect, exquisitely delicate to perception, but most obvious in its accomplished results; and from its operations has reasoned out both its nature and the nature of the subject which exercises it and to which it belongs. It has applied its knowledge of the intellect to that inchoating principle which both unite in calling *volition;* has perceived that this, if not endowed with liberty, is mere inclination translated automatically to its term; and fails to detect in this motion the sign of any potency not material, that might not be intelligibly numbered amongst the inscrutable properties of matter. It has had too often a conscious experience of the freedom of its own human volition to feel the shadow of a doubt, or the "shadow of a shade" of doubt, as to any possible trial between two equal inclinations. It has felt that translation to term is not always easy down-hill movement, but sometimes effort, struggle, and pain, that are inconsistent with automatism, and which it could and would have gladly let go but for a counterbalance of a higher order, an *intellectual inclination*, or motive, that would, during protracted deliberation, hold it in free suspense. Meditating on these plain facts, and contrasting those inclinations that are intellectual with those that arise out of the fixedness of animal nature, it is enabled to dignify its power of free volition with the name of Will. Still progressing, it learns to perceive that the will of man is free only because he is intellectual, and practically deduces with his reason an ample knowledge that his experiences, aided only by his memory, could never impart; which knowledge fills his spirit with motives to restrain his down-hill inclinations, those tendencies which, commencing outside, somewhere in the great Cosmos, enter and pass through his mere animality. Hence appears a necessity for some substantial essence within him that is not matter; possessing, in its faculties of *generalization* and *inception*, potencies that have even no analogy to those of matter; some immaterial proprietor of the will and intellect, out from whom go forth, not propagated but newly begun, all those intellectual volitions, those free intelligences, that distinguish man from all beside; that combine for him his high ideals out of sensible elements; that infuse into him his capacity for art, *fine, civil, and poetic;* and dispense him from the thraldom of inflexible fatality, the cast-iron mould of instinct.

That which was discovered in the distance is a substantial, immaterial, intellectual, prime principle of action, free by reason of its deduced intelligences; which cannot be other than the moral human soul.

The other mind, the skeptical one, either through natural deficiency of metaphysical insight, or deficiency of metaphysical training, has not unfolded to itself the nature of the human intel-

lect; and, failing to distinguish the difference between the brute and human systems of faculties, rests upon its ignorance as evidence, and so asserts that these systems differ, not in kind, only in degree. The wondrous developments of human art, high culminations, by upward movement, of the slow growth of centuries, are contrasted with the lowly broods of mere animal nature that, petrified in immobility, never gain nor lose; and all are pronounced to be effects of like causes that differ but in their measure. The intelligence that can make this comparison, brave the blaze of its disclosure, and still persist, has not so much as a semblance of rational truth on which to lean its dignity. There is not, in the whole domain of human thought, a more insupportable, more shameful, effrontery. For who is ignorant that like causes produce but like effects? And who could be found to say that these effects, these products of human art and brutal instinct, are alike, with no essential difference, only the accident of degree? This other mind has said it, the sad burden of whose muttering is: "Automatism still."

The point of divergence on the path of science was where the consideration of Intellect was reached; and that thing discerned in the distance, which was above automatism, was Free Will, with all that it rationally imports.

The end is not yet, though plainly in sight. It may be urged that intelligent free will in man does not import human spirit distinct from matter; but it does, and a logical continuance of thought will so develop. Matter, in any actually existing thing, is body, an aggregate, a compound. There is no material thing without parts; and no compound can possess intelligence, can think. Any thought, no matter of how many elements made up, is one thought perceived as indivisible by one indivisible perceiver. The subject must be as much a *unity* as the thought itself. That several parts of a subject should separately perceive and possess several parts of a thought in intelligence, is not only an absurdity, but it is contrary to the hypothesis; for this would be several perceptions of several, not one perception of one. *The same could not be present to the same* if there was composition in perceiver and perceived; and without this no one can think. The perceptive principle of the child, and of the old man to whom he has grown, is one principle. It remembers in its age its joys and sorrows, and even childish thoughts, of fourscore years ago; and although every material atom of the child was long ago dissipated in the waste of tissue, this mysterious *unity*, substantial and permanent unity, which was his *self*, has survived unchanged the otherwise universal loss, and is now the old man's self. The substratum must not be confused with the changes that occur upon it; not the identical with the diverse. There has been but one *Ego* for the boy and man, ever conscious of its own identity, notwithstanding the ascent, zenith,

and decline, in long years, of its intelligence, and the many diverse changes that its associated organism has caused it to undergo. All that came and went were but parts of its material co-element and habitation. This substantial thing, being one in reality as well as apprehension, has no parts like all material things or parts of things, and is essentially different from matter both in nature and attribute; for *simplicity* is of its essence, and this is opposed to *composition*, which is of the essence of body.

The subject in which intellect inheres as an attribute, possessing also free will, is a prime principle of action in the strictest rigor of the terms. The principle of brute life, though incapable of originating, must be also simple, and not a body, although derived from the potencies of matter. The failure to reason out this fact is a reproachful shortcoming of materialism, which regards matter in man more ignobly than we regard it in brutes; for we see the necessity, in all living things, of material potencies far surpassing all mechanical and chemical resistances, attractions, and repulsions. Such actuating principles are, however, not *inceptive*, not *universalizing*, not *analytic*, not *synthetic*, not *free;* and these are the distinguishing marks by which we know that which is earthy, that which is akin to matter and is confined, from that which conceives the limitless and is sublime. No matter what the precise nature of this brute principle be, we, in common with materialists, regard it as only *reflective* not *inchoative*, reflecting impressions of cosmical influences in manifestations that, however seemingly high their order, must be regarded as only cosmical; the angle of reflection being just equal to the angle of incidence,—"only this and nothing more." The end has followed the beginning according to fixed law, automatically, instinctively. As for the human principle of action, although intelligently free, in the absence of intellectual *attention* it too reflects only spontaneously the falling influences. When willing its attention, however, it absorbs them quite, after which it gives forth responses differing in kind from the incidences, not in the cosmical order, they being its own special emanations originating in itself.

The state of the question is now reached. Is man in all his acts only a reflector, reflecting but cosmical influences; or is there a part of him, a substantial, incorporeal part, simple, intellectual, and a free prime principle of action? If there is this latter it must be *spirit*, although the definition of spirit is not complete in the description; and a reply to the question is sufficient to settle the issue as between scientific materialism and spiritualism. It must not be supposed that this is the limit of purely natural reason. We are far within it; but enough is said to accomplish the object designed, which was to draw the line sharply between the two opposing theories.

To complete the definition of *spirit* and to amply vindicate it, to demonstrate its incorruptibility and even immortality, to describe fairly its mysterious intercourse with the body, and to set forth a tenable and consistent theory of spirito-corporeal compound that has not been given to his readers by Dr. Carpenter, nor even conceived by himself, are all within the reach of philosophic reason; but to say anything further would be to continue past the goal, and take a new departure into the realm of philosophy not contemplated.

RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES.

THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE HOLY SEE, PARTICULARLY REGARDING RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES HAVING BUT SIMPLE VOWS.

Collectanea, in usum Secretariæ. S. C. Ep. et Reg., cura Card. Bizzarri. Romæ, 1863.

Methodus quæ a S. C. Ep. et Reg. servatur in approbandis novis institutis votorum Simplicium, ab Card. Bizzarri exposita. Romæ, 1863.

Augelus Lucidi. De Visitatione SS. Liminum. Romæ, 1866.

IN writing upon religious communities we are well aware that not a few of our readers may think that we are treating of a subject interesting only to the religious themselves. This would be an erroneous impression. We discuss in the present article more particularly the status of Sisters having but simple vows. Now Sisters of this kind are scattered all over our land, having charge of parochial schools, asylums, hospitals and the like. Hence there are few pastors who are not charged with the spiritual direction of these noble, devoted, and self-sacrificing virgins—the honor of womanhood, and the pride of our holy religion. To these pastors, no less than the religious themselves, and to our readers in general, it is hoped that this article may prove interesting.

The religious state in general, or in a wide sense, may be defined as the state of the faithful aspiring to the perfection of divine charity. The religious state, as complete, or in the strict sense of the term, is defined: The state of the faithful who aspire to the perfection of divine charity, make the vows of perpetual poverty, chastity, and obedience, and lead a community life approved by the

Church. The religious vows are either simple or solemn. Vows are solemn according to the more common opinion, not, for instance, because of any solemnity attending the making of them, but because of the will of the Church. Solemn vows are not essential to the religious state, for the latter is of divine institution, while the solemnity of vows is of ecclesiastical origin. Practically, however, the Church calls and considers as religious proper only those who have solemn vows, while religious communities, male or female, having but simple vows, are called pious and religious societies and congregations.

How are new orders founded? Pope Innocent III. issued a decree forbidding the founding of new orders without permission from the Holy See. According to the common opinion this prohibition applies not only to religious orders with solemn vows, but also to religious congregations having only simple vows, or no vows at all. The law enacted by Innocent III. is still in force all over the world, so far as concerns orders proper. But it seems to be abrogated with regard to religious congregations having but simple vows or no vows. In fact, it is the custom at present to begin these religious congregations with the sole approbation of the Ordinary. Nay, the Holy See, at present, before approving such new congregations or institutes, requires that they shall have existed for some time, and that they shall have been previously approved by the Ordinary.

Moreover, religious communities of women having but simple vows were formerly prohibited, and only such as had solemn vows and papal inclosure were permitted. Gradually, however, the Holy See changed its policy in this respect, and religious communities of nuns or sisters, having simple vows or no vows, came at first to be tolerated, and afterward, namely, from the beginning of the present century, they came to be positively approved. The Holy See at present, therefore, not merely tolerates but approves and encourages these female religious having but simple vows or no vows.

We come now to the erection of monasteries and convents. At present new monasteries of regulars proper, that is, having solemn vows, cannot be built, except with leave from the Holy See. This law is practically in abeyance with us. As to houses of male religious congregations, without solemn vows, the question is disputed. It seems certain, however, that by virtue of custom the permission of the Ordinary may be sufficient. The Apostolic permission is also required for the erection of new convents of nuns having solemn vows. Some even go so far as to say that the Pontifical permission is necessary for the erection of convents of Sisters having only simple vows or no vows, but this seems inadmissible. For, as we

have shown, these communities without solemn vows can be founded by the sole permission of the Ordinary, hence their houses can also be built by his permission. This is the custom with us. In the above cases, where the Pontifical leave is requisite for the erection of new religious houses that of the Ordinary is also necessary. But the latter cannot refuse his consent without just cause, and against his refusal an appeal lies to the Holy See.

Can the regulars or the pastors of a place where a new monastery is to be built oppose its erection? The Bishop can permit the erection without having called and heard the Superiors or procurators of neighboring religious houses, provided he knows from other sources that the new monastery can be built without any detriment to the neighboring monasteries. If, however, the Bishop is not sufficiently certain of this, he is bound to call and hear the said Superiors or procurators, whose monasteries may be within four miles of the proposed new one, and in this case he is bound to obtain their consent. This, however, does not apply to the erection of convents for nuns or sisters. Even when there are no other religious houses in the place the Ordinary should not allow the erection of a new monastery except with the consent of the people, provided the religious are to be supported by the alms of the faithful. With us this consent is never asked, for the simple reason that our religious communities are not, as a rule, supported by alms but by teaching, having charge of asylums, etc.

As to the pastor of the place where the new monastery is to be built, it is certain that he can oppose its erection if by it his rights should be impaired. Now what injuries authorize the pastor to oppose the erection? The pastor cannot oppose the erection because of any accidental or slight detriment or injury he may sustain, but only when he sustains injuries properly speaking, or in the strict sense of the term. Thus he cannot oppose the erection because it might somewhat diminish the concourse of people in the parish church, or reduce the collections, and the like. Where, however, as in this country, the pastor depends for his support on the collections and offerings of the people, he would be authorized also with us to oppose the erection, in case it would considerably diminish these offerings. In this country, according to the Second Plenary Council (n. 203, 407, 408), when religious first establish themselves or erect a new house in a diocese, a distinct and accurate understanding as regards all matters, spiritual and temporal, should be arrived at between the Bishop and the religious Superior, and a written instrument be drawn up to that effect. The object of this regulation is to prevent any possible subsequent misunderstanding. Where religious with us establish themselves only temporarily in a diocese, they cannot, against the will of the Ordinary,

give up colleges, parish schools, or other pious works under their charge, except upon the expiration of six months from the time they informed the Bishop of their intention to that effect. The same holds of religious who, though permanently established in a diocese, have only temporarily taken charge of congregations, schools, and the like.

We pass to the novitiate and profession of religious. A person becomes a member of an Order by canonical profession, that is by profession as made according to the laws of the Church, after a legitimate novitiate. According to a new law, enacted by authority of Pope Pius IX., on January 25th, 1848, no one can, at present, be admitted to the habit (as a novice) without letters testimonial as to his morals, etc., both from the Ordinary of his birthplace and from the Ordinary of the place where he lived over a year after the fifteenth year of his age. The text of this law is as follows: "Dominus noster, Pius Papa IX., hæc statuit atque decernit: I. In quocumque ordine, congregatione, societate, instituto, monasterio, domo, sive in iis emittantur vota solemnia, sive simplicia, nemo ad habitum admittatur absque testimonialibus litteris, tum Ordinarii originis, tum etiam Ordinarii loci, in quo postulans, post expletum decimum quintum annum ætatis suæ ultra annum moratus fuerit. II. Ordinarii in præfatis litteris testimonialibus, postquam diligenter exquisiverint, etiam per secretas informationes, de postulantis qualitatibus, referre debeant de ejus natalibus, ætate, moribus; vita, fama, conditione, educatione, scientia; an sit inquisitus, aliqua censura, irregularitate, aut alio canonico impedimento irretitus, ære alieno gravatus, reddendæ alicujus administrationes rationi obnoxius. Et sciant Ordinarii . . . . ipsis nunquam liberum esse hujusmodi testimoniales litteras denegare."[1] This decree, which has the force of universal law, and therefore obtains also in the United States, applies not only to regulars proper, but also to congregations of men with only simple vows, but not to nuns or sisters, even though with solemn vows. The non-observance of this law renders a profession illicit but not invalid. By this decree, however, ecclesiastics, even though in charge of souls as pastors, are not forbidden to enter a religious Order without the leave of their Ordinary, for the decree requires only the letters testimonial, but not the consent or approbation of the Bishop.[2] So far as concerns the United States the Holy See, at the instance of the Rt. Rev. Abbot of the Trappists, in the diocese of Louisville, somewhat modified the decree in question, declaring that for postulants in sacred orders, the letters testimonial of the Bishop by

[1] Collectanea, A. Card. Bizzari, p. 883.
[2] Bouix, de Jure Reg., vol. 1, pp. 553, 575.

whom they were ordained and of the Bishops in whose dioceses they remained afterwards over a year were sufficient.[1]

It is certain that Ecclesiastics, even though they be pastors and are actually in charge of congregations, can join a religious order, without the consent and even against the will of their Bishop.[2] Nay, this applies even to the entrance into a religious congregation with simple vows, provided it retains the essence of the religious state; because the right to enter a religious community without the Bishop's consent is based on the principle that every person can embrace a more perfect state. Whether, however, Ecclesiastics, especially pastors, can join a congregation not having the essence of the religious state, *v. g.*, one not having even simple vows, is not so certain.[3] Though not required to obtain the consent of their Bishop, Ecclesiastics, especially pastors of souls, wishing to join a religious order, must notify the Bishop of their proposed step, so that he may provide for places or congregations made vacant by their departure. Where, however, the diocese would suffer a grave loss by the entrance of an Ecclesiastic into a religious order, the Bishop can indeed demand him back, even after his profession. We have thus far discussed the common law of the Church on the right of Ecclesiastics to join a religious community without the Bishop's consent. Now what is the particular law on this head in the United States? Priests ordained with us, *ad titulum missionis*, must take an oath not to join a religious order or congregation without special leave from the Holy See. Now to keep this oath is of precept, while the entering into an Order is only of counsel. Priests, therefore, with us, ordained *ad titulum missionis*, cannot enter a religious community without the consent of the Bishop, or rather of the Holy See. Nay, where an Ecclesiastic, even apart from the missionary oath, had bound himself to remain in a diocese for a certain time, he could not enter an Order before the expiration of such time, because the keeping of one's contract is of precept, while the entering into an Order is merely of counsel. Priests, however, with us, ordained not *ad titulum missionis*, but, *v. g.*, *ad titulum patrimonii*, can, as provided by the common law, enter a religious order without the Bishop's consent, except, of course, where a grave detriment would thereby be caused the diocese.

Are religious, in order to be allowed to receive novices, compelled to have the permission of the Ordinary? By the common law of the Church, religious orders or congregations of men, approved by the Holy See, even though not exempt, and having no solemn vows, are not dependent on the Ordinary as to the admission

[1] Lucidi, de Visitatione, vol. 2, p. 86.
[2] Bouix, l. c., p. 542.
[3] Craisson, Man., n. 2617.

of novices. As to religious communities of women, the custom is that where they are not exempt, but subject to Bishops (as is the case with us, all the sisters or nuns in the United States being subject to the Bishops), they must obtain the permission from the Ordinary; and where they are subject to regular prelates, from the latter. However, sisters or nuns, though not exempt, and though without solemn vows, cannot as a rule be compelled by the Ordinary to receive a novice or give the cause of refusing to admit her. The reason is that beside the permission of the Bishop, the consent of the community itself is also requisite. The right to receive novices, therefore, always belongs, at least substantially, to the religious order or congregation.[1]

Apart from privilege the novitiate must last one year, otherwise the profession is void. We said, "apart from privilege;" for the Sisters of St. Dominic, and hence, by communication, all other religious, male or female, received from St. Pius V. the privilege of making, when dangerously ill, the profession before the end of the year of the novitiate, provided they be of proper age. Religious passing from one order to another must again make a full year's novitiate. Jesuits make a novitiate of two years. These regulations as to the novitiate are not binding on religious having only simple vows. Hence, with them the novitiate need not last a whole year.[2] The novitiate must be made in one of the houses of the Order to which the novice belongs, otherwise the profession is void. This, however, does not, strictly speaking, apply to religious communities, male or female, that have but simple vows; still, even with regard to the latter, the Holy See has but recently condemned as an abuse the custom of sending novices, before the end of their novitiate, from one house of the community to another, for the purpose of teaching boys or girls.[3] Novices cannot, at present, dispose of or give up their property to any considerable extent, except within the too months preceding their profession; and even then this action takes effect only after their profession. This law, however, does not apply to congregations that have but simple vows, nor to the Jesuits.[4]

We come now to the religious profession made after the novitiate. The word profession (*professio religiosa*) applies, strictly speaking, only to the taking of solemn vows. Thus in 1841 the Holy See expunged from the constitution of certain sisters having but simple vows, the words profession and professed. In a wide sense, however, the word profession is applied also to the taking of simple

[1] Craisson. n, 2641, *sq.*
[2] Craisson, n. 2657.
[3] Ib. n. 2659; Collectanea, a Card. Bizzarri, pp. 834, 837.
[4] Bouix, de Jure Reg., vol. i., p. 584.

vows, and is so used at present even by the Holy See.[1] The religious profession is express or tacit. The latter, *i. e.*, tacit profession, is at present, according to a declaration of the Holy See, made in 1858, abolished, so far as concerns solemn profession.[2] Novices of regular orders, having solemn vows, must be sixteen years old before they can validly make their religious profession, and even then, according to a new law enacted by Pope Pius IX. on the 19th of March, 1857, they can only make simple vows; and only after three years from the day on which they made their simple vows can they, if found worthy, take solemn vows or make their solemn profession. The same holds of lay brothers or rather lay novices, who, however, cannot make their simple profession before they have completed the twenty-first year of their age.[3] The simple vows, however, in question, tending as they do and being preparatory to solemn vows, are perpetual on the part of the person taking them, and in this respect can be dissolved only by the Holy See. But they may also be dissolved on the part of the Order, namely, by proper dismissal of the professed person. Before their solemn profession, the religious in question can be promoted to tonsure and minor orders, but not to sacred orders, under the *titulus paupertatis.*

Who has the right to receive the profession, or into whose hands is it to be made? If there is question of exempt orders, the proper religious Superior, not the Bishop, can validly admit novices to profession.[4] Apart from negligence on the part of the Order, the same holds true, *de jure communi*, of orders not exempt, nay, of congregations, male or female, that have made but simple vows or no vow at all. We said, *de jure communi;* for by custom or particular statutes, the right of receiving the profession of sisters or nuns bound by simple vows only belongs usually to the Bishops.[5]

What special regulations or laws apply to the novitiate or profession of nuns or sisters? 1st. No girl can receive the religious habit before she is fifteen years old, and novices cannot make their solemn profession before they have completed the sixteenth year of their age. In the United States, the Nuns of the Visitation, who are the only ones that can take solemn vows, must first make simple vows; and only after ten years from the taking of simple vows can they be admitted to the solemn profession.[6] 2d. Moreover girls, before they receive the habit, that is, before they begin the novitiate, and again before they make their profession, are to be exam-

[1] Lucidi, vol. 2, p. 253.
[2] Craisson, n. 2690 (11), 2697.
[3] Craisson, n. 2638, 2689; Lucidi, Visit. SS. LL., t. ii., p. 22.
[4] C. Trid. Sess. 25, c. 16 de Reg.
[5] Craisson, n. 2705–2707.
[6] Conc. Pl. Balt., ii., n. 419, 421.

ined by the Bishop or other person appointed by him, whether they were compelled or unduly influenced to enter the convent; whether they are aware of the nature of the step about to be taken by them. Although these examinations or questions are necessary only in the case of sisters or nuns taking solemn vows, yet the Bishop may, if he chooses, forbid girls to be admitted to the habit or profession, even in communities having but simple vows or no vows, unless they have been questioned by him or his delegate in the above manner.[1] 3d. Only as many nuns or sisters should be received into a convent as can be conveniently supported by the revenues of the convent or the alms received.[2] This, however, does not apply, at least strictly speaking, to sisters or nuns not bound by solemn vows. For the latter, as experience testifies, can very well exist, as a rule, by teaching and the like; hence it is not necessary that their convents should be endowed. 4th. We add a few words on the dower of nuns or sisters. By dower (*dos*) is meant a determinate sum of money, as fixed by the proper Superior, to be given to the convent for the support of the nun or sister making her profession. Even wealthy convents can accept dowers. Congregations of sisters having but simple vows or no vows at all can also accept dowers; in fact, the Holy See, in its remarks on the constitution of such religious communities with simple vows, submitted to it between 1848 and 1861, suggested that a moderate dower should be paid by the sisters, so that the convent might be thus gradually endowed.[3] The dower, however, cannot, at least apart from custom to the contrary, be given to the convent before the profession. Convents in the United States do not as a rule exact any dower. For sisters subject to the Bishop, the amount of the dower is fixed by the latter; for exempt nuns, at present by the Holy See. When nuns or sisters are lawfully dispensed from their vows and leave the convent, the dower must be restored to them if they have only simple vows, but not if they have solemn vows.[4]

We come now to the duties of religious, male or female. We shall confine ourselves to the obligations relating to the vow of poverty and to inclosure. There are four degrees of poverty. The first is where one can neither lawfully nor validly have property or use things as his own. The second is where a person may indeed validly, though not lawfully, own anything, and cannot use things as his own. The third is where a person may validly and licitly hold property in his own name, but where he cannot licitly use things as his own, and where consequently he abdicates only

[1] Craisson, n. 2736.
[2] Conc. Trid. Sess. 25, Cap. 3 de Regular.
[3] Bizzarri, Collectanea, p. 834, *sq.*
[4] Craiss, n. 2739.

the independent use of his property. The fourth degree finally consists in this, that a person while renouncing neither his property nor its independent administration, makes a vow not to have more temporalities than are necessary for his support; such a one, therefore, relinquishes merely the use of superfluities.[1] Now complete poverty, as solemnly vowed in religious orders proper, excludes absolutely and forever all ownership of temporal goods; a person, therefore, who takes solemn vows cannot even validly have property in his own name, while a person taking merely simple vows in a religious institute may validly hold property in his own name, though he cannot licitly administer it independently of or without permission from his Superior. Religious having simple vows, therefore, retain the *dominium radicale*, but not the *dominium actuale*. These religious bound only by simple vows need not, however, transfer the administration of their property to their convent or religious superiors; but may, nay according to the animadversions of the Holy See on constitutions of religious congregations with simple vows submitted to it between the years 1848 and 1862, should, before taking vows, give power of attorney to administer their property, to some one, and that to whomsoever they please; of course, they may, if they choose, give this power of attorney also to their religious Superiors.[2]

The next duty is that of inclosure (*clausura*) as incumbent both upon monks and nuns. What is meant by inclosure as obligatory upon monks or regulars proper having solemn vows? As a rule regulars are not allowed to go out of the monastery except with the permission of their Superior. There is, however, according to the *jus commune*, no prohibition against male persons entering monasteries, though *de jure particulari*, men or male visitors are not allowed in some orders to enter certain parts of the inclosure. Women, however, are generally speaking forbidden to enter monasteries of men, and that under pain of excommunication, *latæ sententiæ*, reserved at present *simpliciter* to the Holy See, according to the Const. *Apostolicæ Sedis*, issued by Pope Pius IX. on the 12th of October, 1869.[3]

What is meant by inclosure as obligatory on nuns? Inclosure, though not essential to the religious state, even of nuns, is nevertheless required by the law of the Church for nuns or sisters taking solemn vows. The inclosure of nuns differs materially from that of regulars or monks, for the latter are not absolutely forbidden to go out of the monastery, but only without leave from their Superior, while the former cannot go outside the convent or inclosure

[1] Craisson, n. 2477–2487.
[2] Lucidi, vol. 2, p. 264, sq.
[3] Conc. Vat., p. 80. Frib. Brisg., 1871.

even with the permission of their Abbess or Lady Superior. If nuns or sisters with solemn vows go out of the convent or inclosure except in the cases laid down in law, namely, in case of great fire, leprosy, and pestilential disease, they, even though they be but lay-sisters, commit a mortal sin, and incur *ipso facto* excommunication reserved *simpliciter* to the Holy See, according to the Const. *Apostolicæ Sedis* of Pope Pius IX. Moreover, generally speaking, all persons whatever, male or female, are forbidden to enter the convent or inclosure of nuns without permission from the Holy See, and that under pain of incurring, *ipso facto*, excommunication reserved *simpliciter* to the Holy See, according to the Const. *Apostolicæ Sedis* of Pope Pius IX. Not even little boys or girls can enter, as all persons, of whatever age or sex, are included in the prohibition.[1] We say generally speaking, for there are several exceptions. Thus, Bishops can enter the inclosure of all convents in their dioceses in order to make the visitation, not only when necessary, but as often as they deem it useful.[2] The confessor of the nuns can also enter the inclosure to administer the sacraments and assist the dying. What has been said in regard to the inclosure of nuns is to be understood of the Papal inclosure (*clausura papalis*) which, by the common law of the Church, is obligatory only on nuns bound by solemn vows. Sometimes, however, sisters with simple vows are granted Papal inclosure. Thus, the Holy See, in 1839, granted Papal inclosure to certain sisters having only simple vows.[3] Here we may remark, by the way, that inclosure is of two kinds, Papal and episcopal. Papal inclosure (*clausura papalis*) is so called because it is and can be established only by the express authority of the Pope, who alone can, except in case of necessity, dispense from its observance. Episcopal inclosure (*clausura episcopalis*) is that which is established by Bishops, and remains more specially subject to their regulations. Sisters having episcopal inclosure need not observe all that is prescribed for the Papal inclosure.[4] Nuns or sisters with Papal inclosure may receive girls into their convents for the sake of educating them, providing their institute is approved by the Holy See to that effect, or provided they have express leave from the Holy See; moreover, the rooms occupied by these girls must be separate from the dwelling of the nuns. Besides, several other conditions are requisite. The only nuns or sisters in this country that have solemn vows, and consequently Papal inclosure, though only in a modified form, are the Sisters of the Visitation, in certain houses. All the other sisters or nuns have only simple vows, and are conse-

[1] Craisson, n. 2847.
[2] Bouix, de Jure Reg., vol. 2, p. 328.
[3] Lucidi, vol. 2, p. 133.
[4] Craisson, n. 2863.

quently not bound to observe Papal inclosure. Even for the Sisters of the Visitation, who take solemn vows, the rigor of the Papal inclosure has been mitigated by the Holy See, so that they are allowed, it seems, to go out of their convent or inclosure in order to teach in parochial schools.[1] In fact, as things are, sisters with us could scarcely observe strict or Papal inclosure. Most sisters or nuns in this country either teach in parochial schools, or have charge of orphan asylums or hospitals, and consequently are obliged by their very works of charity to frequently go out of their convents or the inclosure. Now these offices of charity and labors for the welfare of others are most appreciated at the present day, even by those out of the true Church, and tend to make our faith known and loved. Hence these religious congregations of women as they exist in our midst have done, and are constantly doing, incalculable good in the cause of Holy Church.

Let us now say a few words concerning the government or *régime* of religious communities, whether of men or women. The government or direction of regulars regards either themselves or extraneous persons. Hence we shall speak of the direction of the religious *ad extra*, *i. e.*, in relation to extraneous persons; and *ad intra*, that is, among themselves. Under the head of the direction of religious in relation to extraneous persons, we shall briefly discuss their ability to be appointed to parishes and other ecclesiastical offices, the administration of their property, the relations of religious congregations of men taking simple vows or no vows with Bishops, and various questions concerning sisters or nuns. First, regulars are neither by divine nor natural law disqualified to hold ecclesiastical offices. Nevertheless, according to the present law of the Church, or *de jure communi*, as in force at the present day, they cannot, generally speaking, be appointed to parishes, even in this country, without leave from the Holy See. We say, generally speaking; for they can be appointed to such parishes or congregations as are united or annexed to monasteries.[2] In this country, owing to the scarcity of secular priests, it seems to have become the custom to place parishes or congregations, even though not attached to monasteries, and therefore purely secular, in charge of regulars, without any permission or dispensation, at least express, from the Holy See. In matters relating to the care of souls, regulars appointed to parishes, even though annexed to monasteries, must obey the Bishop. The law prohibiting the appointment of religious to parishes, except by Pontifical indult, does not seem to apply to religious having but simple vows, but only to regulars

[1] In Americana votorum, ap. Bizzarri, Collectanea, pp. 778–788.

[2] Craisson, n. 2874.

proper, or those bound by solemn vows.[1] Regulars may be appointed synodical examiners; also delegates of the Pope, provided they are dignitaries, that is, have no immediate superiors in the same monastery, as conventual or independent priors, but not priors subject to the abbot. Regulars may also be promoted with the permission of their Superior to academical honors or degrees, *v. g.*, to the degree of doctor of theology or canon law,—and that even out of public universities. The Society of Jesus may even confer the degree of doctor upon seculars who study in their colleges.[2] Unless their rules are opposed to it, regulars may be appointed professors in public universities. Besides, they may be created Bishops, Cardinals, and Supreme Pontiffs. In order, however, to be appointable to bishoprics and the cardinalate, they must have the permission of their Superior. Nor do regulars appointed Bishops or Cardinals cease to be religious; for the religious state, and the obligations of the vows, substantially remain. Thus, as to chastity, the case is evident; as to obedience, they cease indeed to be subject to the prelate of their Order, but are placed instead under the obedience of the Pope; as to poverty, they remain, as before, incapable of acquiring property in their own name; but whatever they acquire, instead of going to the monastery, as before, goes to their See. Moreover, they must observe those rules of their Order which are not incompatible with their dignity. When a regular Bishop resigns or is deposed, he must return to his monastery; though from this it does not follow that he must strictly observe the rules of his Order; for he still retains the episcopal dignity.[3]

The next question under the head of the government of regulars *ad extra* refers to the administration of their property. In order that the property of a community may be considered ecclesiastical property, it is necessary that the community or institution be established by ecclesiastical authority. Hence when religious communities, academies, colleges, etc., are established by the Ordinary, their property is ecclesiastical property. Now, except where ecclesiastical law disposes otherwise, religious communities, though having but simple vows or no vows at all, have, of themselves, and without any concession of the Church, the right to administer their property. Of course this right remains subject to the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, by whom it can be restricted or entirely taken away. Again, the Ordinary has a certain power of jurisdiction over the property of religious communities, by means of which he can correct abuses committed by these communities in the administration of their property,—for instance, where it is imprudently incumbered with debts. In this case he can order an investigation, and

[1] Craisson, n. 2876. [2] Ib., n. 2883. [3] Ib., n. 2891.

compel the community to give in a financial statement.[1] Except in the case just given, where, namely, the community mismanages its property, the Bishop cannot, apart from special and approved constitutions of a religious community giving him supreme power of administration, interfere in or restrict the administration of the property of a religious community, whether having solemn or only simple vows, whether of men or women. For such administration is included in the power of domestic government (*potestas dominativa*), but not in the power of jurisdiction (*potestas jurisdictionis*). Now, apart from special statutes, the Bishop has indeed a certain power of jurisdiction over such property, but he has no domestic authority even in regard to the property of religious communities of women. By virtue of custom, however, these latter, *i. e.*, nuns or sisters, depend, especially as to administrative acts of greater moment, upon the Ordinary, if subject to him, or upon the regular prelate, if exempt.[2]

From what has been said it follows that religious communities have the right to administer their property. But has this right been restricted by positive ecclesiastical law? It has; for religious communities are forbidden to alienate except in certain cases specified in canon law, *v. g.*, in case of necessity, where the Pope's permission cannot be obtained in time, real property (*bona immobilia*), or valuable personal property (*bona mobilia pretiosa*), without leave from the Holy See. This prohibition extends not only to orders proper, that is, orders having solemn vows, but to all religious congregations, whether of men or women, having simple vows or no vows at all. For the law applies to all ecclesiastical property. Now, in all religious communities approved by the proper authority, the property is ecclesiastical, even though they have no vows. However, the question may be asked: "Has the above law prohibiting the alienation of ecclesiastical property without Papal permission ceased at present to be binding out of Italy?" Bouix[3] answers in the affirmative, others in the negative. Theoretically speaking, the negative opinion is to be held, as is evident from the excommunication imposed in the *Const. Apostolicæ Sedis* of Pope Pius IX. on "alienantes bona ecclesiastica absque Beneplacito Apostolico."[4] Practically speaking, however, the Papal permission is not, as a rule, required in the United States, for canon law allows of alienation without leave from the Holy See where losses would otherwise follow. Now, in this country, where property changes hands quite frequently, we should often be obliged to allow opportunities of

[1] Bouix, de Jure Reg., t. 2, pp. 279, 280.
[2] Craisson, n. 2906, sq.
[3] De Jure Reg., tom. 2, p. 301, sq.
[4] Excom. 3ª. non reservata. Cf. Craiss., n. 2923.

selling ecclesiastical property at an advantage pass if we had to wait for the Papal permission.[1] Finally, we observe that a bishop may require religious communities of women, even though exempt, to give him annually a financial statement of their receipts and expenditures.[2] This holds *a fortiori* in the United States, where there are no exempt nuns or sisters.

What are Cardinal protectors? They are Cardinals assigned by the Sovereign Pontiff to religious Orders to act as their protectors. According to the *jus commune* as at present in force, Cardinal protectors cannot act as judges in matters which do not refer to the whole Order, nor alter the rules of the Order, nor appoint or remove Superiors or other officers, nor transfer religious from one house to another.[3] But they can be present at the election of the prelates of the Order, and also cast their votes, if the constitutions of the Order so allow. These are, at present, the powers of Cardinal protectors as determined by the *jus commune*. Of course, the Pope may, in fact does sometimes, give them more extensive powers, and that either expressly or tacitly, *v. g.*, by approving the constitutions of Orders giving them ampler authority. What has been said of the Cardinal protectors of regulars applies also to the Cardinal protectors of nuns.[4] The Holy See at present, as we shall see later on, appoints Cardinal protectors, not merely for regulars and nuns with solemn vows, but also for religious communities, especially of women, under a Superioress-General, having but simple vows or no vows at all. Moreover, in 1814, the Holy See decreed that those religious communities which had no houses, or only few, in the Pontifical States, but had numerous establishments in other places, should have some house in Rome where at least their procurator-general should reside, in order to transact the business of the Order with the Holy See.[5]

Religious congregations of men having but simple vows or no vows at all, though subject to the jurisdiction of the Ordinary, and visitable by him, do not depend upon the latter so far as concerns their constitutions as approved by the Holy See, nor as to the internal government of the house, or the administration of their property, nor as to their expenses and accounts, nor as to the election or appointment of their Superiors, nor as to the admission or dismission of members of the institute. The priests, however, of such congregations, must be approved by the Ordinary to hear the confessions, not only of persons not belonging to the congregation, but even of members of their institute, except

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[1] Cf. Com. in C. Ap. Sedis, jussu Mauri. Reate, 1874, pp. 64-65.
[2] Craiss., n. 2928.
[3] Bouix, de Jure Reg., vol. 2, p. 169, sq.
[4] Ib., p. 172.
[5] Craiss., n. 2959.

where it is otherwise provided by the constitutions of such congregations approved by the proper Superior.[1]

Before proceeding to discuss the *régime* of religious communities *ad intra*, we shall subjoin a few regulations peculiar to nuns or sisters in their relations with Bishops. If the sisters or nuns are not exempt the Bishop can and should annually visit them canonically. This applies to all nuns or sisters in the United States, as none of them are exempt. The Bishop may also enact that sisters or nuns having but simple vows or no vows at all, can go to confession only to priests specially approved for them. But if he so ordains, then he should also change the confessors every three years. Religious priests, even though having but simple vows, should not be appointed ordinary confessors of sisters; they may, however, be chosen extraordinary confessors. How are sisters, also in the United States, who though having houses in different dioceses are yet subject to a Superioress-General, dependent on the Ordinary, in the various dioceses where they are? We premise: Religious communities of women having but simple vows and governed by one Superioress-General, though scattered through various dioceses, are with few exceptions of recent origin, dating from the beginning of the present century. When at the beginning of this century, these communities first applied to the Holy See for approbation, fears were entertained that the authority of the Superioress-General might infringe on the rights of Ordinaries. Hence the Holy See at first hesitated to grant the desired approbation. Gradually, however, the Holy See, considering the beneficial effects of the unity of government as attainable only under a Superioress-General, came to sanction such communities, and now approves them without any difficulty. In order to obviate any possible difficulties between Bishops and these communities or their Superioress-General, the Holy See at present usually subjects these religious or sisters to the Ordinary as to matters of Episcopal jurisdiction proper, *v. g.*, dispensations; but to Cardinal protectors or one of the Sacred Congregations, as to matters of general government. So that these sisters, or rather their Superioress-General, in matters in which she is independent of the Ordinary, must usually consult the Cardinal protector or the Holy See. The Cardinal protector, according to the animadversions of the Holy See on the constitutions of such communities, submitted to it between the years 1848 and 1862, is to watch over these religious, and especially over the Superioress-General; and to him must be referred all disputes between Superioresses-General and Bishops, *v. g.*, regarding the transfer of sisters. He must be consulted when new establish-

[1] Craiss., n. 2965.

ments are to be founded in a different diocese; he also presides either personally or by a delegate at the election of the Superioress-General, whom he can also suspend from office for grave and notorious cause.[1] But suppose the Holy See, in approving such congregations of women, has made none of the above provisions, what is in that case the relation of these sisters with Bishops? In other words, how are sisters under a Superioress-General, *de jure communi*, dependent on Bishops? These sisters, supposing them not to be exempt, certainly depend upon Bishops in matters of Episcopal jurisdiction, but not in matters of domestic government. For, as we have seen, sisters, by virtue of custom, usually are dependent on the Ordinary for the graver acts of administration. But this custom might easily prove detrimental in the case of sisters governed by a Superioress-General. For if, for instance, these sisters were dependent on the Bishop of the diocese in which they have houses, then the mother-house and consequently the Superioress-General would also be subject to the Bishop of the place in the more important administrative acts, even though referring to houses situate in other dioceses. The Bishop of the place where the mother-house is situate would thus exercise authority out of his own diocese; a conflict of authority would thus easily follow. For this reason, the Holy See, at present, in approving such communities does not allow the Bishop of the mother-house or any other Bishop to be Superior-General of these sisters under a Superioress-General.[2] Hence it would seem, that even *de jure communi*, sisters under a Superioress-General are not dependent on the Ordinary, even in their graver administrative acts; they are, however, and remain subject to the Ordinary in matters pertaining to Episcopal jurisdiction proper.

We come now to the internal or domestic government of regulars, that is, to their government *ad intra*. The power vested in Superiors of religious communities is of two kinds: one relates to the discipline of the house, by which the Superior can compel the religious even by penalties to observe the rules and constitutions of the Order or institute. This is called domestic authority (*potestas gubernativa, dominativa, œconomica, domestica*. The other is a power of jurisdiction in the strict sense of the word (*potestas jurisdictionis*), relates to the power of the keys, and consists in the power of binding and loosing, and of inflicting ecclesiastical censures. The two powers are distinct and separable the one from the other.[3] Now the power of internal government or the domestic authority belongs necessarily to all Superiors of religious commu-

[1] Lucidi, tom. 2, p. 275–298; Bizzarri, l. c., pp. 831, 833.
[2] Bizzarri, l. c., pp. 833, 834.
[3] Lucidi, l. c., tom. 2, p. 268.

nities, male or female, with or without solemn vows. This is evident from the fact that every corporation or society must have power to make and enforce laws for its own government. Besides, Superiors of exempt Orders of men have also jurisdiction proper. Religious congregations, however, of men without solemn vows are usually vested only with domestic authority, since, as a rule, they remain subject to the Ordinary in matters of jurisdiction proper. Observe that the erection and fixing of the boundaries of new provinces of religious communities, even though they have but simple vows, are reserved to the Holy See.[1]

How are prelates chosen in Orders of men? Chiefly, in two ways: Either by direct appointment of the Pope, or by canonical election. The usual manner of appointment is by election on the part of the community itself. The religious who have the right of suffrage must vote secretly, and that under pain of nullity of the election. By the common law of the Church the election of Superiors must be confirmed by the Holy See. Superiors of institutes subject to the Bishop are usually confirmed by him.[2] According to the constitution *Ap. Sedis* of Pope Pius IX.: "Suspensionem ipso facto incurrunt a suorum beneficiorum perceptione capitula et conventus Monasteriorum aliique omnes, qui ad illorum regimen et administrationem recipiunt prælatos de prædictis monasteriis apud S. Sedem quovis modo provisos, antequam ipsi exhibuerint Litteras apostolicas de sua promotione."[3] By the common law of the Church the solemn blessing of the new abbot belongs to the Ordinary. Two abbots, moreover, should assist.

Lady Superiors, or abbesses, are also usually chosen by election. The election belongs to the sisters or nuns, and must take place by secret suffrage. The Bishop should not vote, even where there is a tie. But he can, in the case of nuns or sisters not exempt, if they are unable to agree upon a Superior, himself appoint one, after having given the sisters a certain time within which to agree upon one. The Bishop can preside at the election of the Superiors, and that *jure ordinario*, when the sisters are subject to him. This applies to all sisters in this country with the exception of sisters under a Superioress-General, as none of our sisters are exempt. Superiors of sisters not exempt should, as a rule, be confirmed by the Bishop.[4] There are chiefly three ways in which sisters in religious communities of more recent origin, especially when under a Superioress-General, cast their votes. The first is: All the sisters entitled to vote assemble in chapter to vote. The second is: One or two sisters are deputed from each house to cast the vote for

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[1] Cf. Bizzari, l. c., p. 845.
[2] Craiss., n. 2999.
[3] Susp. I., Const Ap. Sedis.
[4] Craisson, n. 3013.

their house. The third is: All the sisters in the various houses, who have a vote, vote by ballot in their respective houses and then send their ballots, *v. g.*, inclosed in letters, to the mother-house, or the Cardinal protector, if there be one. If the ballots are sent to the mother-house the Bishop opens them; otherwise, the Cardinal protector.[1] Superioresses have only a domestic authority. Hence, they cannot dispense in vows or the laws of the Church, *v. g.*, in fasts, abstinences, since these are acts of jurisdiction proper. The Holy See, in its remarks on the constitutions of sisters with simple vows or no vows, submitted to it between 1850 and 1860, declared that the manifestation of conscience by sisters to the Superioress should be entirely optional with the sisters, and not obligatory; that, moreover, it should extend only to public faults relating to the observance of the rules, and to progress in virtue.[2]

All religious Superiors and Superioresses have a certain coercive or executive power. For this power is essential to the preservation of order, peace, and the observance of the rules of the community. Now this coercive power is of two kinds, jurisdictional and paternal or domestic. Religious Superiors need not have coercive power of a jurisdictional character; it is sufficient that they have a domestic coercive power. Superiors of religious communities of men not exempt, and Superioresses of sisters or nuns, usually have but a domestic power of coercion, and therefore can impose domestic but not ecclesiastical penalties, such as censures. Superiors or prelates of exempt orders of men have a coercive power, jurisdictional and episcopal; for they are vested with jurisdiction proper not only *in foro pœnitentiali* but also *in foro externo* and *contentioso*. Hence, not merely the generals and provincials of such Orders, but also the local and conventual Superiors or prelates can, except where otherwise provided, inflict any censure imposable on persons. What is the canonical mode of procedure in criminal causes in religious communities? Where only light punishments are inflicted, that is, where the Superior does not exceed the limits of his paternal or domestic authority, no criminal process is requisite. But when there is question of imposing penalties exceeding the limits of domestic authority, *v. g.*, censures, dismissal from the Order, then, as a rule, the Superior must proceed judicially, that is, by canonical trial, since he then acts not as a father but as a judge.[3] The religious have the right of recourse to their higher Superiors, and also to the Supreme Pontiff; nay, when there is question of severe or defamatory punishment, they have the right of appeal in the strict sense of the term, not merely of recourse or appeal in the broad sense of the word.[4]

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[1] Lucidi, t. 2, pp. 286, 287.
[2] Card. Bizzarri, l. c., pp. 832, 835.
[3] Craisson, n. 3052.
[4] Ib., n. 3056.

By whom can the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience made by the religious, be dissolved? Only the Pope can dispense from the solemn vows of religious. Can the simple vows made in religious communities, male or female, having but simple vows, be dissolved by any other Superior than the Pope? If these vows are made only for a limited time, *v. g.*, for one, two, or three years, they cease to bind, of themselves, as soon as the term for which they were made expires. But if they are perpetual, then the Holy See, in approving these communities, either expressly reserves to itself the dispensation, or it gives Bishops the power to do so. If in the apostolic approbation of the institute no mention is made of the dispensation, the latter is reserved to the Holy See, at least, if the religious in question make the vow, or promise, or oath of remaining permanently in the community, or if there is question of sisters under a Superioress-General. As a rule, the Holy See, at present, in approving religious communities with simple vows, reserves to itself expressly the power to dispense from them.[1]

We shall close this dissertation with a few remarks on those religious who change their state, that is, those who either abandon the religious state, or are dismissed from their Order or pass to another Order. By apostates from religious Orders we mean those who criminally abandon their Order with the intention of not returning, even though they retain the habit of their Order. Although fugitives, that is, religious who leave the Order with the intention of returning to it, differ from apostates, yet in canon law they are placed on the same footing with apostates proper. The chief penalties incurred by apostates and fugitives are: They incur *ipso facto* excommunication, if they at the same time put off the habit; moreover, they are suspended from sacred orders, and if during the apostasy they celebrate, they become irregular. Besides, even those who receive apostates and co-operate with and assist them in their flight, incur *ipso facto* excommunication. Observe, that what has just been said of apostates applies only to regulars with solemn vows. As to the expulsion of religious from their Order, we observe that regulars, even though solemnly professed, may, under certain conditions, be dismissed from their Order. The chief conditions are: 1. That the religious be incorrigible. A religious is not considered incorrigible unless after having been three times convicted of and punished for a grave offence he again commits a grave offence. 2. The expulsion cannot be made except with the advice and consent of a majority of six of the most esteemed religious, chosen in general or provincial chapter. 3. A proper trial is requisite. 4. From the sentence of dismissal the expelled religious can, within ten days, appeal to the

[1] Lucidi, vol. 2, p. 267, sq.; Bizzarri, l. c., p. 832.

Holy See. 5. The sentence must be immediately communicated to the Ordinary of the place where the expelled religious is to live; this Ordinary, however, cannot take cognizance of the justice or injustice of the expulsion.[1] Regulars with solemn vows thus expelled, incur *ipso jure* perpetual suspension from all exercise of orders, as is re-enacted in the *Const. Apost. Sedis* of Pope Pius IX. Lucidi,[2] however, well observes that at present the Holy See frequently grants a rescript of perpetual secularization, which takes the place of expulsion. Religious thus secularized by the Holy See do not, except when the Holy See ordains otherwise, incur suspension. These remarks apply to religious with solemn vows, but not, at least strictly speaking, to religious with simple vows. We say strictly speaking, for even in religious communities having but simple vows religious cannot be dismissed except for cause. Ill health is not a sufficient cause for the dismissal of professed religious with simple vows. Nay, the Holy See, in its comments on constitutions of religious communities, male or female, having but simple vows, which were submitted to it between the years 1850 and 1860, declared that members of such congregations having but simple vows should not be expelled except when incorrigible.[3]

In certain cases, *v. g.*, during the suspension of the Order, or to enable a religious to assist needy parents or for similar reasons, the Holy See grants that religious, though bound by solemn vows, may live in the world with the obligation of obeying the Ordinaries of the place where they are. These secularized religious, if priests, can exercise ecclesiastical functions, etc., under the direction of the Ordinary. Again, by the common law of the Church, religious, under certain conditions, can pass from their Order to a stricter one. Only the Pope can allow one to pass from the state of a lay brother to that of a cleric in the same Order; but clerics not yet in sacred orders can become lay brothers with the permission of their Superiors.

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[1] Lucidi, l. c., p. 19. [2] L. c., p. 19. [3] Lucidi, t. 2, p. 21.

THE MENTAL CAPACITY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN AS INDICATED BY HIS SPEECH.

ALGIC COMPARED WITH SEMITIC.[1]

OUR remarks, in a former number of the REVIEW, on the aboriginal tongues of America, were chiefly confined to the refutation of current prejudices, or exaggerations, concerning the mental calibre of the red race, as typified by the highly—some would even have it absolutely—synthetical character of its dialects. Subjecting the Algic branch of Indian speech to a short examination from that point of view, we have come to the conclusion that one great division, at least, of the American race has the capacity to analyze thought and express it in a manner not altogether dissimilar to that in which the highest type of human speech, the Indo-European, solves the linguistic problem.[2]

By thus showing that the difference between our own tongues and those of the red man, as far as their analytical and synthetical characters are concerned, is merely one of degree, we have, however, accomplished but very little. No one holding sound views on the nature of language, or moderately acquainted with the results of modern linguistic science, could have expected anything else. An absolutely synthetical speech, and a race of men utterly unable to distinguish the component parts of thought, are one as impossible as the other. Hence, to do full justice to the Algic tongues and to the race that speaks them, we must go a step farther. We shall, then, try to prove that, from certain points of view—and among them some of consequence—the dialects under treatment bear even a closer resemblance to those of our own family of speech than do most other types of language. Whether these points of

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[1] The Semitic dialect used for the purpose is the Hebrew. Arabic scholars may object to this as unfair. If it be so, the writer's very superficial acquaintance with Arabic leaves him no other choice. Considering, however, the close relationship that exists between the dialects of the Semitic family of speech, the harm done cannot be very great.

[2] Very many of our more general statements concerning the character of the Algic dialects must be considered as referring to a much larger family, which might be termed the Innuit-Nahuatl, or Eskimoetztec. The very names of its two extreme members (*Innuit* and *Nahuatl*) may yet be found to be etymologically connected with a word that, in diverse dialectical forms, denotes several well-known branches of the Algic stock, such as the *Ihnut* (Montagnais), *Nīinawe* (Algonquin), *Nēhiyaw* (Cree), *Inīnowe* (Illinois), *Leninapi* (Leni Lenape or Delaware), and perhaps some other subdivisions. All these names signify "man," or "simply a man," *homo* (*sine addito*). The Ojibwa and Ottawa word *anishinabe*, the Pottawattami *nishinabe*, the Cree *ayisiyini*, *i. e.*, "Indian," or "man" (*homo*), etymologically express the same idea: "man κατ'ἐξοχήν."

coincidence have any weight towards solving the question as to the origin of the Indian tongues and their kinship—however remote—with the Indo-European family, does not in the present inquiry concern us. In accordance with our general aim, the existence of a closer affinity, than generally conceded, between our own mode of expressing thought and that peculiar to the Indian, is all we contend for. The principal points of divergence, the great deficiencies of our aboriginal tongues, and the conclusions to be drawn therefrom, will form the subject of a separate little treatise.

Among those of our readers whose linguistic studies have led them beyond the domain of the Indo-European family, the greater number undoubtedly have first made acquaintance with one of the Semitic dialects, with the language of the Old Testament. Before entering upon its study—perhaps in early youth—most of us were hardly aware of the yawning gulf that separates the Semitic from the Indo-European family of speech, and which the *Fabii Cunctatores* among linguistic scholars still declare to be all but unfathomable. On the other hand, the older among us had in those years perhaps not yet learned to look upon Latin, Greek, German, etc., as sister tongues. No sooner, however, had we crawled over the first pages of our Hebrew grammar, groped our way through the intricacies of its vowel system, and began to grapple with its conjugational paradigms, than we felt that we were treading on ground incomparably more foreign than that of the classic idioms, or of such modern European tongues as previously formed part of our course of studies. Nor did a better acquaintance with that most venerable of languages tend much to efface the first impression. We might theoretically admit the possibility of bridging over the chasm; but the process is so intricate and the work has to be carried on at such a depth that, should it even be successfully accomplished, we shall not be much the better for it: we can scarcely ever feel as much at home in the Semitic dialects as we do in those of our own family of speech.

Now, to come to the point, if such is the divergence between languages, spoken by peoples so nearly agreeing in regard to both physical and mental qualities, and geographically so little remote from each other, as were, or still are, for instance, the Hebrew and the Armenian or Persian, the Arab and the Hindoo, what a degree of discordance would it not be reasonable to suppose existed between the tongues of the most highly endowed races of the Old World and those spoken by the insignificant and all but savage tribes of this Western Continent? A mode of reasoning plausible enough! Hence, it is no wonder that men, otherwise not disinclined to labor for the spiritual welfare of their red brethren, recoil at the thought of having to learn languages which they sup-

pose to be so difficult and so radically distinct from those they know. The more agreeable is the surprise of those who, entering upon the task, not only see most of the fancied difficulties vanish, and with moderate exertion soon learn enough for their immediate practical wants, but really think they have only met an old acquaintance, and at once feel wonderfully at home. This is the more surprising as the strange physiognomy of those Indian idioms can in no case fail to strike the learner. What then lies at the bottom of that unexpected feeling of kinship? Is it the naturalness of the Algic tongues, the transparency of their structure, their freedom from mannerism and all the whims of literary cultivation, the almost total absence of irregularities in their grammars, the palpable homogeneity of the material they are built of? Or, are we, in acquiring a so-called agglutinative dialect, half unconsciously impressed with the fact that we are but living over again the early youth—thousands of years behind us—of our own now fullgrown, nay, almost senescent speech? Whatever may be the cause, such has been the experience of more than one who has learned an Algic dialect.[1]

[1] The experience described above is that of Algic students whose native tongues have less departed from the original character of Indo-European speech than modern English has; such as the other Germanic dialects and, still more, the Slavonic. In the case of persons grown up in the use of the English tongue, the later acquired knowledge of one of those modern languages, or of Latin and Greek, will go far towards making them feel more at home in Algic speech. We have to make yet another remark. A passage on the last page of our first article on Indian languages might seem to be at variance with the present statement regarding the comparative ease with which the Algic tongues may be acquired. We there incidentally spoke of white men blundering in the use of the *difficult* Indian languages. The case stands thus: The difficulty of learning any of the Algic dialects, so as to speak it grammatically, is truly great, nay, insuperable, for white men (adults) who are ignorant even of the grammar of their native tongue. With whavever fluency they may learn to converse with Indians, they will always blunder; and the regularity with which they do it soon enables the good-natured redskins to adapt themselves to the more analytical linguistic habits of their white interlocutors. Educated persons, on the contrary, especially such as understand Latin, or one of the modern continental languages, will, *with the help of Indian grammars*, soon learn to speak the Indian dialects correctly, if not fluently. As to the acquiring a considerable *copia verborum*, there have probably been but few white men, if any, who could boast of having, in this respect, *mastered* a single Algic dialect. Bishop Baraga's Ojibwa Dictionary, the most copious of any published, contains about 16,000 vocables; and the venerable author was himself far from employing every one of them with the ease of a native speaker. But even that number is considerably less than a third part of the words collected by a learned Jesuit missionary, whom we pray that God will spare to bring his task to a happy end and give to the world the fruit of many years' unwearied labor. It is no exaggeration to say that, were a dictionary to include every possible combination of Algic roots, it would exceed in (numerical) wealth that of any literary language. For all practical purposes, of course, there is no more need of knowing each compound by heart, than there is for English scholars to have every word in "Webster's Unabridged" at their fingers' ends. He may be said to have achieved a great deal who is familiar enough with the Algic roots and their various uses, to seize at once the meaning of any novel combination that may happen to strike his ear.

To come to particulars, one of the first etymological peculiarities in Algic speech that favorably strikes the student—especially one who has a taste of Semitic—is the way it handles verbal roots for the purpose of diversifying, pointing and shading off their more general meanings. The principal means employed in Algic for this end consists (as in our own and only the most advanced of the Scythian dialects) in a sufficiently regular and expeditious process of compounding.

In Semitic speech the variation of meaning is effected by softening, strengthening, doubling, or otherwise modifying radical consonants, by inserting semi-vowels or servile letters, commuting vowels, lengthening or shortening them, in a word, by interior changes. Sometimes a consonant or two will be added to the root. In the primitive development of the language, this latter process appears even to have been its principal means of growth. But accretions in the form of regularly employed prefixes or suffixes play a very inconsiderable part in the mechanism of that speech. The prefixing of particles for the purpose of modifying the sense of verbs is almost entirely discarded.[1] A few instances may suffice to illustrate the Semitic scheme of interior modification.[2]

If the root (SHBR) underlying the Hebrew verb *shabhar* "to break" (frangere), is to express the idea of breaking up, smashing, shattering, or shivering (*di*fringere), it becomes *shibber*. From *achal* "to eat" (edere, manducare), is formed the stronger term *icchel* "to eat up" (*com*edere, *con*sumere). Thus the Arabic *daraba* "to beat" (cædere), becomes *darraba*, if the idea of a sound cudgelling (*con*cidere) is intended to be conveyed. In these examples the linguistic symbolism is palpable enough. In the following instances it is less distinctly traceable, though a closer attention, or a naturally keener perception may not fail to discover it. From *palat* "to escape," we have *pillet* "to deliver;" from *qabhar* "to bury," *qibber* "to bury many persons." In Arabic, *hhalima* means "to know," while "to teach" is *hhallama*; *χashuna* "to be rough,"

[1] We would leave out the limiting adverb but for the prefixes employed in the formation of some of the so-called conjugations.

[2] The Hebrew letters for which there are no representatives in our alphabet will be supplied, in a manner, by the following devices. The presence of *Aleph* will only occasionally be denoted by the sign of length on the preceding vowel. For *Beth* and *Caph*, aspirate, we substitute *bh* and *ch*. *Ayin*, the peculiar Semitic guttural, will be represented by *hh*. This will oblige us to make use of a Greek letter (χ) for Hhet (χet). Between *Tith* and *Taw* (surd) we shall not distinguish; but for *Coph* (Qoph) we deem it advisable to substitute the letter (*q*) which took its place in the Latin alphabet. The most awkward of our devices will be *ss* for *Sade* (or *Dsade*, as the Germans pronounce it). As for the vowels and semi-vowels, we are at a loss how to represent them. For *shewa mobile* (and even *quiescens*, where desirable) we shall put *e*.

χAshana, "to handle roughly," *fariha* "to be glad," *farraha* "to make glad." A greater effort seems required for teaching, than for knowing, for making glad, than for being glad, etc.; hence the phonetic strengthening of the transitive and iterative terms. Still more difficult is it to understand how a mere exchange of vowels should convert an active verb into a passive. But such is the fact. From *higgid* "to announce," we form *huggad* "to be announced;" *hoχolah* "to cause pain," becomes *hoχolah*, and in this form signifies "to be pained." In Arabic, likewise, *qatala* means "to kill," and *qutila* "to be killed." An eminent writer on language, himself a Semite, finds it quite natural that an open vowel (*a*) should symbolize activity, while a hollow sound (*u*) serves to express the passive state.[1] And so it may be. But, certainly, all this is very remote from our ordinary way of moulding speech for the expression of ideas and their various relations.[2]

The instances heretofore adduced illustrate the scheme of interior modification, or inflection, as far as its *modus operandi* is subject to rules laid down in every Semitic grammar. The manner in which general meanings were differentiated at an earlier period, in the very budding-time of that speech, may be understood by means of the following example. If we are to believe Gesenius, the root QSS is simply the imitation of the sound produced by the action of cutting or striking (cædere, σχίζειν). But there are diverse ways of cutting; hence, that root, entering into a process of germination, produces a number of vocables to provide for all practical wants. From QSS itself we have *qassass* and *qassah* to cut off; *qassahh*, *qassar*, *qassabh* to cut off, to mow, to judge. The subforms QSH and QS furnish *qasas* to cut into, *qashabh* to point (by cutting), *qasah* to peel. Further modifications are QT and QD; they, in their turn, produce *qatabh* to strike down, to destroy, *qatal* to strike down, to kill, *qatan* to cut off, to shorten, *qataph* to tear off, to pluck, *qadad* to cut to pieces, to split. The variation CHS produces only *chasam* to cut off, to clip, to shear. But we are not at the end yet. With

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[1] H. Steinthal, in his Charakteristik der hauptsæchlichsten Typen des Sprachbaues, p. 259.

[2] There are, certainly, analogies to this grammatical device in our own family of speech. Thus, internal changes, indicative of formal relations, are exhibited in the following instances: *I sit* and *I set; I sing, I sang, I have sung;* and still more frequently in German; for instance: *ich werde, ich ward, ich wurde, ich würde, er wird, er ist* (*ge*)*worden*. But these are rather phenomena of an irregular character, than formations subject to constant rules. Internal changes (or inflections) in our tongues, are (to use Professor Whitney's words) "of secondary growth inorganic; they are called out ultimately by phonetic causes, not originated for the purpose of marking variation of meaning, though sometimes seized and applied to that purpose."—*Language and the Study of Language*, p. 293.

GZ and GD we have *gazaz* to mow, to shear, *gazah* to cut stones, *gazam*, *gazahh*, *gazal*, *gazar* to strike off, to cut off, to eat up (*de-pascere*), *gadad* to cut into, and *gadah* to strike off. Finally, *χassab* and *χatab* are set apart to denote the action of cutters of wood and stone; with *χadad* you sharpen; with *χassass* and *χassah* you split and divide; and this leads you to the last of the series, *χazah* "to discern," and hence, "to see."

All this is simply bewildering. We can hardly see our way through that jungle of palatals, gutturals, and dentals. Still, however, we must not be unjust to the framers of that speech. It cannot be denied that the remarkable development which the system of interior modification has taken in the Semitic idioms denotes a delicacy of the ear and a quickness of perception that argue well for the physical and mental organization of the race that speaks them. We may even, with some authors, recognize in it the manifestation of an inner sense for the symbolism of sound, much keener and livelier than that evinced by the Indo-European language-makers. But, let that be as it may, the rigid adherence to that system, and the almost total exclusion of the method of compounding, for the purpose of differentiating general meanings, has led to results which make the lexicology of the Semitic tongues a thorny field for Western students. The frequently ambiguous nature of those contrivances for enriching the vocabulary, the ensuing vagueness of signification, the difficulty of seizing analogies between form and meaning so awry from Indo-European linguistic habits, will hardly ever allow you to feel rightly at home in Semitic speech.

Now, enter the domain of the Algic idioms. You at once begin to breathe freely. Their broader and more plastic forms, the palpable significancy of almost every syllable, the variety and consistency of their devices for coining words and moulding speech—and among those devices not a few of quite familiar mien; all this combines to produce a feeling of freedom that puts you at ease amid your unwonted linguistic surroundings, and invites you to revel among etymological marvels you little expected to meet. Let it be beauty of a lower species, but beauty there is in those Indian tongues, and enough to dwell on for a lifetime.

The process of compounding has already been pointed out as the chief means by which Algic speech diversifies the meaning, and increases the significative power, of its verbal roots. How nearly in this respect the Algic tongues very often approach our own family of speech, it is easy to show. Every page of their vocabulary yields evidence. Here are some samples, selected almost at random, though, as will be seen, with an eye to the Latin dictionary.

We append a list of Magyar verbs for the purpose of a still more extensive comparison.[1]

Latin.	Ojibwa.	Cree.	English.	Magyar.
venit,	*dagwi*shin, *bi*izha, *bidassamo*sse,	*taku*sin, *pechi*ituttew, *pecha*stamsettew,	he arrives, he comes hither, he comes along (walking),	*ide meg*jönni.
cendit,	*omb*iska,	*opp*iskaw,	he ascends,	*rá*menni.
cumfertur ventus,	*abamo*yanimad,	*apamo*yotin,	(he goes on high), it is squally, (the wind flies around),	szel *körül* funi.
cumnavigat,	*baka*mashi, *giwita*yashi,	*papam*asiw, *wasakam*asiw,	he sails about, he circumnavigates,	*körül* hajózni. hajókázni.
mmoritur,	*dago*ne, *gigi*ne,	*tasta*wine, *kikiñ*,	he dies together (with others), he dies with anything,	*együtt* halni meg.
scendit,	*niss*andawe, *niss*akiwe,[1]	*nitt*attawe, *nitt*achiwe,[2]	he goes down (stairs, on a ladder, etc.), he descends (a hill, mountain, etc.),	*le*menni.
sperat,	*ana*wenjige,	*pon*aspeyimo,	he despises,	reménységet (spem.), elveszteni (perdere).
cit,	*sagiji*webinige, *sagiji*webizhiwe,	*wayawi*wepinikew, *wayawi*wepiniwew,	he casts out (things), (he ejects) (persons),	*ki*vetni.
idit,	*ping*isse,	*pichi*payiw,	he falls in,	*bele*esni.
idet,	*ap*abi,	*tett*apiw,	he sits on (anything),	ülni (with the superessive case).
ubat,	*api*shimo,	*takuchi*siñ,	he lies upon (anything),	*le*feküdni.
icit,	*pinj*webinige, *pinj*webizhiwe,	*pichi*webinike, *pichi*webiniwe,	he throws in anything, he injects inanimate, he throws in (any inanimate being),	*bele*vetni.
nascitur,	*anj*nigi,	*kawi*nittawikiw,	he is born again, he is reborn,	*újra* születni.
vertitur,	*azhe*giwe,	*kweski*payiw,	he returns, he turns back,	*visszatérni.* *viszsza* fordúlni.
ungit se,	*bake*wizhiwe,	*paske*wiyiwew,	he separates from (a. p.), he parts with (any person),	*ketfelé* válni.
rgit,	*oni*shka,	*wani*skaw,	he rises, he uprises,	*fel*kelni.
ccedit,	*anike*shkage,	*aniske*skage,	he succeeds,	*utánna* lenni.
spicatur,	*anam*endam,	*atame*yittam,	he suspects,	gyanakodni.
anscribit,	*anfi*biige, *nassabi*biige,	*raspa*sinaike, *naspi*peike, (he depicts).	he transcribes, he copies,	*ki*irni. *le*irni.
ansnat,	*azhaw*adaga,	*azhiwakame*yayanam, (across the water),	he swims across,	*ált*alúszni.

It cannot fail to be seen how nearly, from the morphological point of view, the Algic vocables resemble their Latin counterparts. It is not quite so with the corresponding English terms, one-half of which have strayed from the synthetical path. Nor would it be difficult to point out some considerable differences betweeen our Latin and Algic samples; and it may be proper to notice one or two of the most significant. Among the Latin compounds in our table, there are but two (*renasci* and *scjungo*) whose prefixes have no separate existence in the matured Roman language; of the Ojibwa particles, on the contrary, hardly one-half still possess a life of their

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[1] The Magyar language, a subdivision of the Finno-Hungarian or Ugrian branch of the Scythian family, is one of the few better known dialects of the Old World, outside of the Indo-European family, that differentiates the more general meaning of verbs by prefixing adverbial and prepositional particles; though not to the same extent as the older Indo-European languages and some of the modern. The Magyar equivalents of our Indian compounds are taken from Márton's dictionary, as there given, *i. e.*, in the infinitive. The particles are italicized, both in the Magyar and Algic samples.

[2] The verbs *nissakiwe* (Oj.) and *nittachiwe* (Cree) are samples of compound adverbs converted into verbs. An English imitation of this form would be "he down-hills it."

own, as adverbs or prepositions (*giwitayi* around, *nissayi* below, *pinjayi* inside, *anamayi* below, *azhawayi* behind, *nassab* equally; and, in a certain sense *dago* "there is some," and *api*, which in some dialects means "there"). As for the *verbal* constituents of our Algic compounds, the comparison gives a still less favorable result. But five or six of them can, at the present stage of the language, be employed with any kind of prefixes (*izha* he goes, *animad* it blows, *abi* he is there, *nigi* he is born, *webinige* and *webizhiwe* he throws); while every one of the Latin verbs in our list may lose its head (the prefixed particle) and still live; though, in the case of some, the form should be somewhat altered. If this, however, be a reproach to the Algic compounds, it falls as well on most of our own. A preposition *de*, for example, and a verb *scend* (or *seand*) have no more existence in the Anglo-Saxon branch of our family of speech, than *niss* and *andawe* in Ojibwa, or *nitt* and *attawe* in Cree; and, but for our schoolmasters, we would soon make sad havoc with most of our compounds borrowed from the classic tongues.

Moreover, it cannot fail to be noticed that most of the Latin prefixes in our list are represented by two or more Algic particles; *ad*, for instance, by four (*omb*—, bi—, *dago*—, and *bidassam*); *circum* by three (*giwita*—, *babam*—, and *abamo*); and similarly with the rest. In general there are, in Latin, between twenty and thirty particles in common use as verbal prefixes, while in Ojibwa at least five times that number may be counted. And those Algic particles (with few exceptions) are by no means interchangeable; each has its definite meaning and corresponding use. Finally, most of the verbal roots themselves, that enter into those compounds, have a less general signification, and, in consequence, a greater number of them is needed. All this is but in keeping with the singularly graphic, nay, picturesque, character of our Indian dialects; a character which makes the most developed of them as close a portraiture of sensible realities as is consistent with the nature of human speech.

For want of space the Semitic verb had to be left out of our synoptical table. The Hebrew terms, it is true, are short enough, but, for our present purpose, not only the various synonyms, but also their diverse meanings, together with the Indian rendering of those meanings, should have been shown in the table. Thus, although the number of Hebrew synonyms for the notion "to arrive," is exceptionally small, the first word alone would have furnished the following group:

Hebrew: bo athah, atha.

(2) *ad*venit, (3) *per*venit, (4) *in*greditur, (5) it, (6) *ab*it, (7) *pro*ficiscitur, (1) venit, (2) *ad*venit, (3) *ac*cedit. (8) iter facit, (9) (sol) *oc*cumbit.

izha (5), he goes.	*bi*zha (1), he comes. (he is coming hither).	maja (*mad*-izha) (6, 7), he starts. (he is going away).	*ani*maja (5), he is going along.	*bim*osse (5), he goes. he walks.	*bidassam*osse (12), he comes. he is walking this way.
vashi (2), es (sailing). gako (2), (on the ice).	*bim*ashi (5, 8), he goes (sailing). *nas*ikage (10), he approaches.	*bid*ashi (1), he comes sailing). *besho*sikage (10), he comes near.	*baba*madisi (8), he travels. *dagwi*shin (2,3), he arrives (by land).	*mad*adisi (8), he journeys. *od*ishiwe (2), he arrives.	*mizh*aga (3), he arrives (by water). *od*itaowe (2), he arrives (in a canoe).
	*pind*ige (4), he enters.	*pangi*shimo (9), the sun goes down.			

As for the second verb in the list (*ascendere*), its most usual Hebrew equivalent is *allah*, whose leading signification may be set down as (1) to go up (*as*cendere, *con*scendere), (2) to be raised up (*e*levari, *e*fferi), and (3) to pass over (*transcendere*). Its principal Ojibwa equivalents are *ogidakiwe*, *akwandawe* (1); *ombishka*, *ombina*, *ishpina* (2); *aniwishkage*, *aniwisse* (3); the particles used in their composition are *ogid—*, *ako—*, *omb—*, *ishp—*, and *aniw—*.

It would be tedious, nor is it necessary, to complete the synopsis, or enter into any further details. The instances compared and explained sufficiently demonstrate the expediency of compounding particles and verbs, and the excellent use made of this system, not only in our own tongues, but also—perhaps excessively so—in those of the Algic family. Nor is there any need of showing by means of additional examples what the Semite has lost by his persistent adherence to the system of interior modification. Within the narrow and almost immovable boundary of his triliteral scheme there are also narrow limits to the commutation of vowels and consonants, and every verbal root is not an aggregate of hissing dentals and rattling gutturals, utterable in a variety of manners, and prolific of nicely shaded terms for the expression of cognate conceptions. Hence the comparative sterility of a number of roots.

To proceed in our comparative view of the two families of speech, that division of the grammar which, in agglutinative as well as in inflective tongues, is first in importance, next claims our attention. The conjugation of the verb has, under the hands of the Algic language-makers, received a development somewhat—or as others view it, entirely—out of proportion with other parts of the grammatical system. But shorn of its excrescences (if really useful parts of a linguistic organism can be called so), a ground plan remains, which but slightly differs from that adopted by the founders of our own system of conjugation, and which forms a most striking contrast to the structure of the Semitic verb. This, you will say, is but what should be expected. The marked individuality of the Semitic race, and the corresponding peculiar character of its speech, preclude the thought of discovering anything

congeneric with the latter in the realm of language, and least of all in the speech of an inferior race. This may be conceded. But the angle of divergence that gapes between the Semitic and the Indo-European conjugational scheme, strikingly demonstrates the wide range of possibilities in the working out of so important a part of the grammar; and the fact that the Algic conjugation (as far as its general framework is concerned) comes so closely up to the Indo-European plan, is certainly creditable to the mental capacity of the race itself. The adoption, however unconscious, of very similar courses in expressing thought is hardly explainable on any other hypothesis than that of an innate agreement in the mode of conceiving relations. Is it not, then, encouraging that our Algic friends should, in the arrangement of the tenses, and partly, also, the modes, have struck the same road as that of our (Indo-European) ancestors?

The well-known defect of the Semitic verb is its poverty in forms for the expression of the diverse relations of time. There are, strictly speaking, only two such forms, and so strange is their application that we find our grammatical nomenclature at fault when we try to select adequate terms for them. By looking over the following table readers unacquainted with the Semitic conjugation will be able to form an idea of the promiscuous, and, according to our sense of expediency, very singular use made of those two forms, the perfect or preterite and the imperfect or future, the former denoting chiefly completed action, the latter incomplete. The Bari (Negroe) scheme of conjugation, and the equivalent of the Algic tenses in a monosyllabic tongue (Annamese or Cochin-Chinese) are appended as a further means to estimate the value of the Indian plan, and its degree of agreement with our own (especially the Latin):

Ojibwa. Theme: IKIT.	English.	Hebrew.[1]	Bari.[2]	Annamese.[3]
Ikito,	he says,	yomar (Imperf.), amar (Perf.),	nge jajambu (Durative), nge jambu (Aorist),	nó nói. ("he say").
Ikitoban,	he was saying, he said, (*dicebat*),	amar, yomar, wayomer,	nge jambu, nge ajambu,	duoong khi nó nói. ("time then he say").
Giikito,	he has said, he said, (*dixit*),	amar, yomar, wayomer,	nge ajambu, nge jambu,	nó da nói. "he already say."
Giikitoban,	he had said,	amar,	nge ajambu,	nó da nói khi truói. ("he already say then before").
Taikito,	he will say,	yomar, amar,	nge jajambu,	nó se nói. ("he by and by say").
Tagiikito,	he will have said,	amar,	nge jajambu,	khi nó se da nói "he then by and by already say

[1] The fact is that, with hardly an exception, either of the forms may be used in the place of any of our tenses, not, indeed, quite indiscriminately, but according to (rather elastic) rules. To do justice to the Semitic scheme, it must be confessed that its practical working is not so bad as might be surmised from the miserly number and consequent ambiguity of its tenses; for, in most cases, the context leaves no doubt as to the

This table exhibits but the principal tenses of the Algic verb. Other forms (or agglutinations) denoting relations of time, for whose expression the Hebrew grammar has made no provision, are the following: *wiikito* he is about to say (*dicturus est*), *aiikitoban* he was about to say; *tawiikito* he will be about to say.[4] Certain niceties of distinction, peculiar to some Algic dialects, we must pass over, to come to another point of divergence, of no mean importance.

If the Semitic verb is deficient in tenses, it is equally so in inflectional forms for the expression of modal relations. Though poorer, in this respect, than some[5] of the Indo-European tongues, our Indian speech has worked out modal forms which have no

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acceptation of those conjugational forms. We may even recognize a sort of poetic flight in that of ignoring the antithesis of past, present, and future, the exact expression of which seems to us Western people inseparable from an adequate representation of the element of time. To a form of speech which, in its choicest products, was to soar up, eagle-like, into the sphere of prayer and prophecy, we must not, of course, apply the measure of our sober logic. A question, however, may be permitted. Had our Indian tongues taken the same view of the relations of time, formally distinguishing only between action complete and incomplete, and were they equally poor in tenses, would not such a course have been animadverted upon by some ethnographer, or linguist, as a striking proof of the red man's intellectual inferiority? In our opinion, any single defect, however great it be, in a people's speech has but little weight for determining its intellectual rank. It is the sum total of shortcomings on one hand, and of excellencies on the other, that decides the question. Is it not so in the case of individuals? There have been geniuses, unable to master the mutiplication table; and intellectual giants, unfit for managing their little household affairs.

[2] It will be noticed how nearly the Bari conjugation approaches the looseness of the Semitic plan. If there be no genetic connection between Semitic and African speech, the vivacity of the Negro, his buoyancy of spirits (which forms so striking a contrast to the sedate character of our Indians) would have to account for the former's off hand way in the employment of his tenses. In regard to the use of the Bari tenses we quote from "Die Sprache der Bari," by Dr. Frederic Müller: "The construction, in Bari, of this part of speech [the verb] is extremely simple. It rests as in [some] other languages on the antithesis of action entirely past and completed, and action as yet progressing and incomplete. The former form, we briefly call the aorist, the latter the durative. The first is the simple root (the infinitive), the second is formed by reduplication. In order to denote the aorist as a pure preterite, the substantial verb '*a*' is prefixed." From the Bari tests in Dr. Mitterrutzner's "Die Sprache der Bari," it would seem that these rules are subject to several exceptions.

[3] In regard to the Annamese tenses, or *quasi*-tenses as given above (from Bishop Taberd's "Dictionarium Latino-Anamiticum"), it hardly needs to be remarked that in ordinary conversation as well as in literary composition so many of the particles may be dropped as are not absolutely required for the intelligibility of the sentence. In most cases, one or two suffice; or they may be omitted entirely, the context making up for the want.

[4] This form is also used in the sense of "he desires to say;" *e. g.*, *wi wissini* he wishes to eat. *Winiba* may mean: "he desires to sleep," or "he is at the point of falling asleep." From *winibo* "he is about to die," a participle (*wanibod*) is formed, which is the counterpart of the Latin *moribundus*.

[5] We use this word advisedly; the Russian tongue, for instance, has not even a conjunctive.

grammatical equivalent in the Semitic language. The most remarkable is its subjunctive. In the actual use of this mode the Algic tongues go far beyond the limits within which our languages employ it. Nevertheless, the term *subjunctive* is used with perfect propriety; for the office of this mode, in Algic, is to denote the fact of a sentence being made subject (*yoked* as it were) to another. Thus, its regular employment forms the exact counterpart to a rule in the German grammar, according to which in every subject sentence the ordinary position of verb and auxiliary must be inverted. For example: "*ich* HABE *gesagt*" is in Ojibwa NIN *giikit;* and "*ich weiss dass ich gesagt* HABE" ("I know I said") is translated *nin kikendan thi giikit*OYAN. There exists, however, a difference, and it rests on the synthetical character of the American tongue. The Indian, having no auxiliary verb, inverts the position of verb and *pronoun* (*nin*, in our example), and, at the same time, agglutinates it in a manner that gives the termination thus formed all the appearance of a genuine inflection (oyan, in the example).[1]

The working out of this Algic subjunctive was a master-stroke. The effects of its employment in the compound sentence pervade the entire language, giving it tone and color, not to say a tinge of elegance. No other part, perhaps, of the grammar and syntax brings those American dialects into such close proximity with our

[1] Algic scholars will find the above rather a novel way of explaining the genesis of the conjunctive ending. Their attention is invited to the following observations: 1. The fact of the shifting of the pronoun in the independent sentence has certainly been obscured by a process of phonetic decay generally considered unusual, if not impossible, in agglutinative tongues. It would not be the first time that facts contradicted theories. The comparative study of the Algic dialects and of the other branches of the Innuit-Nahuatl family will one day throw light on the subject. In the meantime we may take it for granted that the *independent* personal pronouns which were in use when the agglutination in question gained ground, differed more or less from those we are now acquainted with. In any event, how are we to account for those subjunctive endings, unless we take them to be metamorphosed pronouns, like the personal terminations in every other language, inflective or agglutinative? 2. The position of the pronoun (behind the verb) which by agglutination and phonetic decay gave rise to the present subjective endings, may at an earlier stage of the language have been the only one in use. In this case, a second conjugational series (with the independent pronouns placed before the verb, or prefixed in a shorter form) would have been worked out by a process analogous to that which produced the analytical forms in the modern Indo-European conjugations. Instead, however, of making a patchwork (*sit venia verbo!*) of the two forms, as our languages do, the Algic dialects have fully preserved the older, though restricting its use in the manner explained, *i. e.*, employing it exclusively in the subject sentence, and—it should be added—for the formation of the participle and some persons of the imperative. 3. In the Cree dialect, distinct traces of this (problematically) older form are discoverable in the indicative. Compare the following:

	Ojibwa.		Cree.	
Indicative present.	Subjunctive.	Imperative.	Indicative present.	Imperative.
1. p. sing. nind ikit,	ikit*oyan*.		1. p. sing. ni kit*on*.	
2. p. " kid ikit,	ikit*oyan*,	ikiton.	2. p. " ki kit*on*,	kitow.
3. p. " ikito,	ikitod.		3. p. " kitow.	
2. p. plur. kidikitom,	ikitoyeg,	ikitog.	2. p. plur. ki kitonawa,	kitok.

own family of speech. For, not only do these conjunctive endings morphologically bear a close resemblance to our conjugational inflections, but the practical employment of the mood widens the compass of the sentence and facilitates the construction of periods truly organic and, on a small scale, more akin to those of our own tongues than, perhaps, anything within the compass of the Semitic idioms. The alternate use of the two distinct forms prevents the too frequent occurrence of the same personal pronouns, or of the like endings, and thus relieves the monotony of diction, nay, frequently produces a pleasing rhythmic cadence. It enables the speaker to dispense with certain conjunctions and thus to impart a degree of pith and rapidity to idioms generally not considered remarkable for those qualities.[1] We might even recognize a kind of symbolism in the contrast of the two forms: the indicative being employed in the independent sentence and making an impression of unbending sturdiness, the subjunctive form being more pliant and feeble.[1] Examples will enable the reader to pronounce on the justness of these remarks. A word of caution, however, must be premised.

Of all European tongues our own is perhaps the most unfit for illustrating, by means of interlinear version, the peculiarities of any more synthetical idiom. The ravages caused by linguistic decay and the ensuing tendency towards a more and more analytical expression of thought, have produced in the English idiom changes of an almost revolutionary character. Whatever it may have gained by this process, it has lost that vitality which in the youth of our linguistic family multiplied and preserved endings of great beauty and singular efficacy for the free and artistical arrangement of periods. If any one doubt if this be a real loss, let him compare any English version of Horace or Homer with the Latin or Greek texts. The most masterly of translations is no more like the original (to use the simile of a witty writer on language) than a walking stick is like a tree in full bloom.[2] The fault, of course, is not the translator's, but that of his modern idiom. Should this be considered too severe, let us say, then, that our modern English when compared with the classical tongues is as the masted vessel in full rig compared with the woods and fields that furnished the material for its construction. The ship, too, has a beauty of her own (especially when sailing under full canvas), but

> "With all her bravery on, and tackle trim,
> Sails filled and streamers waving,"

[1] It must be acknowledged that a good deal of what is said in the latter part of this paragraph applies also to the effect produced by the alternate use of the imperfect and perfect in the Semitic tongues.

[2] Words: their Use and Abuse. By William Mathews, LL.D., p. 34.

she cannot convey an idea of a northern pine forest or a hemp field in full bloom. Whatever, then, may be said in praise of the English language—the best adapted, probably, among modern idioms for the expression of modern thought—it cannot but make an awkward appearance when forced, for purposes like our present, into moulds furnished by a synthetical tongue. Hence, the English version of the following samples of Algic phrases and periods should not be considered as doing justice to them. It is like the chopped-off limbs of a stately tree piled in disorder around its mutilated trunk. The Latin tongue will serve our purpose much better, and this must account for our unceremoniously pressing Cicero's vernacular into the service of our aboriginal languages.

The first sentence which, in Bishop Baraga's grammar, serves to illustrate the use of the Ojibwa subjunctive, is the following: *Kish-pin pakach* [*gi-*] *ikitoyan wenizhishing gego chi* [*wi-*] *izhichigeyan, izhichigen.* The prefixes in brackets might be used by a nice speaker. Translated, word for word, and without regard to English synthetical rules, this sentence would run as follows: "If once thou-have-said good some-thing that thou-be-about-to-do, so-do." This is intelligible enough. But the impression made by the Algic collocation of words, by the subjunctive forms (*ikitoyan* and *izhichigeyan*) and their contrast with the shorter and oxytonous imperative (*izhichigen*) is much better echoed, so to say, by the equally exact, though not elegant, Latin translation: *si semel dixeris bonum quid quod facturus-sis, ita-fac.* Were we to attempt a Hebrew translation, we might say: *haamartha bhe aχath: ehheseh dabhar tobh? hhaseh haddabhar hazzeh, i. e.* "hast-thou-said once: I-shall-do thing good? do the-thing the-this;" *dixisti-ne semel: faciam rem bonam? fac rem hanc.* Or otherwise: *im-beaχath tomar*, etc., "if once thou-shalt say," etc., *si semel dices*, etc. Perhaps, also, thus: *amartha chi thobheh laasoth*, "thou-hast-said that thou-wilt to-do," *dixisti quod cogitabis* (*cogitas*) *ad-facere;* or, even *amartha chi chhese*, etc., "thou hast said that I-shall-do," etc., *dixisti quod faciam*, etc. There are yet other manners of expression left; but, whichever way we turn the phrases, their literal version will hardly make as good Latin as that of the Algic sentence does.[1]

The second example in the aforementioned grammar is this: *Apegish enamiangin izhi-bimadisiyeg, kaginig gizhigong chi zhawendagosiyeg; i. e.*, as there translated, "would that you lived like Christians that you may be happy forever in heaven;" or, again,

[1] The use of the direct form of speech, in similar constructions, is optional in Ojibwa. In the following it would probably be preferred: *ningoting eta "Kego tanginangen" giizhiyamban, Kawin nin da-gitanginansin, i. e., semel tantum ne hoc-tangas si mihi-dixisses, non tetigissem;* though we might as well say: *ginaamawiyamban chi tanginansiwan*, etc., *si-mihi-interdinisses ut non-tangam*, etc.

in a closely fitting Latin dress: *utinam christianos-ut-decet* (participle) *sic-vivatis, in-æternum in-cælo ut beati-sitis.* Instead of a Hebrew translation, which might be objected against as unfair, or unHebrew (and probably not without good cause), any biblical sentence of similar construction will serve our purpose. The following may not be far from the mark: *mah Yehowah shoel mehhimach Ki im-lishmor eth misswoth Yehowah . . . . letobh lach;* that is, according to the Douay version, and omitting all phrases not needed for our purpose, "what else does the Lord require of thee but that thou keep the commandments of the Lord . . . . that it may be well with thee?" A close, literal translation, however, would run thus: "what Jehovah asking of with-thee but if-for-to-keep commandments-(of) Jehovah for to-be-well to-thee;" or, not a whit better, in Latin: *quid Dominus petens ex tecum sed si-ad-custodire legem Domini ad-bonum-esse tibi?* This is decidedly worse than our similarly close translations from Ojibwa. The phrases that concern us more particularly are *lishmor eth misswoth* and *letobh lach, i. e., ad custodire legem ad bonum esse tibi.* The Ojibwa translation would be *chi ganawendaman ganasongewinan,* and *chi minoayayan, i. e., ut custodias mandata* and *ut bene sit tibi;* and such is, as should be expected, the rendering of the Vulgate.

In the preceding example the general construction of the Hebrew period has not been perceptibly altered in the several versions. There are, however, numerous instances in which such a proceeding has been deemed expedient in order to conform the translation to the genius of our idioms, and in many of those cases an Algic translator would be obliged to follow the very same course if he would produce an idiomatic version. A few examples will not be devoid of interest, at least to readers who have had endurance enough to follow us even thus far.

A frequent change in our versions is that from the direct to the indirect form of speech; another, the substitution of a subject sentence to a co-ordinate. The English and Latin translations of the following short period contain an instance of either sort: *Eich tomar ahahhtich welibbcha en itti?* The Vulgate translates: *Quomodo dicis quod amas me, cum animus tuus non sit mecum?* The Douay edition likewise: "How doest thou say *thou lovest* me *when* thy mind is not with me?" But the literal rendering would be: "Why thou-sayest *I-love*-thee, *and*-thy-heart not with-me?" Who would not expect to meet a construction so simple and almost infantine in one of our aboriginal tongues, rather than in the speech of the highly gifted Hebrew? But an Ojibwa would say: *Anishwin ikitoyan chi sagiiyan kide ano-wiijiwigossiwan?* Literally: "How (is it) thou-say (subjunctive) *that* thou-love-me (subjunctive) thy-heart *though*-it-be-not-with-me?" It would, however, not be

inelegant, in this instance, to imitate the Hebrew construction thus: *Wegonen ki-sagiin wenji-izhiyan, ka-dash ki-wijideemissi?* "What 'I-love-thee' thou-tellest-me-for, and-no thy-heart-is-not-with-mine?" And thus, perhaps, an Algic Delilah would have expressed herself.[1]

There is no conjunction in more frequent use in Ojibwa and the most nearly related dialects than the enclitic *dash*.[2] It is almost the exact counterpart of the Greek δέ, and, consequently, in many cases, represents the Hebrew *wa* or *we*. Like the latter, it may stand for *and, but, then, too*, etc. In very many cases, however, that Hebrew conjunction may, or even must, be rendered by different particles. Other expedients, such as the use of manifold participles, also help to give the Algic historical style more variety, though the proper field of our aboriginal tongues is the rhetorical department. In the following instance the Ojibwa version will be found to depart even farther from the simplicity of the Hebrew construction than the Douay translators thought expedient to go. We copy the original and two versions without further comment, adding only the accustomed interlinear translation.

Hebrew Text.—"*Wa*yabhon shene hammaleachim sedomah bah-herebh, *we*lot yoshebh beshahhr-sedom; *wa*yare lot *wa*yagam, lig-eratham *wa*yishtaχu appaim aressah."

Literal Translation.—"*And*-they-came two the-angels to-Sodom in-the-evening, *and*-Lot sitting at-gate(-of) Sodom. *And*-he-saw, Lot; *and*-he-stood-up for-to-meet-them, *and*-he-bent-himself to-earth."

Douay Version.—"*And* the two angels came to Sodom in the evening *and* Lot was sitting in the gate of the city. *And* seeing them he rose up *and* went to meet them *and* worshipped prostrate to the ground."

Ojibwa Version.—"Eni-onagoshig-*dash* S-odoming gidagwishinog nizh (igiw) anzheniwag, Lot megwa nanamadabid odena wenji-kichi-ishkwandemiwang. Wayabamad-*dash* gipasigwi wi-awi-nagishkawad, ogi-apichi-zhagashkitawan-*dash* (*or*, ogianamikawan-dash michayi giapagisod)."

Literal Translation.—"*And*-about-evening at-Sodom they-arrived two (those) angels, Lot while he-thus-sits town where-great-door-to-it-is. *And*-seeing-them he-stood-up so-he-would-meet-them (*subject*) *and*-he-perfectly-bowed-to-them (*or*, and-he-saluted-them

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[1] Very far, as usual, from the pithy and childlike style of the original departs a French translation (of the last century), which may be appended as almost a *curiosum*: "Comment dites-vous que vous m'aimez, puisque *vous ne témoignez que de l'eloignement pour moi?*"

[2] In Pottawattomie it is —*che*. The Cree, which is remarkably rich in particles (especially expletives) has in its place *maka, mina, wawach*, —*sta*, etc.

on-the-ground by-throwing-himself" [*perfect subj.*]). "Vespereque Sodomæ advenerunt duo (illi) angeli, Lot cum-sic-sedeat urbs ex-qua-parte-magna-porta-ei-est. Vidensque-eos surrexit ut-obiam-eat-eis, prossusque-ante-eos-se-incurvavit (*or*, salutavitque-eos humi (cum) se-prostraverit)."

For a last sample of Hebrew and Algic style the following more lengthy period (of much later date than the preceding) may yet be submitted. We begin with the English (Douay) version of the passage selected. "I thought in my heart to withdraw from wine that I might turn my mind to wisdom and might avoid folly, till I might see what was profitable for the children of men: and what they ought to do under the sun all the days of their life." To judge from the construction of the Hebrew text, there seems to be a somewhat close logical connection intended between the last two clauses. Accordingly, we translate: "Nin-gigizhendam (*or imperfect:* nin-gizhendanaban) zhominabo chi wibonitoyan, mi-dash nibwakawin chi pinjideesh kagoyan, gagibadisiwin-dash chi midagwendaman, binish wayabandamowanen (*dubitative*) wegonen iw wenizhishininig ge-onji-zhawendagosiwagwen (*dubitative*) bemadisijid, kishpin izhijigewapan (*imperf. subjunct.*) megwa babishagiwad aking;" *i. e.*, "I-made-up-my-mind wine that I-would-give-up, and-thus wisdom that enter-into-my-heart (*subj.*) and-folly that I-push-from-my-thoughts (*subj.*) until I-might-see (*dubit.*) what (-may-be) that good by-means-of-which-they-would-likely-become-happy (*dubit.*) the living, if-they-did-it (*imp. subj.*) while they-move-about (*subj.*) on earth." Now compare with this the equally literal translation of the Hebrew text: "I-thought in-my-heart for-to-withdraw from-wine my-flesh and-my-heart leading to-wisdom, and-for-to-keep from-folly till-which I-shall-see what (-is-it) good to-sons (-of) man which they-will-do under-the-heavens number (-of) days (-of) their life."[1]

Are we wrong in asserting a certain agreement, as far as period-building is concerned, between the Algic and the Indo-European idioms? It is perceptibly closer, at least, than that which exists between the latter and the Semitic. The divergence between our own mode of expressing thought, and that peculiar to the Indian, is undoubtedly very great. It appears especially when the two families of language are *singly* compared with each other. But let both be placed side by side with any of the other great types of

[1] Here is the Hebrew text: "Tareti bhelibbi limeshok bayain eth-besari, welibbi noheg baχochmah, welieχoz besichluth, ad asher erech e-zeh tobh libhene haadam, asher yaasu taχath hashamaim mispar yeme hayehem." As for the sense of the phrases *limeshok bayain* and *weleeχeoz besichluth*, we follow the authorized version. At first sight they would seem to have the very opposite meaning. However this be, the sense of those words has nothing to do with the matter of style or period-building.

speech, and they will at once be found to stand in closer proximity. The reason is evident. That proceeding simply puts in a stronger light what the two forms of speech have in common; and of this there is enough to impress us with a feeling of kinship hardly anticipated.

A more extensive comparison of Algic and Semitic speech would have brought out this fact more to the writer's satisfaction; whether also to the reader's is another question. We plead guilty to a degree of partiality for the Algic tongues; and partialities—however so much they may help to discover hidden worth—are also apt to bias one's judgment. Besides, cannot we expect to accomplish—what is in no man's power—to teach a language by half an hour's reading. Idioms cannot be painted and looked at like landscapes. To say the least, one must first become measurably familiarized with the sounds and etymological forms of a strange tongue before he can appreciate its characteristics. Hence the difficulty of imparting to others—by means of samples and more or less awkward interpretations—your own impression of language, and thus bringing home to them the naturalness, fitness, ingenuity, or even beauty, of linguistic forms and devices with which you are more or less familiar, but which to them are almost mazes or riddles.

Will it be believed that the Algic tongues can lend themselves with tolerably good grace to the translation or imitation of the simpler class of our poetry? And, *vice versa*, that Algic verses can stand the test of a literal translation into our own tongues, especially the Latin? Here are two stanzas of an *original* Ojibwa poem, together with their translation into such Latin as our readers must now be well accustomed to. The rhymes in this artless version were not intended; with the exception of one pair, they came out quite naturally, in consequence of the correspondence between the Latin inflections and the Indian "agglutinations" (as philologists seem determined to call them).

Evening Hymn.	Latin Translation.
In the House of Prayer.	
(After the air "God of Might.")	*Almost Literal.*
I.	I.
Zhesos Debenimiyang,[1]	Jesu, qui-gubernas-nos,[1]
Minawa ningogizhigak	Iterum per-unum-diem
Gaganawenimiyang:	Salvos-qui-servasti-nos:
Endayan,[2] chi-bwa-tibikak,	Ubi-degis,[2] ante nœtem
Nongom ki-nasikags,	Nunc ad-Te accedimus
Migwech, migwech kid-igo.[3]	Grates tibi agimus.[3]

[1] Properly: *qui prorsus in potestate tua habes nos.*

[2] The church, as the House of God; or, in a narrower and higher sense, the tabernacle.

[3] Literally: *gratias, gratias tibi agimus.*

II.	II.
Minik nongom gizhigak	Tu[1] quodcunque hodie
Ga-izhi-zhawenimiyang,	Boni-es-largitus-nobis,
Mi-wenji-kikendagwak	Ex illo, quantopere
Ezhi-kichi-sagiiyang:	Tu-nos-ames, constat nobis:[2]
Migwech, migwech kid-igo,	Grates Tibi-agimus,
Eshkam ki-sagiigo.	Te plus-plusque et[3] amamus.

It is not always equally easy to turn Algic poetry into Latin verses of the same metre. The reason, strange as it may appear, is this, that the classic tongue sometimes fails to furnish vocables sufficiently short to render the exact sense of each line, or stanza, within a like number of syllables. Such we found the case to be with the first of the following pair of strophes, culled from the late lamented Father Gailland's (S. J.) collection of Pottawattomie hymns. For the purpose of comparison with a kindred dialect, we translate them into Ottawa, which holds a middle position between Ojibwa and Pottawattomie, as far as a small part of its vocabulary and grammar is concerned.

Pottawattomie.	Ottawa.	Latin.
I.	I.	I.
Kimiyashewi Adam, netim kos'nan,	Gibatadodam Adam, mitam kossina,	Peccavit Adam, protoparens noster,
Shiw k'tukanuk washk'puk ekimichit;	Azhiwi kitiganing washkobak agimijid;	Illic in horto dulce quando man ducavit;
En'gokwakku chayek onichansin	Enigokwakaki kakina onijanissan	Ubique terrarum universos liberos suos
Iw etotuk okik'chenukaan.	Iwi endodang ogikichiinigaan.	Hoc faciendo graviter sanciavit.
II.	II.	II.
Chowi Mani kishepinat'sisi;	Kawi Mani gi-izhi-banadisissi;	Nequaquam Maria taliter corrupta ast;
Win pshu nisheke, nawesh k'chek'nukawshen	Winsa nizhike nawayi minessagawanzhing	Ipsa enim sola inter spinas
Kejwa wewnuk paniyak waskoneto,	Tanassag wenizhishing banak wassakone,	Instar amœni præclari floris,
Mazhat'sikin piyepashkpukse.[4]	Gwenachiwingi bipashkibagisi.	In pulchritudine sua efflorescit.[4]

Can it at any time be importunate to say a word in favor of a people with whose speech, as it moves along in simple strains of praise and thanksgiving, names dear to every Catholic heart are—let us

[1] The pronoun (*tu*) has been anticipated for the sake of the metre. In the original it appears in the second line, and nearly in the ending. The precise translation of this line and the next would be: *Omne hodierna die*—Bonum-quod-largitus-es-nobis.

[2] The collocation of words in the original is as follows: *Hoc-est unde-constat, quantopere-tu-nos ames.* The pronoun *nobis* is added for the sake of the metre.

[3] The particle *et*, here inserted to avoid the elision, is wanting in the text. Would one of our orientalists try a translation (Hebrew, Syriac, or Arabic) in the same metre and equally faithful, that is, preserving the construction of the periods, and neither adding nor omitting any greater number of terms than that acknowledged in our notes? He will find it a difficult task; much harder, at any event, than ours was.

[4] A more accurate translation of this line would be: *Ut mos est pulchris, felia coram explicat.*

hope, forever—interwoven? Whose fertile vocabulary is never found at fault when wanted to give adequate expression to doctrines the most sublime and consoling?[1]

It has come to pass (within the writer's recollection) that men of education and means, who travelled among the tribes, or by some whim of fortune found their lot cast among Indian society, became so enamored with that free and unartificial sort of life, and so much attached to those rude but honest denizens of woodlands and prairies, that they never, or but reluctantly, exchanged the rough charms of a life in the wilderness for the comforts of civilization and the questionable sweets of polished society. Something similar happens to students of the Algic, or other equally developed Indian dialects. Taking up the task for merely practical purposes, they soon find themselves ensnared. The farther they advance, the more they learn to love and value these languages. Called away from those that speak them, they long to listen again to their never-exhausted and ever-novel strain of graphic and ingenious combinations. Their Indian books or manuscript notes go with them and help to while away many an hour of leisure. Such is the fascination of those aboriginal tongues. The whole poetry of our American woods, rivers, and lakes seems embodied in the speech which, growing up among them, spreads its branches over the length and breadth of the continent.

And more than this! A people's speech is the photograph of its mental constitution. It reveals what there is in them, much more so than their outward manners and actual degree of culture. Had there been students of comparative philology in Brennus's times, or in the days of Marius, they could have told the Roman senate that those Northern barbarians were not to be trifled with. Study the Indian tongues, and the feeling of brotherhood, which can never be entirely wanting in the breast of a true man, not to say a Christian, will be kindled to a flame. You see the capabilities which a common Creator has laid down in the depth of those souls. Those souls—you become more and more convinced of it—deserve care and culture. They too were made to share with yours the knowledge of Him who created, and who became incarnate to save both you and them. Those tongues too are destined to chime in with yours in His praise. *Omnis lingua laudet Dominum!*

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[1] An example in point, from the Ojibwa and Ottawa vocabulary: *Bininigi*, "sine macula nascitur;" *binigi* "sine macula concipitur." Where is the Indo-European dialect that could do the like?

APPENDIX.

Indian Reminiscences of Pontiac's Conspiracy, and the English War of 1812.

Explanatory.

Several years ago, the older heads of Middle Village, a small Ottawa settlement in Lower Michigan, met for the purpose of overhauling their stock of historical knowledge concerning certain promises made to their tribe by the British, more than a hundred years ago. Some of those men must, in their early youth, have been acquainted with eye-witnesses of the events of 1763. It was not, however, with the hazy recollections of childhood the meeting was concerned, but with a distinct tradition handed down, in the shape of fireside tales, through the two or three generations preceding their own ripe manhood, and supported to a certain extent by wampum strings still in their keeping. One of the younger men, who had sat listening to this sifting of historic lore, took advantage of his superior penmanship, and committed to writing the principal points of the tradition regarding Pontiac's conspiracy, and the creditable part his clansmen—the *Arbre Croche* section of the Ottawa tribe—took in the affairs of 1763. A copy of his essay fell into the writer's hands. Presuming, then, the permission of the Ottawa author, we translate his account, without amendment or embellishment. We wish to present a genuine specimen of Algic style, as far as this can be accomplished by means of a translation. For this purpose we retain even the position of phrases and words as far as consistent with the requirements of our English syntax. In a few cases only we deem it advisable to deviate from the original. For the sake of variety, the conjunction *dash*, which answers all the purposes of the Greek δέ or the Hebrew ו, will be translated, as the case may demand, by either "but," "and," "now," "so," or "then." For *iwipi*, or *iwiapi*, "then," we shall occasionally substitute "at that time." A similar freedom will be taken in a few other cases. With all that, our version will remain far inferior to the original. It is hardly more possible to imitate, by literal translation, the pithiness of some phrases, and the whole native physiognomy of an Indian composition, than is the case in translating from the classic tongues.

The second paper, written by a young man of Little Traverse (Emmet County, Michigan), is an independent attempt, and completes the account of the relations between the contracting powers, the Ottawa tribe and Great Britain, down to the year 1815.

It should be remarked that neither of these authors has had the advantage of an English education. Even as native writers, they are rather automaths, like many other Ottawa and Ojibwa scholars.

1. The Massacre of Michilimackinac, 1763.

Translated from a Native Account.

This is how things happened at the Bluff when the Englishman was killed there by the Ojibwa. The one who then commanded was called Obwandiyag, an Ojibwa.[1] Now he, Obwandiyag, was told by a certain man: "There will be war; the Frenchman is going to fight the Englishman." So said, it is reported, the one by whom Obwandiyag was informed. "At the Bluff where the trace of my fire is left, I shall surely dwell." So said, it is reported, the one by whom he was informed.[2] Upon this the Ojibwa had a big smoke, and informed his chiefs of what he had heard. Then they went to work and determined on what they were to do to kill the Englishman. "The Frenchman upon arriving will, with little trouble, enter his village," they said; this is why they killed the Englishman. "And ourselves, we shall be accounted the first when this shall have happened," they said. "But that Ottawa there will be held in low esteem, we having done it, while he thinks himself the first." So they fully determined on what they would do to kill the Englishman. Then Obwandiyag said that first they should play ball around the fort. And they said they would throw the ball into the fort, then they would all rush in to strike, to kill the Englishman. So they all took up their arms and carried them with them. And they went to the chief and informed him of what they were going to do.[3] And they told him that he should go a little out of the house and look at them from the fort. One of those days, then, they informed him that now they were going to work. Then they began and played ball; but soon, do you see, they threw the ball into the fort; then, all rushed in, struck them, killed them. But the soldier-chief, it is said, had not his sword with him at that time. Many would have been killed by him if he had it with him that time. However, they did not kill all; some threw themselves into the houses and there locked themselves up. This is what the Ojibwas did when, at the Bluff, they killed the Englishman. Afraid they were of him, to fight him openly; this is why they deceived him.

At that time the Ottawas dwelled at the Cold Springs, at the time this

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[1] *Obwandiyag* (or Abwandiyak) is the Ottawa and Ojibwa form of *Pontiac*. According to Ottawa tradition the celebrated chief of that name was an Ojibwa by paternal, an Ottawa by maternal, descent.

[2] The informer—perhaps himself a Frenchman—in the above words, personates the vanquished power. The "Bluff" (*Pakwadinang*), where the Frenchman's fire had burned for over half a century, is Fort Michilimackinac, now "Old Mackinac," at the northern extremity of Lower Michigan.

[3] Captain Etherington, the English commandant at Fort Michilimackinac, is understood.

happened.[1] Now there was a seer living there, and he said awaking: "There are a great many people there, perhaps something is the matter." So men were looked for that were to run. "Before the sun sets you shall have to be here again." But they did not come. Now it being night again, they set the seer to work, and he said: "They are being held fast, they are standing about, those you appointed; but in the village there are a great many people." So they again appointed others to start in the morning to go thither, just to look and to be here in the evening to tell them how matters stood.[2] By these, then, they were informed that the Englishmen had already been killed. "But he has not killed all, he has still left some unslain." Thus they were, it is reported, informed by him; and when they were told so by the seer, they started and went all to the Bluff. Then they had a talk together, the Ottawa, the Ojibwa; and they demanded of them they should give them those they had left unslain. But they were not given them. To kill all, this, apparently, was what the Ojibwa intended. Thrice they spoke to him, and this is what they told him, having already thrice spoken to him: "Better, then, we fight, by and by, when not a dog of thine shall anywhere walk about, then at last I shall let thee go," they said to him. Then the Ojibwa became afraid, and they were given to them.[3] And they brought them hither and they kept them as long as one winter. But in the spring they took them off and brought them to Canada. And this was said to them by the chief of the English: "Great thanks, indeed, that thou bringest me my flesh." And they were treated exceedingly well, and all kinds of things were given them. And it being summer again, all the Indians were summoned and brought together. And they were kindly asked why they killed the Englishman. But not one, it is reported, said anything. And they were told by him: "Why, of course, the little bird that utters sundry sounds has been at your ear; this is why you have done it. Never more, indeed, shall you see the Frenchman; we have fought each other, and I have beaten him completely." And again they were told by the Englishman: "Do not envy your fellow-Indian for all the goods he took; in a very short time he will use them up, he will not long have them. But what I am going to promise you, you shall never use up. And thou, who art called Ottawa, who comest from where the land rises highest, very far thou seest as thou lookest round about.[4] Exactly so it stands with thy wisdom. But

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[1] Cold Springs (*Takibiing*), the old Ottawa appellation of the neighborhood, in Emmet County, where now the Indian town, Middle Village, is located, about twenty-five miles from the fort.

[2] "To be here," *i. e.*, at the Cold Springs, or Middle Village, where our account was written.

[3] It would have been folly on the part of the Ottawas to wage war, single-handed, against the much more powerful Ojibwa tribe. The latter declare it was the English rum that caused some wrangling, and that the dispute was settled by a cordial invitation, on the part of the Ojibwas, to sit down and have a general "good time."

[4] The bulk of the Ottawa tribe resided then, as they do now, along the shore of Lake Michigan, between Little Traverse Bay and Cross Village. Their clearings and plantations were on the high bluffs that overlook the northern part of the lake. The Beaver Islands and a part of Upper Michigan are in sight.

thy fellow-Indian, every one, he who dwells around on the lowland, he sees a very short way, let him ever so much look about; and so it stands with his wisdom, let him ever so much reflect. Well, then, I tell you now how I shall be kind to you. Behold, my children, when the sun rises and appears yonder in the east you will see him, he will come forth with red metallic lustre; it is him I resemble, this is why I wear red clothes.[1] Any morning you look out and the sun rises and appears with metallic lustre, you shall think 'I see my father,' as long as you live. Behold, my children, a great tree I plant yonder in your land; branching towards the east it shall stand there, southward also, and westward, and northward, branching, it shall stand there. There your children will lie sheltered should it, perchance, be too warm. And again, nicely shall I sweep where that tree stands, lest thy child hurt his foot against something. Again, my children, a great fire I build yonder, where your children will warm themselves, one that will never go out. Only, if the Great Spirit resolve that there be, as they call it, the end of the world, then the fire will go out, which I promise you. And again, you see my canoes; as large as they are, heaped full, every summer, they shall bring you what I give you, according as I promise you now. And a rope I shall haul out which I have made, and toward where you are it shall go forth, so that you may pull it in the direction of where you are. As I am powerful in every place, I, who am called the Englishman, so (surely) shall you behold what I promise you. And if ever you search in vain for anything in my canoe, may be that you search in vain for a paper of needles, you will let me know. And this is why I say I am not going to lie: verily, my children, should I see a dog of yours, an exceedingly shabby one, I would inquire, 'Who is the owner of that dog?' I would say, and I would be told, 'It is the Ottawa's dog,' there and then would I take him up to put him into my bed; so much shall I love him whom they call the Ottawa."

This is how things happened when the Englishman was killed at the Bluff.

[Here the first account closes. We omit, of the second, the history of the massacre, and begin with the speech of the English general in Quebec, which will be found to contain some noteworthy variations.]

2. Complementary to the Foregoing.

The War of 1812. *How the Ottawas were wheedled into participation; how they "whetted their hearts;" their reward. Translated from a native writer.*

Then he who then commanded in Quebec rejoiced very much, and having been properly informed how things happened, he made a speech and said:

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[1] *He will come forth with red metallic lustre.* The translation scarcely does justice to the text. *Apitchi ta-bi-miskwabikisi:* "He will look like a red-hot ball of metal," though less literal, would better express the meaning.

"Great thanks, indeed, for thy bringing this my flesh! Yonder where thou livest, I have once heard of thee—being so named—how wise thou art. 'The Ottawa is very wise,' I heard people say. This then is thy own self, indeed? Really, now I see thee who art called the Ottawa! And, indeed, wise art thou, bringing this my flesh. Well, then, we shall be brothers as long as this earth shall be earth. In the land where thou dwellest, thou beholdest, I presume, the sun as he rises in the morning, as he hangs there with a red metallic lustre,[1] and he is very large: this is myself! Again, yonder where thou dwellest, likely—while strolling along the beach—thou seest some pebbles; and one of those pebbles is very white, and if one pick it up and try to cut it with a knife, it is very hard. This is my heart! Again, in the land where thou dwellest, thou mayst see a creek that runs from out of the woods; it never ceases running: this is my drink! Well then, my brother, forever I shall clothe thee, as long as there is earth. This is why I mentioned the sun; he is forever clothing the earth. And that hard pebble, this is that I do not lie. Indeed, indeed, I tell the truth; the Spirit hears me that is above. I shall clothe thee forever, and so likewise the Ojibwa. I have nothing against him, although he jostled me. Whosoever is called an Indian, I shall clothe him. And the drink I make will never cease running; forever, forever thou shalt drink this drink. Well, then, my brother, this is what I promise thee. Never do I tell a lie, my brother!" This is what the Englishman said, when he thanked for his flesh being brought by them to him who commanded in Quebec. But he did not tell the truth when he said: "Forever, forever shall I clothe thee;" when he said: "as long as there shall be an earth." He told a lie.

Again, another time, the Englishman addressed the Ottawa and said to him: "My brother, I have a great request to make; this is why I send for thee. We are going to fight each other (I and) the Big-Knife.[2] I don't mean to be beaten this time. Please help me, I beseech thee. We shall beat him, I tell thee, if thou help me."[3] But the Ottawa says to the Englishman: "My father, concerning this I do not respond to thee.[4] You, yourselves alone, fight with each other (thou and) thy fellow-white-man. For I, being an Indian, should I want to fight my fellow-Indian, I would not tell thee anything. I would just go ahead and fight my fellow-Indian. I do not respond to thee, my father." Again, on the morrow, the English chief says the same thing: "My brother, I beseech thee very much that thou help me. I tell thee I do not mean to be beaten by that Big-Knife, now that I am going to fight

[1] *Bi-miskwabikagojing*, "as he hangs there with a red metallic lustre," or perhaps better, "like a red-hot ball of metal," a fine specimen of polysynthetic word painting.

[2] *Ni-wi-migadimi sa Kichimokoman*, literally "we are going to fight each other, the Big Knife;" one of the extremely rare cases of ellipsis in the Algic dialects.

[3] It was by this sort of palavering the Indians were spoiled. As long as rival powers existed on the Continent, the tribes east of the Mississippi were not allowed to come to their senses.

[4] *Ka sa manda ki-nakwetossino*, literally "concerning this I do not throw back the word to thee;" *i. e.*, "I do not answer affirmatively." A polite refusal.

him. But if I beat him, then thee also shall I beat; thou shalt not be at the Crooked-Tree.[1] Myself, I shall own the land where thou livest, the Crooked-Tree. Not even a needle shall I give thee more. It would be very sad, indeed, while we are good brothers to one another.[2] My brother, if thou help me, yes, if thou do it, then, as I do to my young man, so shall I do to thy young man, that is to say, when my young man gets a little scratched by the lead, let him get well ever so soon; still, as long as he will live, I pay him.[3] This, I say, I shall likewise do to thy young man, if he be a little scratched by the lead. As long, I say, as he will live, I shall pay him. As is my custom to do, paying out in silver, thus I shall pay thy young man." He mentions also how many dollars he will pay each month. But to the Ottawa says his young man: "No, then, better do not respond to him." On the morrow the Englishman says again the same thing: "My brother, please respond to me! Indeed, I want thee very much to stand with me. No, no, I tell thee again no, I do not want to be beaten by that Big-Knife." And the Ottawa says to the Englishman: "My father, I respond to thee. So be it then, I will help thee. Beforehand, I shall return home. I want to prepare, I want to whet my heart. An axe works well, it is sharp if one whet it; or a knife, if one whet it, works well. Then, having got ready, I shall let thee know; and we shall go to fight the Big-Knife. But, as thou now beholdest me here, just so I am getting along: I have nothing to shoot with." Says the Englishman: "I shall give thee everything thou art to work with: guns, powder, lead, knife. But how is this, my brother? Wherefore dost thou want to prepare, to return home beforehand?" Says the Ottawa: "It is a bear, nothing else, I want to make a feast with. Then, having done eating, I rise up, I shout, I whoop also a little, and then I dance the warrior's dance. And while dancing I also sing. This is how I whet my heart." Says the Englishman: "My brother, I have a beast that equals a bear. I shall give thee an ox to make a feast with. I shall see thee; I shall be glad to see thee whetting thy heart. Thou shalt not return home beforehand. Get ready to make the feast to-day." Says the Ottawa: "All right! I respond to thee again. Yes, I will make the feast to-day." So an ox was killed, and they boiled all of it; and they eat well. And having finished eating they whooped. And some rose up and danced the warrior's dance, singing while they were dancing. And this is what they said as they were singing:

Stand up in front of him! The warrior! } It being answered:
Stand up in front of him! The warrior! } *eh! eh! eh! eh! eh! in front! in front!*

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[1] *Waganakisi*, the *Arbre-Croche* of the French, a general name for the highland between Little Traverse and Cross Village.

[2] "It would be very sad *if this happened*, while," etc.

[3] "My young man" (*nind-oshkinawem*), *i. e.*, my fighting men, my braves, my soldiers. The frequent use of the singular for the plural is characteristic of the diplomatic style of Indian oratory. Thus, tribes or nations address each other as individuals; yet they are conceived to be embodied in their representative speakers. The same holds good in the case of serious transactions between Indians and half-breeds, Indians and whites, etc.

And again changing the text, one sings:

No matter, indeed! To the warrior, whenever I meet him,
BONJOUR! BONJOUR! *I say to him!* BONJOUR! BONJOUR! *I say to him!*
The smoke of the battle is rising! The smoke of the battle is rising![1]

And all that listened to each other raised a big whoop, and very much longed to join in the campaign for certain. For the Ottawa Indian sets great value on his whoop. This is how it looked when the Ottawa Indian was whetting his heart.

The fighting being over the Englishman clothed him; as much as one wears he put on him.[2] As for the wounded, he hung them a piece of silver about the neck. He did not speak truly, for so he said: "As I do to my young men, so I shall also do to your young men. Every month I shall pay—as I am accustomed, in silver—every one that will be scratched by the lead." This is what he said when he wished very much to be assisted. In fact, he did not win at all.

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[1] The Ottawa text of this song runs as follows:

Assamigabawitamaw! Manissino! | Nekwetang dash:
Assamigabawitamaw! Manissino! | è è è è è! assam! assam!

Pochigena! Manissino nekweshkawagi:
Bozho, bozho! nind ina! Bozho, bozho! nind ina!
Egawanodegine! Egawanodegine!

[2] *Ogi-agwian, enakwanayenid o gi-izhi-agwian*, literally: "He put clothes on him, as much as 'him' wears, he thus put clothes on him;" *i. e.*, each brave received a full suit of clothes.

THE PERIODICAL LITERATURE OF THE DAY AND ITS TENDENCIES.

WHEN a learned but eccentric genius was taken to task for a paradoxical theory regarding the authorship of the Classics, he answered that he did not get up every morning at four o'clock merely to say what others had said before him. The spirit of this answer is the spirit of contemporaneous American literature. We are the modern Athenians, ever in quest of news and novelty.

The newspaper breathes the spirit of contemporaneous American literature, which deems originality to be its crowning glory. We are ever in quest of the American novel and the American play, but we have both in our newspaper. In our laudable effort to be original, we do not stick at paradox, extravagance of idea and statement, word-coining, or reckless sensationalism. The spicy flavor of American humor has quite spoiled the British taste for the platitudes of *Punch*. Emerson says that the London *Charivari* produces one good joke a week; but he *could* say that a half dozen American newspapers weekly originate more genuine humor than English literature presents from Johnson to Hood. The exuberance of American feeling runs over in strange novels, clever dramas, crude but original criticism, and above all in newspapers and periodicals, which mainly constitute the American's library. If Spain is the land of the troubadour, America is the land of the newspaper. A Frenchman will listen to the oracles of the Academy, but the American's Delphos is the news-stand. He must have his journal every morning as regularly as his coffee. He would rather you stole the mat from before his door than take away his cherished journal. Conning this he forms his opinions upon the whole circle of knowledge, literature, art, politics, and the drama. He seems to say, Fate cannot harm me, I have read the paper. In his arguments he rarely dreams of going into the principles or the facts of any question, but appeals to his journal, and the reply he receives is an appeal to another journal. As Downing Street rules the British Empire, so Newspaper Row rules America. All this is unintelligible to our Briton, who, however much he may read the *Times*, struggles heroically to be above its opinions, unless they are his own. If he and the Thunderer disagree, he forthwith writes a letter to it; if it does not appear, he immediately withdraws his subscription. The man in America who would write a letter to the papers on every trifling occasion, is regarded with admiration only by the office boy, whose waste-basket his manuscript helps to

fill. If he be a public man, people first read, then wonder, and finally laugh.

Now, editors are not going to be up until four o'clock every morning, merely to say what others have said before them. Their hard-bound brains *must* grind out more than eight lines a year. They say with Iago, "I'm nothing, if not critical;" and as their criticism is not often what Blair defines to be a liberal and humane art, it leads them into habits of thought and expression which calmer and more philosophic minds ponder over with regret and amazement. If the press is the fourth estate anywhere it is so here, with a power and influence which we do not realize, because we are completely under its dominion. No man or institution can afford to scorn it. It will bear good-natured criticism with imperturbable calmness, and serenely continue on in its perverse career.

An American writer says that the daily press has made barbarians of us. We sit down to the paper civilized men, but rise up savages. Schuyler Colfax attempted to snub the Washington correspondents, and perhaps lost the Presidency. The press has no mercy and little judgment. The moralist looks aghast at its description of crimes and misdemeanors which are as coolly tabulated as stocks and provisions. It is a mad irresponsible monster that bellows out all that friendship or courtesy would keep concealed. It paws the most delicate and exquisite thoughts, and its triumphs are suggestive of mechanism and coarse power.

Dickens said that all American conversation has the air of being a little speech. So all our popular literature partakes of the characteristics of the newspaper. The reason of this we find in the fact that almost all American authors, even the most ambitious, began life in the printer's office. Their university was Carlyle's university—a collection of books. The habits of composition which they form are such as are gained in the vocations of reporter and editor. Their style can never rid itself of a slight "rolling cadence," which, like the gait of Micawber, distinguishes the editorial from all other forms of composition. Above all, the stretch after original thought, which is so painful to the reader at times, betokens at once the enterprising journalist. Besides, most American literature first becomes public through the periodical press, the weekly literary paper, or the magazine. Thus published serially, it is of the highest importance that the interest of the story or article should be kept up for the ensuing week or month. The author accordingly has to fashion his romance in such a way that he can stop at the most interesting point. The consequences of such a fashion are, of course, deplorable. Most American stories are like poor melodramas, with a startling tableau every second or third scene. Brought up in such a school, which is anything but

Della Cruscan, nearly all our American romancists fell under the newspaper curse of craving for the sensational. Not even Hawthorne's exquisite taste saved him from the error of having a "sensation" in every third or fourth chapter of his tales. The sustained power and equable interest of Thackeray is due to his resolute refusal to fall under the conditions of serial writing.

Such being the predominance of the newspaper in American life, it behooves the reviewer to bestow upon it calm, wise, and genial criticism. Not in the spirit of harsh invective, much less in that of disguised flattery, should he proceed in his analysis of its spirit, its outcome, and its possibilities. Here it has its fairest field, its finest opportunities of development, and also of deterioration. It must be judged here or nowhere. We believe that as yet it has not put forth half its strength; nor can we conceal from it or from ourselves, that with all its opportunities and advantages, with a nation of newspaper-readers, and a favoring and protecting government, it has not made one-tenth of the progress in enlightened thought, careful criticism, or even general culture that its patrons and admirers have had every reason to expect. As this is a grave and comprehensive charge, which every journal is interested in refuting, we proceed to give our proofs—not, as we before remarked, in any fault-finding spirit. We write with a full knowledge of the difficulties of journalism. We can sympathize with every man upon the staff, and we know the answer which will most likely spring to his lips.

Even in the days of Cowper, the newspaper deserved the title of "the world in print." How much more so now, when not satisfied with a few hours' intelligence from Europe, we are impatiently expecting a Pacific cable which will transmit us yesterday's news from China. Our future Herodotuses, in compiling their histories, will be under no necessity of travelling into the countries the annals of which they want to examine, but they will need only the files of a great newspaper. The reader may remember Thackeray's beautiful description of the press and its miracles, as set forth in *Pendennis*. Surely the highest laurels have been gained in its own legitimate field. We are too exacting, perhaps, in our demands upon the sorely tried editor. After all he bargains with us only for news, and news in abundance does he give us. But we cannot let him off on this plea. Just because he commands so many readers, do we hold him accountable for the very influences and powers which are in his hands. He invites criticism and observation, for will he, nill he, he has managed to draw, as to a focus, nearly all the literature and learning of the day. He lives in and for the day. His ephemeral sheet is the record of the world's day. The charm of novelty, the present interest, to-day's light and life,

such as they are, become mirrored in his paper. The secluded scholar, buried in his classics and abstruse literature, admits the paper to his study, with or without a welcome. And, as the vast majority of readers feel no interest in the speculations of Aristotle or the dreams of Plato, but seize unconsciously upon their living results, so the writing of this our day and generation commands an audience, from the very fact of its being of to-day and of the present. Lacordaire's finest argument for Christianity is that it has outlived novelty, and has in itself perennial fountains of interest and attraction.

We turn to the American editor, for we have little confidence in the sincerity of the average English journal, and none at all in the Continental scribe, who writes under the gleam of a bayonet and within sight of a jail. If the American editor cannot give full and free expression to the thought that is in him, then journalism had best confine itself to the chronicling of news. If the journal cannot be lifted up into power and moral influence amongst ourselves, there is no possibility of such happy consummation elsewhere on this planet. With his abounding opportunities, the American editor should be able to form and fashion our thought and action in the real heroic mould. He, if any one, has the true Archimedean lever.

Shall we boldly declare the real reason of woful failure in this respect? Shall we venture to shock the faith of many an honest reader of high-toned journals and unsuspected advocates of liberty? Then, know all men, if all men do not know, that *money* has been and is the bane of all high journalism in America. We sneer at the poor author of the eighteenth century who could get his history or his poems printed and published only by flattering some noble or wealthy patron. But what shall we say of the practice of taking bribes in an age which boasts, and truly boasts, of its manifest popular patronage of literature. Yet it is an undeniable fact that nearly all the political papers in the country are in pay, and at least one-third of the semi-political ones are only too ready to accept payment for any services they have in their power to give to any political party, no matter of what complexion, provided the cash is forthcoming. The painful exhibition of journals on sale was never more prominently brought before the country than in the last Presidential campaign. We see no objection whatever to the banding together of a number of politicians to found a journal to be devoted to their political interests. This is normal and praiseworthy. But we protest in the name of the highest interests of journalism against making it a matter of barter and sale. When opinions can be bought the day of their influence is over. The ideas which rule the world were never set up at auction. There is

something very significant of our political decadence in the circumstance that our organs of public opinion are prepared to play any tune which the bestower of a copper demands, and that the editor, to carry out the figure, will obediently practice any political gymnastics that the same generous donor may express a desire to see.

The cultured and scholarly editor will meet this charge with a deprecating denial of being personally or individually interested in the paper for which he writes. His themes are set. His salary is paid. He advocates the principles of the journal and is careless as to their ulterior consequences. He may answer with Dr. Johnson: "I write for my bread." Readers to whom the editorial sanctum and newspaperdom in general are as vague and mysterious a region as the green-room of a theatre, must be taught to give this excuse some admittance. We cannot be always true to our ideals. But it cannot be denied that such a view of the journalistic profession has reduced many a man to the condition of the newspaper thresher, as Carlyle harshly terms him, beating out his thin thoughts in an unceasing round, thinner and thinner every year, till nought but chaff remains. The impersonal "we" of the editor is a sad symbol of those indefinite opinions which it is his to advocate without heart and without belief.

The fact is that the modern newspaper has had an unequal growth. It originally was only a printed letter, detailing a few events without note or comment. Down to the time of Dr. Johnson there were no Parliamentary reports, and even those which he wrote for the *Gentleman's Magazine* were mainly his own thoughts and his own eloquence. The utility of a paper as a political organ was never fully realized until the time of George III. The different departments and general form of the journal were matters of successive addition and improvement. Hence, we cannot lay down fixed and unalterable principles which any paper is absolutely bound to follow. Journals never carry out their prospectuses. An editor would smile at the elaborate essays on journalism that graduates occasionally spout at commencements. And yet there must be some principle, some guiding ideas, to which he is morally bound. What is the true mission of journalism if it be not to instruct and elevate its readers? Can a paper be conscientiously supported that dwarfs the moral element, and exercises no careful espionage over all its columns? There are very few, even highly respectable journals, that exclude objectionable advertisements. The country papers are fetid with all sorts of abominable notices of a peculiar class of medicines. The "Personal" column of many a journal has often pointed the way to the descent of Avernus. We would place as the essential basis of all true journalism, a rigid morality in all de-

partments—from the editorial to the advertisement. Away with all "spicy locals"—away with all accounts of filthy crimes and immoral cases. Let there be no moralizing upon divorce, no holding up as terrible examples the wretches that disgrace humanity. There should be a fine, noble, dignified tone, a grace, and light, pure morality, and charming writing, the richness of history, the exaltation of poetry, the laugh of genial humor, making a feast to which the world-wearied man may sit down with a thankful heart. Away with the dark forms of disease, the suicide's death, the paramour's guilty pleasure, the civic strife. All these things tend to evil, and make the newspaper an instrumentality for debasing public sentiment.

The newspaper has got us into the habit of measuring the universe every morning. It rolls its crudities before us. Its form, like Gloster's, is frequently sent into the breathing world but half made up, and that lamely and unfashionably. We are impatient for news, and forget that to-day cannot form a judgment upon itself. Since newspapers began, history has been almost impossible. The clear conceptions we gain from Livy, Tacitus, and Suetonius are never imparted by historians in these newspaper ages. Nothing but his utter lack of the poetic and imaginative faculty can possibly give the reason why Bancroft continues to write his history of the United States amidst the whirlwinds and immeasurable drifts of newspapers.

The lowering effect of money-bribes upon the intellectual tone is freely admitted by editorial writers, but the temptation is irresistible. The same may be said of the interference of stockholders and proprietors, and even the influence of ignorant and unknown subscribers is suffered to have undue weight with our writers. In heaven's name, let them speak out their true feeling and convictions, and be not eternally watching and waiting for effects. If there is a scintilla of truth, genius, or judgment in their sayings, let them be henceforth and forever convinced that their reader will find it out and appreciate it. But if they are to listen to the far-off sounds of varying public opinion, if they are to be forever on deck ready to change sail at the slightest roll of the ocean, let them at once descend from the position of teacher and writer, and help the boy to sweep out the office. The New York *Herald* lost the grandest journalistic career in this country, or in any country, by its despicable re-echoing of mob feeling and "popular sentiment." No sooner does the editor put pen to paper than he assumes his rightful position of teacher and instructor of his fellow-men. He takes upon himself the highest office of humanity. He addresses an audience which not even Demosthenes in all his glory could gather together, or influence so powerfully. He holds the rod of Moses.

At its outstretching the waves of public opinion, moved by his genius, his prestige, or his opportunity, are troubled to their depths, foam into fury, and sweep the enemies of his party to destruction. But he must be a true prophet—a veritable *vates*—for if he hesitate, blunder, tergiversate, or trifle, it were better that he had never undertaken his office.

We write from the fulness of affectionate regard for the entire body of journalistic writers; because from our knowledge of them, many of them fail to understand the vast influence which they exert upon the masses of mankind, especially in America. Marlborough used to say that all the English history he knew he got from reading Shakspeare. So, nearly all the ideas the American has he gets from his paper. The formation of the intellectual and ethical mind of America is thus thrown practically into the hands of the journalist. His own sphere of duty is almost as sacred as that of the preacher of the Divine Word. It is no wonder that the friend of civilization and the Christian priest view with profound interest his education, his character, and his utterances. Nor can the true journalist turn with chagrin or impatience from the wise and gentle admonition of his best adviser and friend. We know the impression which a printed statement makes upon all. *Verba scripta manent.* Not all the raillery which has been bestowed upon the journal has deprived it even of its illusions in the minds of men. The American cherishes his paper with infantile regard. His opinions vary with its changes. He consults it as did the readers of old the almanacs of Partridge. His views when original are in the last analysis only modifications of its opinions, and all his literary and political errors can be traced to its influence. In a free land he is singularly subject to the literary absolutism of the press, and, no matter how bold and independent his opinions may be, he unconsciously seeks for them its countenance and exposition. To abuse this confidence cannot but be ranked amongst the gravest of offences, and to awaken in the bosom of unsuspiciousness false theories, wrong historical prejudices, and irreligious or skeptical fancies must be regarded as the basest and meanest violations of a high and solemn trust.

We have also said that the American newspaper, and we use the term universally, betrays a lack of careful criticism. This word has an invidious meaning; but there is no editor who must not be a critic. To criticize is literally to judge. Nor must his criticism be restricted to merely literary or scientific points; but it must embrace all social, religious, and political life. Of the crudeness of literary criticism, outside our leading reviews, we need not here speak. It is true the task is an ungracious one, but all tasks are such. American life offers to the satirist the best kind of game.

But the satirist is not a teacher; the editor is. The social essay has no place in our journals which busy themselves about political questions, the root of whose difficulties lies precisely in our social system. Now and then we come across a brief paragraph upon some minute question of dress or behavior, but the newspaper, which ought to be a regular school of social theories and advice, rarely if ever adverts to such themes.

But our great issue with the press is its treatment of religion, and especially of the Catholic religion. We are utterly at a loss to understand its concealed, but none the less deadly, hostility, to the Catholic faith. In this objection lies the reason for our charge of "general lack of culture," for, if we understand this favorite word in the sense of the German philosophers, *culture* includes a thorough knowledge and liberal toleration of all the great creeds;[1] and, surely, Catholicity, which we claim as the only creed, must rank, even on their own ground, among the most interesting and important beliefs of the human race. Perhaps we are a little too sensitive upon the religious point; but we never have read a newspaper article upon any Catholic question which satisfied us either as fair or as honest. The writer might have been well-intentioned enough; but Catholics are very properly sensitive upon every point connected with their religion. There is an undefined and inexplicable feeling among editors that somehow or other it will not do to give prominence to the Church. They cannot tell why, but the atmosphere of public opinion (which is their great bugbear, and which, as we said, they should form) is not favorable to Catholicity. This wretched explanation is all the more contemptible when it issues from journals, the majority of whose writers are Catholics.

Three-fourths of the talent upon the New York dailies is Catholic; and the roll of employés upon the *Herald* is like the roll of an Irish regiment. But because the Church is the Church, for we know no other reason, it is destined to suffer petty as well as great persecution. Catholics want nothing but fair play. If a paper has anything to say against the Church, let it be said with full vigor and proof; but nothing disgusts us more than that absurd system of shallow praise and "historical investigation" that characterize most articles upon Catholic subjects. Of course no writer who values his name for ability or average intelligence now ventures to call us idolatrous or superstitious; but there is a nauseating style of patronizing eulogy which awakens no less wrath and contempt in the breast of a Catholic where it does not provoke a hearty laugh at the writer's unconscious insolence.

[1] We are discussing the subject, as already intimated, rather on general grounds than on those specifically of Catholicity.

The fact is, the valiant editor who charges with such fury upon political evil-doers and negligent ash-carriers feels, like Bob Acres, all his courage oozing from his fingers when he ventures upon a feeble defence of the Church, or even feels a desire to credit a Catholic with any extraordinary excellence. He would sooner write a panegyric upon Wang-Ching-Loo, the celebrated Chinese commentator on Confucius, than a simple complimentary reference to St. Thomas of Aquin. His courage evaporates. What will the Protestant community think? The unworthy Catholic writer asks the same question, and is influenced by the same answer. Bedaub with praise anything or anybody except the Catholic Church. It is a mark of the obtuseness of Catholics that get into politics, that they continue in them after receiving the most convincing evidences that they cannot and shall not get office. The editor, after all, is politic. He knows that he can safely ignore and contemn the Catholic faith. We know hundreds of Catholics that subscribe to publications which do nothing but ridicule their religion. Happily, however, either their stupidity or their faith is without bounds.

Now in the potent name of fair play, why does not the American press make a new departure in this matter? When it takes notice of Catholicity, let such notice be intelligent, impartial, and appreciative. People are not fools. There is not an editor in the land but knows that many of his subscribers are Catholics. He should reflect upon the pain he gives by misrepresentation, or even by his ignorance. No man can afford to be ignorant of the Catholic Church, her history, or her influence. He ought to throw out of the window half of the cheap histories that burden editorial shelves. If he wants to learn anything about the Church, let him consult Catholic authorities, but let him not expose his ignorance and wound the feelings of his Catholic readers, either by an exhibition of good-natured patronage, or of poorly concealed indifference or hostility. A little well-timed severity on the part of Catholics in this matter would be attended with beneficial effects. There is no reason why we should be exposed day by day to the criticism of callow writers and the profound philosophizing of ignoramuses. A contracted subscription list would act with wonderful efficacy upon certain newspapers which we could name. Every literary knight thinks himself qualified to tilt against the faith and customs of the Church, and he often goes out of his way in quest of adventure. There is only one effectual means of cooling this chivalric ardor. Stop the paper, and give the reason for the discontinuance.

We regard the idea strongly advocated by some Catholics of a daily paper as not only not feasible, but inadvisable. The Catholic weeklies find it hard enough to get along, and the peculiar spirit of journalism does not admit of a daily religious paper. Whatever

be the reason, the fact is that readers do not care for religious comment in daily newspapers. The Protestant religious daily, which was started some time ago in New York, proved a complete failure. We can, however, negatively defend our religion by a united and sustained display of opposition to any paper that makes a habit of attacking, misrepresenting, or belittling our faith. As long as we can do this we need not have recourse to a Catholic daily, which would be sure to get into religious polemics in the second number.

We believe that much of the anti-Catholic spirit of the American press results from ignorance. It is simply astounding how little even educated men know about Catholicity. A writer has set phrases against the Church fashioned to his hand. Bigotry has saved him the trouble of composition. All English literature is pervaded with this spirit. It seems sanctioned by literary taste to quote a passage against Romanism. The neatest and aptest epigrams in the language were suggested by religious controversy. The finest of Wordsworth's poems (*The Ecclesiastical Sonnets*) breathe the full Protestant spirit. There is no essayist or historian in the language who has not discoursed eloquently upon the "abominations of Popery." Take this element from Macaulay, and you have nothing left. The young collegian is trained in these schools of history, and his style must be more or less tinctured with bigotry. What easier theme is there than an essay upon the Spanish Inquisition? How deftly an allusion to that famous institution can be interwoven in an article, for instance, on Political Persecution.

Our editor late at night is working hard upon an article which, in the language of Jefferson Brick, will make the Court of St. James tremble.

"A politician (writes he) of deep and designing views, another Torquemada, is attempting to coerce his constituents. Such conduct recalls the worst features of the Spanish Inquisition, when the cowled and gloomy Dominican gazed impassively upon his victim's tortures. Jesuit-like this political Richelieu conceals from the country his true aims, the subjugation of our liberties. Like the Church of Rome he sells indulgences before he incites to criminal deeds, and thus gains adherents that he will afterwards reward with office. As the infamous and notorious Pope Alexander the Sixth perished by the poison which he had prepared for his Cardinals, so this political trickster will die politically from the very means he is using to destroy others. Bloody Mary burnt the martyrs at Smithfield, when Latimer said, 'Please God, we will light a fire in England to-day which will burn forever,' so let our fellow-citizens march in the torchlight procession to-night and light up the fire of patriotism in the breast of every son of liberty. Luther heroically burnt the Pope's bull in the square of Wittenburg, and thus declared the freedom of the individual conscience. It was a great and noble act, worthy of perpetual remembrance. But we, who enjoy the blessings of which that act was the seminal principle, should stand by our convictions to the last. The wily Cardinal Pole, with the characteristic craft and cunning of the Roman priesthood, dissembled his political views, and our political reynard hopes, perhaps, to equal him. He thinks that the chicanery which may, perhaps, find place in a Vatican council when it

made the Pope equal to Almighty God, can avail in an American convention. But though the Pope may be impeccable, we are not disposed to think any other man so, especially such a man as Mr. Blank."

This may be regarded by some as an exaggerated specimen of American newspaper theology, but we submit if it does not nearly hit the mark.

Whilst we are upon the religious aspect of journalism it may be as well to inquire into the reason of the prominence given to all sorts of absurd religious speculation. Is it that the low tone of Protestantism disposes the American for a relish for descriptions of spiritualistic manifestations, Mormon life, and cremation services? Or is the press to be held accountable for presenting such stuff to its readers? It is an obvious fact that fuller reports are given of the proceedings of ridiculous conventions, odd religious meetings, and the *bizarre* in religion generally, than to the deliberations of regular religious bodies. Very likely the love of the sensational is the motive of the reporter. We do not complain of cutting down long sermons and abridging generally the usually prosy proceedings of religious conventions, but we fail to see the use, not to speak of the positive injury, of detailed accounts of maudlin preachers, women apostles, and other such small deer. Nor has it escaped us that the tone of the daily press is hopelessly worldly and materialistic. We struggle with the impression that after all religion has no place in its columns; but surely sound morality and the Christian life calls for serious and most reverent treatment. A crackbrained geologist finds somewhere in a London bone-yard a fossil of the Pliocene period, and forthwith the important discovery is the theme of a thousand busy pens. The missing link is found. The anthropoid ape is already seen in vision patting Adam on the head and jabbering out, "My dear grandson."

The science of the newspaper is much of a piece with its theology. In contrast with this scanty attention to the Christian belief we have full and highly colored accounts of every crime committed in the world—the more horrible and loathsome it is, the better. Newspaper men defend this on the ground that the public must have such details. But they have it in their power to keep such matters hidden from the public. The recountal of suicides, rapes, murders, abortions, and *crim. con.* cases certainly does no good, but on the contrary positive and frequently irremediable harm to public morality.

The transition from the daily newspaper to the literary weekly is not so abrupt as one would imagine. The same sensational element is here transferred from news and politics to the region

of fiction and poetry. The novel here blossoms in rank luxuriance. Tales of hairbreadth escapes, love stories, historical novelettes, and the wildest fiction make up the greater portion of the paper. The prime condition of the story is that it be of absorbing interest. No matter if it absorb all probability, the taste of the readers will be sure to appreciate it. As the palate of the drunkard fails to distinguish the delicate aroma and bouquet of choice wines, so the mental intoxication of the readers of these blood and thunder romances leaves them incapable of enjoying or appreciating the finer literature of the language. The novel in our day is vastly superior to the novel of a hundred years ago. Since Walter Scott's genius dignified and immortalized the romance, it can never fall to the depths from which he raised it. Other men of genius, notably Dickens and Thackeray, have made it the medium of communicating much that is good and true, and the former ban which was upon it has been lifted by worthy and pure hands. But if there is ever to be a return to the wretched condition of the older novels, it will be wrought out in the American weeklies. We have seen some English story papers, but they are tame and commonplace alongside of the American ones. The American writer has no fear of his genius. He will undertake the delineation of any character. Luckily for himself and his readers, his French, if he have any, is not idiomatic enough to enable him to read the worst French novels. He rarely gets beyond George Sand, who, Heaven knows, is bad enough. The strong public sentiment on marriage curbs his vivid imagination, and he is generally thrown back upon warm love scenes or distracting jealousy. Such writers never forget and never learn. They cannot originate ideas, nor can they correct their faults. Their stock in trade consists of the old-fashioned stern parents, lovely heroine, noble youth, sordid villain, and comic servant. These puppets are made to go through a few dances, and the curtain is rung down on a scene of happiness. Many writers, however, attempt a bolder flight. Arms and the Indian, they sing. Whatever romance there may be in the Indian character and existence, Fenimore Cooper extracted it long ago. The modern novelist is reduced to the position of second violinist in the orchestra. He plays accompaniments to Cooper, nor cares he for the discords. Like the musician Wagner he regards dissonance as the true soul of music, struggling for pure utterance. All boys, even those of a larger growth, have an undisguised admiration for Indians. They regard them as the embodiments of chivalry, skill, bravery, and eloquence. Everybody thinks that he could track his way across a prairie or blaze trees in a primeval forest. When we first read Robinson Crusoe we are seized with a wish to live on a desert island. The love of adven-

ture so strong in youth is fostered unnaturally by these high-strung stories; whilst the gentler emotions which are supposed to agitate the feminine bosom receive due exercise from the melancholy fortunes of the heroine whom the Indians call in their sweet language Wisheetoshawishee, or "Stamping Mare," from a pretty habit she has of stamping her little foot when angry. Cooper's finely drawn character of "Leatherstocking" reappears under such dingy habiliments that we fail to recognize him in Buffalo Bill or Snaky Jim. The style and moral of these stories are coarse and indelicate. At times we are treated to an historical novel of the days of knight-errantry. Of course the burly friar in a chronic condition of ebriety rolls through the story, singing snatches of a Latin drinking song. We are aweary of this fat friar, who should be permitted to rest, for he has done service since the days of Rabelais. No one enjoys more keenly than ourself the humor and *bonhomie* of the clerical or monastic character; but we tire of the bawling Silenus who is such a favorite with Protestant writers. As far as we can learn at this distance from their day, the poor monks of the middle ages found it hard enough to get a good meal; and, if we look at their labor, they had more to do than drink wine and roar Bacchanalian songs. If we take Luther as a specimen of the true monk, we admit that we make a mistake; but it is absurd to represent the monastic body as having many such members as the jolly, amorous, and beer-drinking monk of Wittenberg. It is amusing to learn that knights spoke in a stilted style, and, at every moment, grasped their swords. We want another Cervantes to laugh such chivalry away. The fashionable novel revels in gorgeous descriptions, and is a great favorite with young ladies whose mirrors flatter them with dreams of ambition, and whose present sphere, with its sordid cares and rather bad clothes, is manifestly unfitted for them. The lords and ladies in these wondrous tales live a life which transcends all understanding. Their talk, their walk, their eating and drinking, the mansions they live in, the parties they give, seem to mark them out as another race of beings. Lord Bumpkin thinks nothing of drawing £100,000 in gold out of the bank (without a horse and cart either—though a satchel is suggested), and losing it at a single sitting. He marries a peasant girl of superhuman loveliness, but flies to the Continent, where he lives in a palace such as is described in the "Lady of Lyons."

Nor is the reading of this trash confined to shopboys and store-girls, as many would fain have us believe. All classes read it. There are very few grades of "culture" in America. The millionaire in the art gallery who asked if Mrs. "Madonna" lived in that town has his counterpart everywhere. Few men get more than the public school education, and whilst they develop acute busi-

ness tact and talent, they are wofully behind in literature. Charles Lamb was afraid to let people know that he never read, and in fact detested many model authors and grave historians. The American has no bashfulness in telling you that he yawns over Shakspeare, and can't see what is so wonderful in half the books people make such a fuss over. And this he may say, with a clear conviction that he is wrong in expressing such heterodox opinions; but we must give him the palm of honesty. "Milton," said honest old Johnson, "is more praised than read." Spencer is inexpressibly tedious. "Few," said Lord Macaulay, speaking of the Faerie Queen, "are in at the death of the Blatant Beast." The impatience of tedium, which is the mark of a quick and active mind, not schooled to reading, makes Americans rush to papers, magazines, and reviews for nearly all their literary pabulum. The circulation of the weeklies is enormous. The *New York Ledger* boasts of four hundred thousand, but this we doubt. It holds, we are told, the first rank in the literary weeklies, but we see no difference between it and its sisters.

When we reflect that the literary taste of the people is formed by these papers, we can pronounce a clearer judgment upon their marked love for all light, exciting, and spectacular lectures and plays. The Italian will exact pure language and precise history from a lecturer. A public speaker in France trembles before his audience. There is one grammatical mistake in Boileau, which by its repetition in the grammars, is better known to Frenchmen than the most exquisite passages in his writings. In Germany the Herr lecturer must look well to his points, or grunts of dissatisfaction will soon be heard. But in America, let the lecturer rejoice if he possesses quick sympathy, ready humor, and facility of expression. *Vive la bagatelle!* is our motto. There is no other country which has the lyceum system such as we have founded; nor is there any country, not even excepting Ireland, where the public speaker is more warmly and graciously received. We ask only to be amused, the highest duty of man, if we are to believe Epictetus. Let us have life joyful and riant. We leave dull history to the Dryasdusts. We come to hear sound sense all tingling with humor, grace, poetic feeling, sunshine trembling through pathetic tears. America is the paradise of the lecturer, but woe to him if he does not touch with deft fingers the hearts that will tremble with sadness or laughter under his spell. A great, noble people feeding upon these unripe fruits of literature is very saddening to the thoughtful mind. We have bravely gotten over Sydney Smith's sneer, "Who reads an American book?" The time is coming when we may retort, "Who reads an English book?" Just in proportion as the American mind unshackles itself from English

literary forms and habitudes will it grow in strength and moral power. Where would our noble Latin literature have been if Rome had been completely subjected to the Hellenic mind? We depend upon England for the matter of our literature, not for its form. The American scholar must study the great masters of English poetry and prose; but he must approach this study, not in the spirit of pupilage, but in the spirit of a high-minded student, seeking new sources of intellectual power.

The bondage to the English mind perceptible in our graver literature is shaken off with boyish impetuosity in the classes of literature which we have been examining. And yet the English language is more correctly written and spoken here than in the island itself. The slovenly style of English composition may be an imitation of the hesitating style of speech in the Houses of Parliament, but the American talks with all the correctness imparted by clear and vivid ideas. It is a matter of surprise to English tourists that they can understand their language as spoken from Maine to the Gulf, whereas they themselves cannot understand their own Yorkshire and Lancastershire dialects. With this knitted and compact race of men, united in government and language, a great author should feel the mightiest stirrings of ambition. A quick, perceptive people, not learned, but what people is?—critical, but what reader is not?—above all, nobly appreciative, will welcome him to their homes and lives. It was America that gave the first audience to Macaulay, Jeffrey, and even to Tupper.

The highest form of our periodical literature is the magazine and the review. The older magazines were rather commonplace affairs, much in the style of the annuals, with a picture of some celebrated beauty, and a superabundance of rather watery poetry. They were mere transcripts of the English magazines. Occasionally a bright story or pretty poem gave note of awakening native authorship, but such was the absurd veneration in which English opinion was held that it took a bold publisher to print an original article. When the *Atlantic Monthly* was started, a magazine to which American literature owes much, and American morality nothing, there sprang up the first indigenous growth of American writers. Shy scholarship was tempted from its retreat, and the first magazine that could compete with the English periodicals enjoyed long years of literary renown. The better class of writers are drawn to the magazines, on the principle of the greater force and permanence given to their writings and opinions. The principal publishing houses have got into the fashion of issuing magazines, not, we think, with the happiest effect upon literature. The course of reading in a magazine includes sufficient literature to satisfy the easily contented American mind. We do not regard

illustrated magazines as deserving the name. An illustrated magazine suggests the predominance of travels, adventures, and spectacular subjects generally. Their popularity, however, is seen in the enormous circulation of Harper's, which is a disgrace to American literature.

In this review of our periodical literature we have necessarily omitted many suggestions and reflections which might bear misinterpretation. We had intended to speak of our reviews, particularly of the *North American*, which, until a recent change of management and policy, was noted for its dead learning and utterly uninfluential character. We also designed calling attention to that dangerous class of papers intended for the young; but the unity of our purpose has restricted us to the most general observations. We have dwelt on periodical literature as the reflex of the American mind in its literary aspirations and satisfactions. Our survey has convinced us of the need of a great, free, and wise censorship of the press; such, for example, as this REVIEW has it in its power to exercise. If publications of weight and merit should extend a corrective yet protective guardianship over journalism, not failing to upbraid when necessary, nor praise when deserved, the periodical literature of our day and country would feel throughout the beneficial influence. No men more quickly take and act on a hint than newspaper men. The honest desire to improve the press, which we think will long continue to be the only form of literature our people will care about, will insensibly work out desired improvements. The day no doubt will come when every reader will be a Scaliger in learning and a Saint-Beauve in criticism. But until that day come (which may the kind fates long defer!), the newspaper will be the horn-book of the nation. Let the editor study hard to attain that purity and precision of language which add so much to the dissemination and establishment of ideas. He should spare no pains to perfect himself in the great masters of English prose. He should be an unsparing critic of himself. There is absolutely no reason why American literature should stand in constant need of English watering-pots and foreign gardeners. Scatter the seeds of noble thought, poetry, philosophy, and genial humor, over the national mind, and leave its own native strength and vigor full and fair play. We shall undoubtedly have a large and sturdy literature, like our own California trees, upspringing to the glad heavens, giving shelter to sweet singers, and filling the land about with grateful shade and beauty.

The duty of studying the higher criticism of the language is incumbent upon all writers, but particularly on the writer for the press. He should thoroughly familiarize himself with the great laws of expression, harmony, and grammatical and rhetorical cor-

rectness. A good course of rhetoric, which he may study in private, would correct the extravagance into which the journalistic style is so apt to run. The ambition or necessity which leads writers to compose long articles would soon disappear under the exactions of good sense and good taste. The limited and peculiar phraseology of journalism should be widened and improved by the careful reading of the great English essayists. It is a mistake to suppose that good writing is wasted on newspaper readers, or that the subjects discussed in a journal do not admit of fine composition. The writer who carelessly dashes off his thoughts should reflect upon the saying: "Easy writing is generally very hard reading." He should be alive to criticism, and studiously correct those faults which such men as Richard Grant White seem to make it their business to detect and ridicule.

For those contemplating a journalistic career a word of advice may be necessary. There is no greater delusion than the very common one that anybody can write for the paper. The fact is that erudition and high scholarship are nearly as great a bar to success as illiterate ignorance. The learned professor, whose ponderous sentences, interlarded with Greek and Latin quotations, are the horror of the printer, may compose a profound lecture, but he cannot write a readable article. This is the essential condition of periodical writing, that it should interest all classes of readers. The editorial genius is seen in the variety of a magazine or journal. Our professor cannot understand why all people do not take the same interest that he does in the nature and derivation of Greek verbs in *mi*, and if his valuable MS. finds its way to the waste-basket, he groans dismally over the decay of learning. The journalist must be interesting. His style must have that happy medium of refined scholarship, with easy familiarity of words and turn of thought. Such a style comes only from a natural aptitude for journalism perfected with severe practice. He must be able to catch and fix the fleeting thought of the present, to give quick and durable expression to the popular feeling of the day upon any subject, and to write in the style of the people. The magazinist is not bound to the present; still he, too, must belong to the day and generation. He has the leisure, denied to the daily journalist, for polishing his style. The standard of magazine writing is much higher now than formerly. Writers now affect quaint forms of speech, old English words, far-fetched metaphors, and other eccentricities of style, simply to have some sort of originality. This quaintness can never make up for want of thought, but it is an evidence of painstaking study. *Non nova sed nove.* A bald, commonplace article, such as any educated man would be likely to write, would find no acceptance. The rapid, crisp, and entertaining style

attained by some magazinists lends a charm to the dryest subject, and allures into reading articles upon themes of little or no interest.

The delusion about writing for the papers is like the delusion about going on the stage. When Gwendolen, in *Daniel Deronda*, asks Herr Klesmer's opinion upon her dramatic chances, he replies, "My dear young lady, you wouldn't know how to walk across the stage." The imagined ease vanishes. We read a fine article, and it seems so smooth, bright, and natural, that it invites and stimulates imitation. Or, we plod wearily through a frightfully dull essay, wondering what the editor saw in such a piece to publish. We wake from our delusion after a few trials. It is said that every Yankee feels competent to run a hotel, edit a newspaper, and make a speech. No wonder the country is so full of failures. "Cousin Swift," said Dryden, reading the Dean's heavy Pindaric odes, "you will never be a poet," and Swift never forgave him. How many editors have been consigned to perdition by ambitious young men, with rolls of manuscript under their arms, and a Byronic fire in their eyes!

The reader has perceived that we have treated our subject more from a literary than a moral point of view. We have sought to call attention to the falseness and absurdity of much of newspaper literature, believing that a taste for the higher literature of the language would wean many readers away from the trash that so abundantly surrounds us. A man who relishes Shakspeare is not likely to waste his time over a weekly literary paper. The disastrous effect upon morals has called forth the repeated protests of all classes of moralists and litterateurs. The description of furious passion, which is dignified by the name of love, generally inflames the ardent temperament of youth, or at least relaxes that strength of mind which is the evidence and effect of the virtue of purity. The mental debasement of the confirmed novel-reader springs quite as much from moral weakening as from mental sloth. The feelings and emotions cannot be suffered to riot without destroying the spiritual temple of sacred peace and divine love. The agitation produced by extravagant description, thrilling situations, and high-strung lovemaking, leaves a mental depression which exposes the soul to its enemy. No effort should be spared to limit the circulation of these papers and to destroy their influence. Unsparing ridicule, severest censure, should be showered upon them. The young, who are keenly sensitive to sarcasm, should be shown the intrinsic absurdity and insidious immorality of their favorite weeklies.

There is a regular descent in these journals to a class which is openly indecent. Our readers will recognize our reason for not making specific mention; but it is quite natural to suppose that

Indian stories will pall upon a surfeited appetite which will seek new spices in the shameful columns of a so-called criminal record. At times, the authorities take cognizance of some glaring impurity in such sheets, but with little effect upon their existence or suppression. The French law which requires an author to subscribe his name to every article which he publishes, should be enforced here, particularly in such cases as we are contemplating. If the erotic gentlemen who write for such sheets were at times permitted to cool off in a dungeon, their imagination might have some chance of becoming purified.

The abject pandering to popular prejudices and passions, which characterizes nearly the entire press, must, of course, react fatally upon its independence and its usefulness. The mercenary spirit which does not shrink from bribes, flatters itself, with commercial honesty and enterprise, in "catering to our patrons," to use a vile phrase.

The independent editor is generally alone in his glory, but if there is a spark of that feeling which cheered Marius in the ruins of Carthage, it should warm the breast of any man who sees that the populace know not what is good for them, and who turns a deaf ear to their insane demands. Ages ago the wisest of mankind described the people as children, with all the infantile vices but without their grace or innocence. It must be said to our shame that the popular journals of no other country are at a lower point in ability and morality than are ours. An American should blush at the horrible specimens of journalism that are scattered over the country. His *Journal of Civilization* grossly caricatures ideas and persons that are dear and precious to half the people. His children revel in experiences gleaned from juvenile literature which would startle and pain him unspeakably. His political paper represents the purse of a political ring, or rather the public purse, whose strings it holds. He has no time to read a book, and what will he do? He will join us in demanding by word and action the purification of journalism, the suppression of open and disguised licentious sheets, and the establishment of a censorship of the press, empowered to bring journalistic scoundrels before the bar of justice, and thus before the greater and sterner bar of public opinion.

EMOTION.

THE most profound and elaborate as well as the most ordinary and superficial examinations of our own minds agree in revealing to us a unity—our own persistent conscious existence, our mind or soul.[1]

The peasant following his plough would quickly make evident to an intelligent questioner that he, no less than the philosopher in his study, was conscious of this unity. He would substantially declare his conviction that his various present sensations, together with the experiences he remembers, are those of one persisting mind.

It is common enough to speak of this mind, or soul, as possessing different "faculties," and to a certain extent the term is a good one, though it may mislead. It is manifest that our soul performs a multitude of acts which more or less differ from, and resemble, one another; and these acts may be grouped together according to the likenesses and differences which exist between them. Thus, *e. g.*, acts of "judging" may be grouped together in one class, and acts of "willing" in another. Now as the mind which performs these acts has, of course, the power of performing them, we may properly speak of these different aspects of its power respectively as the "faculty" (*i. e.*, the power) of judging, and the "faculty" (*i. e.*, the power) of willing. At the same time these terms may mislead on account of the necessity we are constantly under of having recourse to material images as vehicles for expressing incorporeal things. It thus comes about, that, being familiar with different bodily organs as agents for performing the different bodily actions, the illusion may be produced that there are in the soul analogous distinct parts, for the existence of which reason gives us no warrant.

The classification of mental acts is a process more difficult and disputable than the classification of objects of sense. This is due especially to the fact that its subject-matter can never be examined by more than one person in each case, consisting as it does of the acts of the observer's own mind. Nevertheless there is a general agreement amongst recent psychologists, that the mental activities may be arranged in three groups, (1) Feelings, (2) Thoughts, and (3) Volitions. The power possessed by the soul of energizing in this threefold manner may be spoken of as (1) Sensitivity, (2) Intellect, and (3) Will.

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[1] See Lessons from Nature, 1876, Chapter I.

Feelings themselves are to be further discriminated, viz., (*a*) those resulting from direct nervous stimulation—external or internal—and (*b*) those occurring as secondary results of such stimulation, accompanied with pleasure or pain. The first set of feelings results from that aspect of the soul's power which may be spoken of as "Sense;" the second set results from that which may be termed "Emotional Sensitiveness." Thus Sense, Emotional Sensitiveness, Intellect, and Will, are the four headings under which all our psychical powers are classified in the most widely accepted English psychology. But Emotions are deemed by many (as, *e. g.*, by Mr. Herbert Spencer and his school) to be only bygone clustered sensations of the individual or of his ancestors which reappear once more in consciousness, it may be faintly or strongly, but always vaguely and indistinctly. Similarly, thoughts (or ideas) are also deemed to be but past sensations of the individual reappearing in consciousness, it may be faintly, but always distinctly as compared with Emotions. Thus Thoughts and Emotions being nothing but transformed sensations (respectively vague and distinct), Sensations and Volitions become, in this system, the two *summa genera* of our mental activities—the results of powers of "Sensitivity" and "Will." But what is "Will?" The unanimous verdict of our most generally followed psychologists (the two Mills, Bain, Spencer, etc.) would represent it as being nothing more than the oversetting of an unstable balance which has been temporarily maintained between competing attractions—the passing from tendency into action (mental or bodily) in some definite direction. According to this view there can be no "act of Will" at all, the only "actions" can be those of the attracting influences and the automatic responsive action of the organism.

The opposite modern school of psychology—that which admits the freedom, and, therefore, the reality, of volition—regards Will as something altogether *sui generis*, consisting of the mental act of determination, the result of a purely determining and executive faculty which is *toto cælo* distinct from "sensitivity." The same school represents "Emotion" as a species of the genus "feeling," meaning the pleasurable or painful concomitant of any kind of mental activity.

Strongly contrasted with these two purely modern schools is the teaching of men who follow an older philosophical system—the Peripatetic or Scholastic. The latter represent Will as more closely connected with intellect, and more continuously acting—defining it[1] as an "*appetitus rationalis.*" On the other hand they consider

[1] It may be doubted whether Kant even did not identify the practical reason with the Will.

all "feeling," whether emotional or otherwise, as essentially sensitive, and not at all as intellectual.

Thus the three systems referred to differ as follows:

The first or modern sensist school recognizes merely sensation, and that subjective accompaniment of incipient automatic action which it misnames "Will."

The second, or modern intellectual school, recognizes self-determining will as entirely distinct both from intellect and sensation, but it makes no sufficiently sharp distinction between emotions and sensations.

The third, or older school, regards Will as not only a determining power but as containing intellectual activity and much which non-sensist moderns would call feeling, "*appetites*;" but it represents "*passiones*" (the nearest equivalent to our term Emotions) as being merely sensitive phenomena.

Thus it seems we have between these systems a cross division. Much that by the moderns is reckoned "feeling" being included by the followers of the older philosophy under the head of "Will," and, therefore, much which both the modern schools consider as merely sensuous, the older school reckons as belonging to the higher mental faculties, namely, as one aspect of the "*appetitus rationalis*."

It may be well, then, to inquire what can be said with respect to our higher emotions: (1.) Can they with greater propriety be ranked as a very exalted species of a genus which also contains those emotions which we share with brutes? (2.) Should they be ranked as an altogether distinct group of our higher mental activities? Or (3.), should they be once more included under the head of Will?

And now, at starting, I must assume that my readers concur with me in recognizing the fundamental distinction which exists between two classes of our psychical activities; *i. e.*, between our higher, reflective, self-conscious mental acts—the acts of our intellectual faculty, and the lower, direct, merely felt acts—the acts of our sensitive faculty. This distinction I believe to be the most fundamental and important of all the distinctions of psychology. It has been most strangely ignored from the days of Locke to our own; but when once its truth becomes generally recognized, that recognition will occasion nothing less than a revolution in modern philosophy. I have elsewhere[1] contended for, and given evidence of, this fundamental distinction, and pointed out the differences which exist between the acts of our intellectual and sensitive faculties respectively: between sensuous perception and *intellectual perception*; between the associations of sensations and images and *reason*;

[1] Lessons from Nature, Murray, 1876.

between sensuous memory and *intellectual memory;* and between emotional language and *rational language.*

In what relation to these two sets of psychical activities do our various emotions stand? Do they pertain to the class of intellectual or to that of sensitive activities, or to both of these?

"Emotions" are, of course, "feeling"—if we use the word "feeling" according to modern custom, which gives to it so extended a meaning, since, according to that custom, every mental act which is not a thought or an act of volition is a "feeling."

Now, it appears to me that under the common term "Emotion," two very different, even radically distinct, orders of psychical activity are included. It is, however, far from wonderful that this distinction should be lost sight of by the popular school of philosophy, which compounds "reasoning" with "sensuous association," and represents "ideas" as aggregated unity of feeling. But it is remarkable that the distinction has not been insisted on by the modern intellectual school.[1]

Let us compare "Emotion" with "perception," taking the latter term in its widest sense; *i. e.*, let us compare "feeling" with "knowing."

Now, "knowing," or "cognition," in this widest sense, is of two kinds: One intellectual, belonging to the higher order of faculties; the other merely sensitive, and belonging to the lower order of our faculties. The former kind of cognition is that by which we perceive the truth of the law of contradiction, or that ingratitude cannot be a virtue; the other (the merely sensitive) kind is similar to that by which the wolf recognizes his lair.

We may, I believe, make a parallel distinction between feeling and feeling. I mean between Emotions of a higher and supersensuous kind and Emotions of a lower, merely sensuous, order. As examples of the higher order of Emotions may be cited the feeling which moves us to aspire to imitate an act of generous self-denial, of which we may have just read, or that by which we are indignant at an act of cruel injustice. As examples of the

[1] The principal classification of Emotions in England, proceeding from a non-sensist point of view, is that which Hamilton has adopted from Kant. That it is pre-eminently confused and unsatisfactory may be seen from the following specimen: In his Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii., p. 492, he divides feelings into emotions and sentiments, the latter being the "feelings which accompany the energies of all our higher powers of mind." He further divides (p. 495) the sentiments into the contemplative and the practical, and the former of these again into the subsidiary and the elaborative faculties, and the first of these into the self-conscious and the imaginative. Strange to say, amongst these high self-conscious feelings, we find the feeling of Tedium, or Ennui, as well as those of Vanity and Shame. This circumstance is connected with Hamilton's whole position (and that of many German writers, *e. g.*, Beneke) that there can be no consciousness without self-consciousness.

lower Emotions, we may take the pleasurable feeling with which a parched traveller sees the glittering surface of a rippling brook, or that with which an old huntsman listens to the distant cry of hounds, which awakens in him confused images of many bygone pleasures of the chase.

But in spite of the radical distinctness between these two orders of feeling and cognition, the action of our intellectual and sensitive powers must ever be most intimately united, on account of that complete oneness of our being, which was adverted to at the beginning of this article. With the perfect unity of our composite nature, there is always an intermixture both of causes and effects. In perception, we intellectual animals cannot, on the one hand, observe the lowest sensible phenomenon without having, at least latent and implicit within us, the ideas of Being, Substance, Accident, Cause, etc. Similarly, on the other hand, we cannot think the highest and most abstract thoughts save by the aid of merely sensible images, and certainly we cannot communicate such abstract ideas to other men of whatever intellectual cultivation, without making use of terms which are in origin but the verbal representatives of concrete and sensible objects and actions made known to us through sensations. In a word, our thought, though essentially intellectual, is accidentally sensuous.

Similarly, then, we might expect that in our Emotions the intellectual and sensuous elements would be similarly blended. But, indeed, when we reflect that Emotions are psychical affections, so much less distinct and sharply defined than either sensations or ideas, we should anticipate that the intellectual and sensuous elements would be yet more intimately and confusedly blended together in them than in perceptions. Certainly, then, the mere fact of such blending can be no argument against the radical distinctness of the two kinds of Emotion. One kind consists of the essentially sensuous emotions, which are merely accidentally intellectual (*i. e.*, merely intellectual, because they are "*sensed*" by an intellectual being); such, *e. g.*, are the feelings of relish for particular flavors or feelings of the lowest sexual kind. The other kind consists of emotions which are essentially intellectual, and only accidentally sensuous (*i. e.*, merely sensuous, because they are "*intued*" by a sentient being); such, *e. g.*, are the pleasurable emotions accompanying the recollection of a mathematical problem finally solved, and that which attends the perception that an arduous act of duty has been successfully accomplished.

Some persons, as we shall shortly see, would reply by dogmatically affirming that "feeling" is necessarily "corporeal," but I rejoin by affirming then that "knowledge," as we experience it, is necessarily corporeal since, as has been just said, we cannot think our

most abstract thoughts save by the aid of sensuous phantasmata, and yet for all that, thought remains intellectual. Why, then, are not some kinds of "feeling" also to be considered intellectual? What are we to think of such mental states as the feeling of warm gratitude to God for making known to us religious truth, or of delight at the thought of the Beatific Vision? Are they not both feelings of some kind or other? And if they are feelings at all, are they not intellectual feelings?

It seems, then, that we may answer our first question as follows: "Emotions" of the higher kind can be ranked as species of a genus also including mere brute emotions, in the same way as and no further than intellectual perceptions can be ranked as species of a genus including also within it the merely sensuous perceptions of brutes. But so to group "perceptions" is to unite unnaturally together faculties which belong to two radically distinct orders of psychical activity, the intellectual and the sensuous. Similarly, therefore, so to group together "Emotions" is also to unite unnaturally together faculties which belong to two radically distinct orders of psychical activity. It may be convenient upon certain occasions, for some special purpose, to group either perceptions of the two orders together, or to group emotions of the two orders together in this unnatural manner, nor need we scruple so to do or to speak of both sets of Emotions as "Feelings," provided the distinction between the intellectual and merely sensitive orders of our mental powers and acts is all the time clearly borne in mind.

The confusion between the lower and higher feelings of the soul has been aided in the English-speaking world by our ordinary language. I mean by the way in which all such mental modifications, however intellectual, are often spoken of as "feelings," and yet it must be admitted that the word "feeling" *is* a very useful generic term.[1]

The second question now arises, namely, the question whether "the higher emotions should be ranked as an altogether distinct genus of our universally recognized higher mental states?"

Our higher faculties are divided into two genera: (1.) Intellect; (2.) Will. Shall we then add a third genus, "higher emotion," or can our intellectual emotion be associated with one or other of those higher faculties just enumerated and generally recognized?

Before, however, proceeding to consider this second question, I

[1] Sir William Hamilton (Lectures on Metaphysics, vol. ii., chapter xlv., p. 491), indeed, does divide "feelings" into "sensations" and "sentiments," but he does not make these two groups correspond with what I intend by "sensuous" and "intellectual" emotions respectively; besides, the term "sensations" is evidently one quite unsuited to denote emotions of even the lower kind.

wish to advert to the teaching of some of those who, in our own day, advocate the old or peripatetic philosophy of the Scholastics. In spite of so much that is admirable in the teaching referred to, there are yet some points in it with which a certain number of well-disposed thinkers cannot bring themselves, as they fain would, to agree. In the hope, therefore, of eliciting such explanations as may serve to remove the objections referred to, I venture on the following remarks:

We are sometimes told by religious expounders of the scholastic philosophy that all "feeling" is "corporeal," and that such mental activities as love of Virtue or of God, reside in the *Will;* also that in the state of disembodied spirit we cannot have feelings or emotions at all, since these belong essentially to the body. In that state, they tell us, we can have knowledge and Volition only.

To say the least, these statements are, to some persons, unsatisfying, not to say painful. To them it seems that one great motive to follow virtue and to seek heaven would be annihilated the moment we became convinced that feelings of love are to be unknown till the Resurrection, and that our will is to cleave to God as iron does to a magnet, without any feeling or emotion whatever. Yet this is what these statements seem to imply. Tell us that our feeling of happiness, *as we know it*, and our feeling of love, as we know it, are but symbols ever so inadequate of our "feelings" in heaven, and we shall not mind if only they are true symbols *as far as they go*—if they only fail, as our present knowledge fails, from inadequacy, not from mendacity. But tell us that we shall have nothing corresponding to the feelings we can now experience, and our future bliss seems poor indeed!

No doubt the feeling we experience here is very different from, is but a poor representation of, our "feeling" in heaven, just as the "knowing" we experience here (with the necessary sensitive element mixed up in it) may be but a poor representation of our future "knowing" in heaven; but just as there must be a conformity between the two forms of "knowing," if we are to have any confidence in our present intellectual powers, so there must be a conformity between the two forms of "feeling," or all the rhetoric applied to depict our future joys becomes not only unmeaning, but positively deceptive.

We are taught by the same authorities that "rational love" is the tendency of the will towards its object, the intellectually good which is in possession, and that "desire" is "this tendency merely unsatisfied." But every one who realizes the modern meaning of the word "feeling" must be convinced that "feeling" is as much an ultimate unanalyzable power of the soul which thinks and wills as is either "knowledge" or "volition." We cannot but be con-

vinced that those intense feelings of love to God which so many of the saints have not only felt but have spoken of with approbation, were feelings of the most acute pleasure. The teachers referred to would tell us: "Yes, but all this is in the WILL;" but if so, then Will *feels* and feels pleasure more keenly than does any other faculty—thus "the Will" becomes "feeling" *in excelsis*—surely this would be a strange use of the word "will," and—if, as moderns believe, the "Will" is one thing and "feeling" quite another—what would be the value to us of a heaven in which we had an indefinite quantity of "Will" but no particle of "feeling"?

But, in fact, a "tendency of the Will," *in se* and strictly speaking, can mean only a volition (if the tendency is in operation), or a velleity, or a habit of eliciting volitions and velleities of a particular kind. Any pleasure or pain, then, which may be the cause or concomitant of such a tendency ought to be taken distinct note of and not confounded with the tendency itself. "Desire," we are told, exists where this tendency is balked. So it does; but it is not the balked tendency, but a concomitant of it. Otherwise we are using the word "desire" in two meanings: (1.) A tendency which does not attain its end. (2.) The peculiar feeling by which this is accompanied. The fact is, there is no Latin term for our generic word "feeling," and as the scholastics employed the terms *sensus, sensatio, etc.*, they came not unnaturally to exclude feeling altogether from the higher powers of the soul, and in this the modern teachers referred to follow the scholastics. Some of these teachers have urged against the views here put forward the following observations: "Every faculty of the soul when rightly exercised gives rise to an appropriate and corresponding pleasure. Thus, an intellectual man feels pleasure in the successful employment of his reason, the amiable man delights in the society of his friends, and various sensuous pleasures attend the exercise of our various lower powers. The due exercise of the will has also its pleasures, and above all, in its adhesion to God in an act of Divine love, but as our nature is composite such mental activities tend, as it were, to overflow into the lower faculties, and thus sensuous pleasure becomes intermixed with such acts of volition and of intellect."

This representation appears to me by no means to fully and accurately express the facts upon which it is founded. There are numerous and well-known instances in which the "right exercise of our faculties" is accompanied by pleasure, while their wrong exercise is painful; but these instances are so crossed by contradictory instances that no general statement, such as that above quoted, can be made without our having to guard it by so many saving clauses that the general statement itself becomes practically worthless. It is one of the most common and ordinary phenomena

of the human mind that much good action is difficult and painful, and wrong-doing pleasurable and easy. How painful may not be the abandonment of a tender attachment, dictated by the plainest of ethical judgments! How long-continued may not be the suffering resulting from the conscientious relinquishment of a large fortune, which has unjustly accrued to a suffering man with a numerous and sickly family! Moreover, there may be intellectual emotions in which the intellect is duly and rightly exercised, while yet the result is painful: as in the contemplation of God's justice and our own unworthiness. But even if it were true that feelings, respectively of pleasure and pain, accompany the normal and abnormal actions of our minds, ought these feelings to be referred to those very faculties which elicit the operations on occasion of which these pleasures and pains arise? Faculties are distinguished by the nature of their acts, and not by any synchronousness which such acts may exhibit. The activity of the senses is, in any one who is in the full possession of his faculties, accompanied or immediately followed by the activity of the intellect, and the intellect does not operate *sine conversione ad phantasmata.* We do not, however, therefore identify intellect with the sensuous powers, and we do not do so because the natures of the acts themselves are essentially different. The feeling of happiness or remorse which accompanies an act of the will, or the satisfaction which is attendant on the solution of an intellectual problem, is quite as different in nature from volition or intellectual activity as these are from each other, or as are sensations from the lower desires to which they may give rise. Such feelings of happiness or remorse, therefore, ought to be regarded, not as being themselves products of intellect and will, but as manifestations of a concomitant power or faculty. When right action or intellectual activity gives pleasure, this is due not to the internal constitution of the intellect and will themselves, prescinding from the rest of the mind, but to the constitution and organization (so to speak) of the mind itself, which is thus shown to possess within it the power and faculty of feeling such happiness or remorse.

But it is further urged by my opponents that "all feelings are essentially corporeal, lower, sensuous phenomena, correlated with the possession of a material organism, and having of themselves no spiritual significance." But here I must again distinguish between feelings and feelings. As I have before urged, some of our feelings are lower and sensuous—the feelings of sexual appetite, of anger, and of fear (like those of the lower animals) are undoubtedly of this character; but other feelings are of a higher nature. Amongst these is the feeling of remorse. By remorse, I do not mean a painful feeling unattended by an act of judgment, such as

we might conceive to arise in a bird which had deserted its offspring in order to migrate with its fellows, but that higher and spiritual remorse which, in an habitually conscientious man, would attend the distinct perception that he had in a solitary instance violated the moral law. Along with remorse I would also place our feeling of admiration for a noble action. Such feelings are of the higher order, and have an eternal significance in the mind of man. No one is in a normal moral state who does not feel them when the occasion arrives; they are correlated, not with his physical organism, but with his highest spiritual capacities. Any state, therefore, in which they were absent, would be the state of a hurt and maimed spiritual creature. I readily grant that in our present condition the lower feelings are almost inextricably interlaced with the higher, and hence either may be excited accidentally by causes lying out of their proper sphere; but there is an analogous interlacement in our cognitive actions. Nevertheless, and in spite of this, our thoughts and intellectual perceptions so correspond with those of pure spirits (in respect to that which is essential to thought, the intellectual element itself) that the same name (thoughts) may properly be applied to both; and both men and angels may be said to *know*, and to intellectually apprehend, in spite of the sensuous element which necessarily enters into all the knowledge and all the thoughts of which we men have actual experience. Similarly (we have seen), in precisely the same way, our higher Emotions and the states of happiness of blessed spirits, may both be justly designated "feeling" (in the wide sense of that word), in spite of the sensuous element which necessarily enters into all emotion of which we men have actual experience.

I contend then—and, on account of the close connection there is between phraseology and thought, explicit insistence on this point is necessary to remove a philosophical difficulty from many minds—that our higher emotions should be ranked as an altogether distinct genus of acts belonging to our higher faculties, and running parallel with the other groups of higher mental acts. Some accompany the activity of the intellect; others, the activity of the will. I do not stickle for the precise term, "higher emotions," though that is the best that occurs to me. Let them, however, be called by whatever name may be preferred, the fact remains that there is a group of phenomena of mind, analogous to the lower emotions, but of a higher order, and incapable of being traced by sound psychology to a sensuous source—phenomena which pertain to our higher mental facts, though incapable of being classed under the head of "intellect."

This is my answer to the second question proposed, and now we may turn to the third; namely, the question, "May our higher

emotions be ranked under the head of Will?" I maintain that the name, Will, is utterly inappropriate. My reasons are these: The word Will (or equivalent expressions in other languages) has had, and has, it is not to be questioned, other meanings besides that of a self-determining power. Nevertheless, this application of it is of such transcendent importance that it has thrown the others almost entirely into the shade. All who believe that we possess a really free will, admit that whether it is, or is not, *more* than a determining faculty, it is at least this, and is primarily this. The will is, *par excellence*, that power by which we determine our action, and elect one out of a plurality of motives which solicit our activity. No by-meaning of the word should be allowed which even threatens, and that even in appearance, to conflict with this or to relegate it into the background. Again, not only is this advisable, it is, if we would be understood, necessary. There are frequently acute feelings and pure love and keen intellectual delight, feelings of sorrow for moral evil and of pain at the doing of others—where the action of the determining faculty is obviously no constituent of the feeling. Such, for example, are the feelings excited by the sudden clearing up of a religious difficulty, or the admiration excited by hearing of an exceptionally generous act of self-devotion. The will may afterwards co-operate or dissent, may encourage or discourage these feelings; but it is in every one's experience that they arise independently of it in the first instance. To call these states of mind *acts of will* seems meaningless to modern ears.

But, it may be said, the will is an *appetitus rationalis*, and as such has its yearnings and its loathings. That there are yearnings and loathings which precede, accompany, or follow its action I have insisted on all along. But ought we to class the faculties of the mind so as to place these feelings as constituent elements in the self-determining power itself? By no means. We should thus favor the idea that motives are not the counsellors but the tyrants of the will. It may be said that this is a mere matter of classification. If so, it ought to be answered that no matter of classification ever was, is, or can be, a *mere* matter of classification. A classification fixes a tone of mind and draws after it numberless trains of consequences. And, I would ask, is it advisable in the present day to call the will an *appetitus rationalis?* Let any one reflect on the meaning in which appetite is now used and ask himself whether it is practically possible that, if *appetite* were the recognized name for the Will, it should not be conceived of after the analogy of the other appetites. There is, therefore, the very grave objection to the view that the Will is an *appetitus rationalis*, that a great difficulty is thus thrown in the way of accepting the freedom of the will at all. If the will itself is an "appetite" it must adhere

to that which gratifies it, and be dominated by external attractions, as the appetite of a brute is so dominated. None of our appetites are free. We are compelled to adhere to the truth for which there is sufficient evidence; to admire a beautiful object when its beauty is made manifest; to honor a noble action even though in spite of ourselves. But it may be urged it is an intellectual appetite, an *appetitus rationalis*. But what is an intellectual appetite but an appetite still? It is an appetite after all, and is, therefore, governed; not governed indeed by animal impulse, but by the calculations of a necessarily acting power, such as the reason is! It treads in the footsteps of reason instead of in the footsteps of sense; but it is still a subject. In fact those who called the will a rational appetite must mean much more than they said; but turn the matter as we will we cannot get rid of the associations attaching to the word appetite. If that term be the one adopted, then the natural and necessary result seems to be that doctrine which the Dominicans affirm to be taught by St. Thomas, the so-called Thomist view of the Will. The question as to what really was the teaching of the Angelic Doctor is one which cannot be gone into here, but a few passing remarks may be permitted. That his teaching cannot be considered clear, is evident from the fact that most able men interpret him differently. The Jesuits, to whom all churchmen and indeed all Theists are on so many accounts indebted, have a strong claim to gratitude also in this matter. The Jesuits may be said to be the Church's "Rationalists;" they are the men who have especially made a free use of their reason, and it is they who have excogitated and put forward the only truly rational theory of the Will, vindicating its freedom against the fatal teaching above referred to.

It was most natural that the Jesuits should seek to make out that St. Thomas had really taught their doctrine, both through reverence and to obviate prejudice against their views. Yet surely the direct spiritual descendants of St. Thomas—the Dominicans—are the men who are most likely to have preserved the true tradition of his oral teaching. If this is so, then we must in this matter venture to discard even the authority of St. Thomas himself, and shelter ourselves under the ample shield held over us by the disciples of St. Ignatius.

This matter is pertinent to our inquiry, inasmuch as the root of this old error seems to be the treating the Will as an "*appetitus*" ὄρεξις, instead of treating it as a pure faculty of free determination. They said that being an appetite (*appetitus*) it has an "object" which it follows *ex natura rei;* that object is the *bonum* or good which is proposed or propounded to it by the intellect. When, therefore, this object is sufficiently placed before it, its determina-

tion follows as a matter of course. This teaching is at least open to serious misconstruction, and I do not therefore think that the faculty of free choice ought to be called "appetitus," either "*rationalis*," or anything else; not "rationalis," for we are quite as liable to be moved by the lower, or sensuous, as by the higher propensions, and not "*appetitus*," for the power of free choice deserves a name and a place to itself. The use of the term "rational appetite" to denote "Will" is objectionable as favoring the view that we must always act in some determinate way, determined by preponderance of appetite. The term "*appetitus rationalis*," however, but for the bad use already made of it, might have well seemed to designate the sum of our higher emotions.

To sum up what has been here contended for, we have recognized three higher powers, or faculties, (1) knowledge, (2) feeling, and (3) Will. We have recognized that in each of the two former, as we experience them, there is both an intellectual and a sensuous element. Will stands apart as something altogether *sui generis*, a faculty of free self-determination. Thus the "Will" of each man is seen to be his very self—it is his individuality *par excellence*, his personality *in excelsis!*

Let us now endeavor to analyze our various psychical states, both of the lower and the higher series, with a view to still better understanding "feelings," both sensuous and intellectual, and especially the nature and true value of our higher feelings, that is, our sentiments in higher emotions.

In the soul considered as *sensitive* we have first, as the foundation of all, "simple *sensations*" produced by the agency of external objects; then faint repetitions of such states, recurring without external excitation, *i. e.*, images in *phantasmata;* then complex sensations associated together, and with certain images making "*sensible cognitions;*" then faint repetitions of these recurring without external excitation, *i. e.*, *imaginations;* then the recurrence of these associated in clusters, and clusters of clusters, forming more complex imaginations, and, also, in connection with other sensations, constituting that which in the brute simulates reasoning, *i. e.*, the complex association of imaginations and sensations, namely, *organic inferences.*

Finally, besides these, we have associated imaginations occurring in complex groups which are vague and indistinct, and are accompanied more or less strongly and distinctly by pleasure and pain, and these constitute the "*lower emotions*," such as those felt by brutes, *i. e.*, sensuous emotions or animal propensions.

So much for the soul considered as sensitive; now as to the soul considered as *intellectual.*

Here we have first, as the foundation of all, "*ideas;*" then clus-

ters of ideas constituting "pure complex intellectual perceptions;" then clusters of such perceptions associated in their logical relations, *i. e.*, "reasonings." Finally, clusters of such perceptions accompanied more or less strongly and distinctly by pleasure and pain, and such constitute the *higher Emotions.* Emotions such as a pure spirit must be capable of experiencing, *i. e.*, intellectual Emotions or rational propensions.

Besides these we must distinguish Volition as a power of the higher order, and motion as one of the lower order, the latter being divisible into (1) locomotion of the whole organism, and (2) the minute organic motions through which the actions of bodily life are carried on.

I should then divide the powers of the soul into lower and higher, with subdivisions as follows:

- Lower.
  - Motion.
    - Organic.
    - Locomotive.
  - Appetite and sensuous Emotion.
  - Sensation.
    - Vivid.
      - Distinct
      - Associated.
    - Faint.
      - Distinct
      - Associated.
- Higher.
  - Intellect.
    - Ratiocinative.
    - Intuitive.
  - Emotion.
  - Will.

A few words now as to the possibility and probability of the existence of the higher evolutions in the disembodied state. Let us test this once more by the analogy of intellect. Our ideas are not innate as ideas. We have at first only the capacity of evolving them on the occurrence of the requisite stimuli. Now our fundamental ideas (*e. g.*, those of being, reality, difference, numbers, quality, cause, merit, etc.) are only called forth through the occurrence in us of groups of sensations. Similarly our intellectual perceptions require for their elicitation the occurrence in us of sensible cognitions, and these cognitions and perceptions together constitute our *external intellectual perceptions* (*i. e.*, our intellectual perceptions of sensible objects), while the recurrence of imaginations forms the basis of and the occasion for our *internal intellectual perceptions*, and, therefore, of all our reflections and reasonings. These latter, therefore, as has been before insisted on, have always, in us corporeal beings, their imaginative or sensational element.

Similarly, our higher emotions must also have their sensational element. Again in our lower or sensuous emotions there is always a vagueness and indistinctness; and, since these lower emotions form the sensuous correlates of our higher emotions and arise at the same time with them, there is necessarily a certain vagueness and indistinctness in the latter also, as they present themselves in

he concrete. If, then, in the purely spiritual condition the sensible element in our intellectual emotions so disappears that what remains cannot be called a feeling of any kind, they would thereby become something which we cannot imagine and for which we have no term. But "feelings" in this way would not alone disappear, but "thoughts" also. For if this is possible as to Emotion, it is possible also that the sensible element in our intellectual apprehensions may likewise disappear, and thus they would become intellectual acts of a nature such as we cannot imagine, acts to which the term "knowledge" would not be applicable with any meaning for us. It seems, then, from this point of view also, that if we must deny to our disembodied condition the possession of 'Emotion" because of the sensible element which enters into our 'emotions" now, we must also deny to that condition the possession of "knowledge," because of the sensible element which enters into our "knowledge" now. But I would contend that just as our soul, when disembodied, may retain the ideas it has acquired through the agency of sensations and imaginations, so it may also retain the higher emotions which it has acquired through the very same kind of agency. This need not prevent a change in the quality of our emotions, owing to the absence of the material organism, any more than it need prevent a change in the quality of our future intellectual activity. More than this, our organism, as we now experience it, may check as well as aid our intellectual activity. Much of that activity takes place only subconsciously, and consciousness can now only follow in a single thread, as it were, at one time. Moreover, our nervous organization more or less quickly becomes fatigued, and so by checking imagination temporarily paralyzes thought. It may be that when disembodied, we may be fully conscious of all our intellectual activity, and our consciousness may possibly be multiple so that we may simultaneously follow several chains of thought. Again, exhaustion of nervous tissue will no longer be a check to continuous mental activity. If this should be the case, why might not "feeling" be similarly enlarged—emotion losing all its vagueness and gaining in both intensity and continuance as well as in complexity and fulness? In a word, why may not both intellect and emotion—our sentiments and affections—be depurated by separation from the body as it now is?

But the word "affections" suggests yet another consideration with respect to Emotion, namely, the question as to the excellence of "feelings of piety," and of what is called "sensible devotion." May it not be the case that as such feelings have been unduly valued and cherished by the evangelical school of Protestants, so they have been unduly slighted by some amongst ourselves? I

venture, till better informed, to consider such feelings to be always excellent and to be often even meritorious. To this new opinion some persons will object that "feelings of piety" are sometimes elicited by alcohol, and, therefore, that in asserting such feelings to be always excellent, we should be virtually asserting that intoxication may have excellent effects. To this I reply, such feelings may be admirable in themselves, however blameworthy may be the means that have called them into activity. Having such feelings may (as in the case objected) be a demerit, but having them under other circumstances may be not only excellent but also meritorious. Do not our retreats appeal to the feelings, and what is devotion to the Sacred Heart but a strong appeal to and consecration of feeling? Is not that state of mind which makes a man shrink with loathing from impurity or other gross sin a good thing?

The explanation of this difficulty seems to be that though all merit or demerit springs from the Will and the Will only, yet that from the unity and complexity of our nature, much which is really distinct from and which seems independent of the will is really due to its activity past or present. That the wish—the feeling or desire—is often "father to the thought," is a recognized truth, and it is generally assumed that the will is dependent on the wish or feeling. I believe, however, that frequently it is the other way, and that our desires and feelings are, though quite distinct from, yet very often really dependent on the will, when such an origin is quite unsuspected. For there are many acts of our soul which take place unconsciously. This is manifestly the case with much of our organic action. Ordinarily, the beating of the heart, the motions of the lungs, etc., are unconsciously performed, and the processes of digestion, circulation, secretion, and assimilation are certainly so performed. Effects also may be wrought in the organism, even through the actions of the senses, without affecting consciousness. How often do we not remember to have seen or heard something which, when before our eyes or sticking in our ear, we altogether failed to recognize?[1] Some persons think that in what is called "unconscious cerebration" the intellect itself acts unconsciously; but however this may be, sensible modifications which accompany or prepare the way for intellectual action, may, at any rate, take place unconsciously, and certainly much intellectual activity is exercised in a subconscious state.

[1] In such cases we evidently have sensations without consciousness. Such cases are, *e. g.*, when it suddenly strikes us that we have seen a word over some shop-front and turning back we find it was so, or that some name has been pronounced in our hearing of which we were at the time quite unconscious, and on inquiry find that such was really the case. Our psychical state at the time we had these sensations unconsciously, may serve to make conceivable to us the sentient life of brutes—made up as it appears to be of a series of unconsciously received sensations.

Probably, Will also may come to act subconsciously[1] when it has once been intentionally set going in some definite direction. Hence the merit or demerit of much which at first sight seems independent of volition. Not, of course, that really unconscious acts of Will, if such be possible, can have merit or demerit—otherwise, meritorious acts might be done in dreams—but subconscious acts may have merit or demerit. Thus, a defective apprehension of spiritual things may be really due to a subconscious turning away of the Will, which has become an unnoticed tendency through habitual early misuse of Will. Such misuse may have produced a distaste for the thought of spiritual things, and a consequent want of education and exercise in directing the mind towards them. This, again, may be secondarily the occasion of the rejection of religious truth.

Again, though there is no merit in feeling, but only in will, yet as we feel pleasure in doing that which we can do effectively, easily, and well, so the repeated exercise of the Will, in certain directions, tends to give not only a facility, but also a pleasure, to its exercise in such directions. Thus, the state of our desires may be an index to the past habitual exercise of our volition. Again, by the habitual early misuse of Will, we may have so weakened (by want of exercise) our ethical intellectual activity that the pleasure resulting from its exercise in good directions has become proportionally weak and feeble, while the pleasure arising from its immoral exercise has become proportionately strengthened; and these induced feelings may occasion the really voluntary, but unconsciously voluntary, rejection of religion altogether.

Thus, consciously or subconsciously—or, it may even be unconsciously—the Will may accompany emotion; flowing into emotions of all kinds, and, as it were, transfiguring them. Thus, our higher emotions may be meritorious, as well as excellent, on account of the past volitions to which their present existence may be due. This simultaneity, however, of emotion with Will in no way obscures the essential distinction between the two psychical activities—"Feeling" and "Willing."

The views here put forward may serve, I venture to think, to bridge over the gulf existing between the non-sensist schools of modern philosophy and the modern representatives of scholasticism; *i. e.*, as regards the relations existing between feeling and intellect. By the recognition of two radically distinct kinds of Emotion, belonging respectively to the higher and lower powers of our soul, we make clear and distinct an important difference obscurely indicated by the ancients through defective phraseology. The word

[1] See Dr. Ward's Nature and Grace, p. 234.

παθος Cicero translated by *appetitus;* and the whole of whatever can be the subject of desire or aversion was named appetitus, especially in ecclesiastical use. The term was used as the equivalent of the Greek ὄρεξις—both the lower desires, ὄρεξις ἄλογος; and the higher ὄρεξις λογιστικος. The confusion being removed by the distinct recognition of the double nature of "feeling," it seems evident that "feelings" as well as "thoughts" may exist in the disembodied state. Let Emotions in so far as they are sensuous cease; yet in so far as they are supersensuous, they may (though originally elicited accidentally through the organism) none the less persist, just as thought (though also originally elicited through the organism) may persist. The Will, considered in the combined light derived from both schools, becomes recognized as a most real and distinct faculty; but one purely determinative and in no way an appetite, although as infusing itself into propensions it gives force to appetites both animal and rational.

The Emotions of our higher nature may be compared, in a parallel series, with the appetites of our lower nature. Just as we have animal propensions towards the objects correlated with nutrition, safety, or sex, so we have rational propensions towards objects known to us as truthful, beautiful, or good.

As the bodily appetites may be increased in intensity by our own acts, so also may our rational propensions. The pleasure which attends the gratification of both groups may be similarly augmented, and therewith will also be augmented both the tendency to repeat appropriate acts and the facility of such repetition.

The want of due balance between our lower tendencies may so influence the organism as effectually to exaggerate the attractions and hide the disadvantages attending the fruition of some one desire: like an animal in the blind ardor of sexual pursuit, failing to observe a danger, the proximity of which it would normally avoid.

The want of due balance between our higher tendencies may similarly cause one of them so to influence the mind as to exaggerate or to hide the due claims of objects appealing to the other higher tendencies.

It is impossible to love beauty too much; that is, we cannot have a love of it which is absolutely too great, though we may easily have love of it which is relatively too great; *i. e.*, too great in proportion to our existing propensions towards goodness and truth. The abuses of this tendency are obvious.

We cannot have moral emotions of too great absolute intensity; but if our propension for truth be simultaneously defective, a peculiar distortion may arise. By the propension of truth I do not, of course, mean "the love of *truthfulness*," for such a defect would be a glaring moral failing; but I mean "the love of abstract truth for

its own sake." A defect in this propension is sometimes seen to produce the distortion referred to, when a very moral and religious man neglects to face fully and fairly religious difficulties which circumstances bring in his way. The result may be an acquiescence in error which might have been got rid of; the hindrance, so far, of the advance of truth and the promotion of that prolific source of human ills—superstition.

We cannot love truth too ardently; we cannot be absolutely too devoted to it. But if our love of goodness and holiness be relatively feeble, we may from this disproportion so exaggerate the critical spirit as to come to reject religious truth which we ought to have accepted. It may be objected in reply that this is impossible; that no amount of love of truth can distort our judgment; and that we ought to make our belief tally, in all cases, exactly with the evidence producible. To this I answer at once that we ought most certainly to endeavor as much as possible so to do, and never consciously to tamper with truth in the smallest degree. Especially should we be jealous as to the adequacy of the evidence for anything, a belief in which we would press on the acceptance of others. Nevertheless, the following considerations should, I think, no less be borne in mind:

(1.) The acceptance of religious belief is a practical as well as a speculative matter; and in practical matters we have constantly, in life, to act upon probabilities with the same energy and vigor as if we had absolute certainty about them.

(2.) The critical spirit developed to an extreme degree may lead to a carping fondness for criticism for its own sake, no longer for the sake of truth itself. This critical spirit may moreover come to be consciously or unconsciously exercised for the critic's own glory and to gratify his love of superiority, instead of for that pure love of truth which is put forward as its cause. Such danger is, above all, likely to attend religious criticism, wherein the temptation is so great to the proud or vain to have an easy triumph over the credulity of their fellows. Not every one who loudly proclaims himself a zealous follower of truth is really such, any more than every man who proclaims himself a zealous follower of virtue is really virtuous.

(3.) The relative weakness of ethical emotion in the case supposed may really lead the inquirer to overlook evidence for religion, which is plain to him whose tendency towards virtue is more ardent. For we all know the sharpening effect upon the attention of any keen feeling; and an ardent desire in favor of religion is the most rational state in which to carry on inquiry concerning it. It is absolutely impossible for any man to be really quite impartial and unprejudiced—free both from inherited proclivities and from those acquired by the joint action of his own nature and his environment. In this matter, moreover, we have no business to be "im-

partial" even if we could be so—if we were impartial, our mental nature would be so far defective. No healthy man, in the full vigor of life, is "impartial" with respect to food set before him after a long fast, or as to any other object of the animal propensions. Similarly, no rational man with a well-balanced mind—a man with tendencies towards beauty, truth, and goodness maintained in due proportion—can do otherwise than long with the most ardent longing to find evidence for the existence of that God in whom all his highest ideas are realized, of whom all that he can conceive of goodness and of beauty can serve but as the faintest and most distant adumbration. *Sicut desiderat cervus ad fontes aquarum ita desiderat anima mea ad te Domine!* is the exclamation of every rational man who aspires to goodness and who understands the problem before him.

(4.) It is evident that the truths of natural religion, like those of Revelation, have not been made so plain and evident that assent to them on the part of all rational men is forced upon them, as the recognition of the sun in the heavens is forced upon them. Granting the existence of God, it is evident that He has not chosen to allow himself to be caught at the bottom of any man's crucible, or to yield himself to the experiments of gross-minded and irreverent inquirers. On the hypothesis of theism, it is evident that a moral element may enter into religious belief, and any man who has not convinced himself of the certainty of God's non-existence (which no rational man *can* have done) would be foolish indeed not to weigh well this consideration in undertaking his religious inquiries. He cannot but admit that the world *may* have been so ordered that in many cases intellectual assent to theism shall constitute a test of moral worth. Thus a want of balance between our aspirations after truth and goodness, through defect of the latter, may result in a failure to perceive the truth of what is really true, and may also be an evidence of the perverse exercise of unnumbered antecedent acts of will.

In conclusion, I would—as the result of all the foregoing various considerations—maintain that "Emotion" is a distinct kind of action of our higher mental nature. I would maintain that in that higher nature we have a faculty of "feeling" parallel with our faculties of intellect and of will, and not to be confounded with either of the latter. I would contend even further, that it is a faculty of extreme value in this life, as the greatest aid we naturally have here in the pursuit of all that is beautiful, truthful, and virtuous. Even further would I say, that it is a form of activity which will be exercised by the disembodied soul, and one at this moment constantly energizing in the spirits of the just made perfect—in cherubim and seraphim, in the highest of all created beings, and one which may be affirmed to exist, as well as knowledge, in the eternal activity of Almighty God himself.

POPE ALEXANDER THE SIXTH AND HIS ORIGINAL TRADUCERS.

1. *Histoire des Papes.* Par J. Chantrel. Paris, 1862.
2. *Histoire d'Italie.* Par Guicciardini.
3. Burchardt's *Diarium.*
4. *Histoire du Pape Alexandre VI.* Par l'Abbé Jorry. Paris, 1851.
5. *Etudes Critiques sur l'Histoire d'Alexandre VI.*

ONE of the strangest as well as most instructive works that probably could be composed, would be what might be called the History of History. Such a work, if written only with ordinary ability, would undoubtedly cause many persons, however painful it might be to them, to reverse the opinions they have formed of certain personages and occurrences of former times.

It is not my design in this paper to attempt such a history, except as regards the principal defamers of one of the successors of St. Peter to the Pontifical throne.

Truly unfortunate, I may remark in passing, is the person who, like the unhappy Döllinger of our own times, pins his faith to the sleeve of what is often called or imagined to be history, in preference to Divine revelation and the teachings of the infallible Church of God. It was not, indeed, without cause that Count De Maistre pronounced the history of the last three centuries to be a "conspiracy against truth," but the illustrious Count may well have included in his animadversions a longer period than these three hundred years.

Let nobody imagine that we are attacking all history, for such by no means is our design. We mean to reprehend only what may be called sham or pseudo history.

Perhaps few studies in modern times have afforded more striking or more important results than those of history and biography re-examined in their original sources. It need hardly be remarked that the effect of this has been to reverse many opinions which, for a long time, were received as settled historical facts. The researches in this field may be said to have as yet only begun; but, judging from the success of those who have only partially traversed it, the student who will still more thoroughly explore and minutely re-examine and cultivate it, will assuredly reap from it a harvest of imperishable laurels.

It need not be remarked that the original sources of biography are various; indeed, it may be examined and studied from different

standpoints; but one of these is the examination, not so much into the facts or occurrences narrated as into the characters of the original writers who have recorded them; or, in other words, a careful examination of their moral characters, and consequently of their truthfulness or the contrary; for it need scarcely be remarked that the testimony of an enemy or of a suborned witness is commonly, if not always, worthless.

It was by a study of the kind just noticed, that is to say, by the diligent re-examination and collation of original Spanish and Italian documents and of the moral character of certain writers, that Count Roselly De Lorgues, in his *Christophe Colomb, sa Vie et ses Voyages*, an abridged translation of which I some years ago gave to the public, was enabled, beyond the shadow of a doubt, to show that the several accusations made against the illustrious discoverer of the New World, and particularly the one of his not being married to the mother of his son Fernando, are sheer calumnies, wholly destitute of any original support. With these prefatory remarks, we now proceed to our theme.

To mention the name of Alexander VI., is it not at once to recall a series of crimes and infamies upon which the most prudent course for a writer who values his reputation would be to observe a dignified silence? To try to defend the infamous Borgia, as he has been unthoughtfully designated, is it not to undertake a task as culpable as it is vain and useless? Or rather is it not like stirring up some matters which the more they are stirred, the more noisome they become? Mention if you will, some of our Catholic friends will say to us, that the crimes of Alexander cannot justly be attributed to the Church, or even to the Papacy, because the vices of the private man do not nullify the sacred character of the Pontiff; say further, if you desire it, that the divineness of the promises made to the Church are found precisely confirmed by this miracle, for it is no less than a miracle that she has been able to withstand and overcome so much infamy and perversity; but do not endeavor to rehabilitate a name and a memory hopelessly doomed to eternal dishonor.

These counsels, however well meant undoubtedly they may be, will not stop us. Above all things it is the truth that we love, and that claims our homage and devotion; it is the truth that we wish to defend and vindicate, and we intend that we shall not be swayed from doing so either by worldly policy or by fear. Like M. Chantrel, whose name appears at the heading of this article, and most others who flattered themselves as being fully conversant with the subject, we conceived in early life, from what we had read of him, a hearty detestation for the memory of Alexander. Leaving to the enemies of the Catholic Church the enjoyment of

the luxury caused by this hideous blemish on the Papacy, we lamented with deep regret the scandal, consoling ourselves with the reflection that Christ had predicted that scandals should come, and even taught or indicated their necessity. But about the year 1860 a total change took place in our ideas regarding this Pope, in consequence of having read in the January number of the preceding year an article entitled "History in Fiction," the burden of which was the shameful injustice done to the memory of this Pontiff. Later on, from thoughtful reflection and a more thorough course of studies, and seeing that by diligent and thorough investigation the far greater part of the scandalous charges with which certain writers filled what they miscalled histories of the Papacy, began one by one to disappear; and further, seeing the memories of other sovereign Pontiffs gloriously rehabilitated by Protestant writers, such as Hurtur, Voigt, Roscoe, Ranke, Mueller, and some others, we asked ourselves the question: Could it be possible that the fifteenth century could have endured for eleven years a Pope so depraved, so odiously infamous, as Alexander VI. is reported to have been?

Under these circumstances, a doubt, which no candid, intelligent person will pronounce unfounded, took possession of our mind; and soon after the doubt came the full conviction that the scandals, if such there were, in the cases alluded to, were at least grossly misrepresented or exaggerated. M. Chantrel informs us that even Voltaire, who was by no means sparing of the character of Alexander, justified this conviction in reproaching Guicciardini with having "deceived all Europe" in regard to the death of this Pope, and with having too easily listened to "the inspirations of his own envenomed hatred."

The doubt referred to was not be hushed or smothered. We multiplied and extended our researches. We found the Protestant Roscoe generously and nobly engaged in the work of vindicating this much maligned Pontiff, in rectifying several errors connected with him, and in repelling or dissipating a large number of slanders that had been circulated of him. Further ascending to primitive or original sources, we found that all the accusations made against Alexander came originally from persons who were notoriously his enemies, or who were hired or suborned to defame him, and that many of the accusations mutually contradicted or invalidated each other. On an attentive perusal of the famous *Diarium* of Burchardt (if, indeed, he be really the author of it), which is often quoted as a testimony against Alexander, one will be surprised to find that he drops as false or untenable a large number of the charges preferred against that Pope by his other accusers.

M. Chantrel, the writer to whom we are most indebted for the matter for this article, mentions among the incidents of his conversion to the cause of Alexander the following one: "A recent pamphlet, written by an enemy of Alexander's, but who forced himself to be just, completed our conversion or conviction. Such certainly was not the aim of the author, M. La Rochelle, when he wrote his pamphlet, *Sur les droits du Saint Siege; Alexandre VI., et Cæsar Borgia;* but seeing that this enemy of the Popes and of their temporal sovereignty was compelled to admit that Cæsar Borgia endeared himself to and was beloved by the people whom he had delivered from their tyrants, and further candidly acknowledged that most of the crimes with which Alexander had been charged never had any existence at all, we felt sustained and greatly strengthened in our change of opinion."

Our own conviction on this subject is now fully settled. We believe that henceforward nobody acquainted with his true history can consider Alexander as a monster, as a second Nero encircled with the tiara, or as an assassin or a debauchee. We fully believe that he was a worthy Pontiff and a great temporal prince, and that Catholics have no real cause to blush at his name. And as his memory, we doubt not, will appear more and more untarnished in proportion as we study more attentively and impartially his real history and that of his times, and study more carefully the circumstances amid which he acted, we by no means despair of seeing, one day, the gravest historians repeat with the *Dublin Review* that Alexander VI. has been calumniated in almost everything, as were before him St. Gregory VII., Innocent III., and Boniface VIII., with the sole difference that he has been more thoroughly and persistently thus dealt with than they were.

In our times reference is often made to the pontificate of Alexander VI. The enemies of the Papacy who would subvert its temporal authority, in order the more surely to undermine its spiritual authority, pretend that the temporal sovereignty ascends really only to this Pontiff, and that this is a sorry origin for a power which Catholics hold or pretend to be sacred. To this charge Catholics may well truthfully reply that they have seen this sovereignty, in germ in the Apostolic times, show itself plainly under the first Christian emperors, and become still more developed under the iconoclast emperors, to become completely established in the eighth century by a growth, slow but sure, which Catholics legitimately deem a mark of the Divine will, but which those who reject the idea of a Providence call "the march of events." This temporal sovereignty, having in the course of time become enfeebled, Alexander VI. only prepared the way for its consolidation, in rendering powerless the petty tyrants who, like

Victor Emanuel of the present day, seized on and oppressed the States of the Church. Subsequently, Julius II. finished what Alexander had begun, and henceforth was consolidated that monarchy which gave a tranquillity of three centuries' duration to the Romans.

It is evident, then, that pontifical royalty does not date from Alexander VI., and that if it did, it would by no means have a shameful origin, as will presently be seen, since it is not true that he was an unworthy Pontiff, though we are willing to allow that he probably was the least worthy of the successors of St. Peter on the pontifical throne.

The writers who have particularly treated of Alexander VI. may be divided into three classes: enemies, defenders, and those who are indifferent—that is to say, neither friends nor enemies. Among the first class, the only one we will now revert to, we should mention: 1. Francis Guichardini or Guicciardini, especially in his *History of Italy*. 2. Burchardt in his *Diarium, or Journal of Alexander VI.* 3. Paul Jove, who wrote a history of his own times. 4. Tomaso Tomasi, author of a history of Cæsar Borgia. 5. Macchiavelli, a secret enemy, but a pretended admirer of the same Cæsar Borgia. To these must be added the following writers, who used them for the purpose of criminating Alexander, namely: Voltaire and his whole school; M. Mary Lafon, in his *Rome Moderne;* M. Challamel, in his *Histoire des Papes;* an anonymous writer in his *Rome et Paris, en la Question Romaine;* M. La Rochelle, in the pamphlet already mentioned; and finally, Bianchi Giovini, in an infamous pamphlet bearing the title of *Il Diario di Burcardo, Quandro del costumi della Corta di Romana.* We cannot spare space or time to refer particularly to the defenders of our Pontiff, or to the large class who have been indifferent in regard to him.

The *Critical Studies* of M. Favé, a work which by no means is as well known as it deserves to be, and the article in the *Dublin Review*, in our estimation settle the question, and can leave no doubt that Alexander has been the victim of an odious conspiracy of calumnies.

Catholics, who have a horror for lies, and who cannot comprehend to what a degree malignity and impudence are capable of exciting the hatred of some of their adversaries, are often induced to make all the concessions which do not compromise faith itself; more than one of them, even after having read this paper, will still, there is but little room to doubt, hesitate to believe that calumny has been so audacious in regard to Alexander, and probably they will say there must surely be some truth, however small it may be, where there are so many accusations against a Pope of the latter part of the fifteenth century. The adage will occur to them, "Where

there is smoke there is fire." They will unhesitatingly believe that Voltaire and his disciples and even some fiery Protestants of the sixteenth century, would not, when needful for their object, shrink from resorting to falsehood and the most audacious fabrications; but how admit for a moment that historians like Guicciardini and Paul Jove, and a familiar acquaintance of Alexander's, like Burchardt, who died a bishop, could have been able to forge calumnies to the extent they have done, if that Pontiff were really innocent?

We will answer these objections in showing the degree of credence these writers merit, who form the arsenals, that is to say, the sole original sources, whence the enemies of Alexander have drawn their arms and ammunition, and in doing so we will make revelations which will be strange to many.

Macchiavelli may surely first and foremost be rejected, as a witness whom nobody acquainted with his character would accept, and he is too well known to command the least confidence. This noted Florentine, who passed a great part of his life in conspiracies, and another part in writing unchaste comedies, is the author of a work, entitled *The Prince*, which has become the manual of conspirators, of the ambitious, of cheats, and of rascals. His expressed admiration for Cæsar Borgia, whom he secretly hated, would have been of itself an accusation or rather a condemnation of that personage, if one could trust the good faith of Macchiavelli. Still it is evident from his statements that in many cases Cæsar acted from the most imperious necessity; and certainly it is not in Macchiavelli that one finds materials for the calumnies with which the memory of Pope Alexander has been so shamefully tarnished.

Guicciardini was a Florentine also. He was only twenty years old when Alexander VI. died. Educated and trained doubtless by a disciple of Savonarola, of that extraordinary monk whom a Catholic would be disposed to rank among the holiest of reformers, if he had not put himself in opposition to the Holy See, he imbibed deeply the prejudices and anger of the Florentine monks of that time against Alexander. To have an idea of his good faith and impartiality when speaking of the sovereign Pontiffs, let it suffice to say that he represents throughout his work St. Gregory VII. as the vile paramour of the Countess Matilda, and that he designates as bastards the legitimate children Innocent VIII. had before he entered the priesthood.

The bad faith of this writer is such that the infidel Bayle, in his *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, says: "Guicciardini deserves to be reprobated; he is guilty of the fault of all scandal-mongers," and that Voltaire, as we have already noticed, accuses him of imposture in relation to the death of Alexander. Moreover, we have the judgment of Guicciardini himself in relation to his book—a judgment

given in the face of death, and which can be well questioned by nobody. Some time before his death, he sent for a notary to dictate to him his last will and testament. The notary having asked him what was to be done with his *History of Italy*, then in manuscript, he answered: "Let it be burned." We do not question the brilliant qualities of this historian, but, according to his own solemn avowal, are we not bound to reject his evidence when he appears against a Pope?

Paul Jove merits no more credence than does Guicciardini in what regards Pope Alexander. He was, as everybody acquainted with his history knows, a venal and untruthful writer, who boasted that he wielded two pens—one of gold, the other of iron—to write of princes according to the favors or the frowns he received from them. Bayle, in his *Dictionnaire*, thus speaks of him: "Giacomo Gohorri hesitates not to say that the adventures of Amadis de Gaul are as real and truthful as the histories of Paul Jove. According to Vossius, he set on foot or opened what he called a bank, and promised an ancient pedigree and an immortal glory to any knave who would pay him handsomely for his labor; while on the contrary he mercilessly defamed those who would not pay him for falsehoods."

Tomaso Tomasi was also, as we are informed by M. Favé, a countryman of Guicciardini and Paul Jove. He appears to have proposed to himself for a time two prime objects: one, to pay court to and gain the favor of the Duchess of Florence, a princess of the family of the La Roveres, by vilifying the Pope, whom the Cardinal of St. Peter-in-Chains had contended with; the other, to show in Cæsar Borgia a picture of turpitude and monstrosity which the most dissolute imagination could not well conceive. This is what in other terms has been said by Antoine Varillas in his history of Louis XII.

One accuser more remains yet to be noticed, namely, John Burchardt. We are going to see what evidence the *Diarium* or journal which goes under this worthy's name merits, and the opinion that may be formed of it. Burchardt died in a quiet obscurity, and few persons were aware that he had written anything at all, when, one hundred and ninety years after his death, in 1696, a French Calvinist came to Hanover to present to Leibnitz some detached leaves, some written in French, some in Italian, and still others in Latin. Leibnitz believed, or affected to believe, that he discovered in them some portions of the *Diarium* of Burchardt, and published them in his *Secret History*, expressing in a preface his regret that he had not been able to procure the original text of Burchardt. Eleven years after, in 1707, La Croze found what he considered, or pretended to consider, the *Diarium*, in a library in Berlin, and Johann Eccard

published it, in 1723, in tom. ii. of his *Corpus Historicum Medicevi.* This *Diarium* differs in some important points from that published by Leibnitz. Now, where is the authentic version, if such be in existence, and what authority, we would ask, can be assigned to a journal written against a Pope, when it is found or discovered only by Protestants in Protestant libraries, and edited solely by Protestants? Besides, these are not the only pretended editions of it that exist; others are found which are equally discordant, and M. Chantrel says that these versions likewise in several places mutually contradict each other. Is it then, we beg leave to ask, in the authority of such a book, of an authenticity so questionable, and of an integrity or truthfulness still more questionable, that a serious accusation can be founded against a legitimate successor of St. Peter?

But it will, no doubt, be objected that one may receive as truth the parts of the different editions that agree among themselves. We say, be it so, but it remains to be seen what credence the author himself deserves. Here is what Paris de Grassis says of him:[1] "Not only was he no man, but he was really the most detestable of beasts; besides, he was very wicked and spiteful. He has written books which nobody can understand unless it be a sibyl or the devil, who must have been his accomplice; he has written them in characters so illegible, and with so many erasures and alterations, that I may believe he had the devil himself aiding him." This Paris de Grassis, be it remembered, was a canon of Bologna, and at a later period Bishop of Pesaro. His authority, then, if it does not entirely nullify or overturn that of Burchardt, must at least make us have serious doubts of the latter.

But the book of Burchardt itself, as it has in its multiform condition come down to us, bears about it characters of falsehood and stupidity, which of themselves would suffice for us to adopt the judgment of the canon of Bologna, who in estimating the work solely by itself, pronounces the following judgment upon the author:

"In reading him one would think he never quitted the Pope for a single instant. He follows him to the chapel, to the consistory, to table, to bed; night has no darkness, the obscurity of which he cannot penetrate. He is a person who does not believe in the existence of virtue, and who by the omnipotence of a ducat would ordinarily explain many a good thought or a good action. Never did a romancer with a naiveté so comical sport with the credulity of his readers. Of Alexander VI., who according to him was dissimulation itself personified, he makes the chief personage of a melodrama who publishes his own dissoluteness to the whole Roman people. Only let a cardinal die, and forthwith he examines the drink of the deceased, and almost always finds in it some traces of poisoning. What was the object of this poisoning? It was because Alexander wished to possess himself of the riches of the cardinal. Voltaire, as a tragic

[1] Ex Diario ad annum 1506.

poet, has bitingly jeered at this gross violation of the first rules of the dramatic art. 'It has been pretended,' says he, 'that in a pressing need for money Alexander desired to succeed to the estates of some cardinals, but it is certain that Cæsar Borgia took away a hundred ducats of gold of the treasure of his father. The need for money, then, was not so real. Besides, how was it possible to be mistaken about that bottle of poisoned wine which it is said caused the death of the Pope? If, when the Pope died, granting that he was poisoned, the cause of his death had been known, it certainly would have been known by the very persons whom it was intended to poison; they would not have left such a crime unpunished, nor would they have suffered Cæsar Borgia to obtain peaceable possession of his father's treasure. . . . . It is not difficult to invent falsehoods when persons are determined to calumniate.'"

If we could believe Burchardt, Alexander VI. must have been stricken with idiocy. He would have been the Cassandra of a comedy, seeking expressly the light of broad day to render a city, a nation, the whole world witnesses of his criminal follies,—a cretin of Maurianna exposing to view on the highways his disgusting sores. Never did a tattler of the feminine gender utter such silly stories as does this master of ceremonies. One would think that to fill his pages he played the part of a *fucchinio*, loafing about the streets, the market-places, the shops, the stables, and of all that he could hear from the lips of valets, of waiters, of grooms, of barbers, making entries the evening of each day, and calling these entries his "journal."

Such is the man who, it is alleged, has furnished the chief materials to those who have defamed Alexander VI. Yet it is a remarkable fact that the same Burchardt, who has been made so much of, furnishes also important materials for the defence of this Pope from more than one grave accusation made against him by the other maligners. "There are still pearls to be found in this dunghill of Burchardt," adds Audin, further on, "but precious care is taken not to bring them to light." Thus, little or nothing is said of the appeal of Alexander to the Christian world to repulse the Turks, who menaced the West, and whose triumph would have been the grave of letters and every other vestige of civilization. This certainly was a noble and glorious idea. Conformably to his vigorous sense of justice, this Pope put under contribution the riches of his cardinals. Ascagna Sforza, who had funds amounting to thirty thousand ducats, was obliged to pay three thousand into the treasury instituted for that purpose by Alexander; Cardinal Medici, afterwards Leo X., only six hundred, the tenth of his annual income; Carnaro had nothing to pay because, says the journal of Burchardt, he had no income—*nullos habet reditus.* Yet this Carnaro was one of the cardinals whom Alexander wished to poison!

Many other accusations made against this Pope are refuted by the journal of Burchardt, whether it be that he mentions the things

differently from the other defamers of Alexander, or that his silence in regard to other accusations shows their falsity. For instance, Tomaso Tomasi seeks to make the Borgias responsible for the murder of Alphonso of Arragon, yet Burchardt's *Diarium* does not say a word in confirmation of this suspicion. Tomasi speaks of pamphlets come from Germany, and relates some scenes of immorality which had taken place at the banquets at which Alexander and Cæsar Borgia attended. The *Diarium* nowhere speaks of these scenes, and yet it makes mention of the pamphlets, and says that one of them was shown to the Pope, undoubtedly to make known to him the length to which the malignity of his enemies went. Examples of this kind could be abundantly adduced.

It is now fully seen that we must distrust everything that has been written disparagingly of Alexander. And we think we have been able to convey to the minds of our readers the full conviction that they are not only to be distrusted but absolutely rejected. Thus we see that it is possible to justify him against all the charges brought against him, and certainly it must be the duty of every sincere and truth-loving person to do so upon every becoming occasion. But we should not confine ourselves to this negative defence of him; justice requires that we should go further. Alexander VI. was neither a debauchee, nor a cruel and perfidious prince, nor a scandalous Pontiff. He was, on the contrary, a great temporal prince and a remarkable Pontiff; and we believe the *Dublin Review* speaks the truth when it says: "There is positive testimony to be rendered in favor of his character—testimony as irreconcilable with the accusations brought against him, as if they had been brought against Gregory VII. himself. The *Bullarium* of this great Pontiff has a remarkable value; the list of his letters and other writings, composed during a pontificate as short as it was troublous, is long and very varied, and attests at once his ability, his energy, his talent." . . .

The true basis, as M. Chantrel has well remarked, upon which the defence of Alexander ought to be placed is this: All the accusations brought against him may be summed in the simple one, that he employed Cæsar Borgia to defend the pontifical dominions by force of arms against Italian princes and their foreign allies. What proves that such was the case is, undoubtedly, the significant fact that those who attack him most do so chiefly on account of Cæsar, and show that they do not admit, or at least that they pretend to doubt the legitimacy of defending by force of arms the pontifical patrimony. The accusations of immorality recall those laid to the charge of Boniface VIII. and Sixtus IV., and it is easy to see that they come from the envenomed spirit of party, and that they are fully refuted by their own improbability, their atrociousness,

and the absence of all impartial and disinterested testimony. The only things they mention that can be admitted without reserve, are those which have relation to the defence of that patrimony by force of arms. None of those who acknowledge or admit the legitimacy and propriety of this defence attack Alexander. If his case, then, differs from that of some of his predecessors and successors, it is simply in the degree of calumny with which he has been assailed. And yet it may be doubted whether in this respect there is any difference, when one pays attention to the circumstances of the times, and the great resentment which the opposition of contemporary princes excited against that Pontiff, the history of which has consequently been corrupted in its very sources by bribed so-called historians. When once we give due heed to these circumstances, we find the case of Alexander VI. to be no other than that of the Sixtuses, the Juliuses, the Bonifaces, the Innocents, and the Gregories of the glorious pontifical line.

We have, as it were, seen and examined the four sole original witnesses (or their writings) against Alexander; and before proceeding further, we would beg leave to ask whether there is a court of justice in the whole of Christendom that would receive their testimony, either singly or collectively, in the most trifling case, or rather that would not scornfully throw it out of court? And surely the person who would receive it against a Pope must be sadly afflicted with that mental or intellectual disorder which very appropriately has been called *papaphobia.*

It will help much to elucidate the subject we are engaged with to remember that the charges made against Alexander—and, it may be added, against other Popes—were welcomed as inevitable godsends by the French Jansenists and their successors, the Gallicans, who spared neither pains nor brilliant talents to circulate them far and wide, no doubt imagining they found in them a justification of their own pestilent doctrines and practices. And well has it been remarked by our illustrious Brownson, in his *Review*, that "France for centuries has led the public opinion of the world, and the world read history through French spectacles, and for the most part misread it."

It may well be conceived that the votaries of Protestantism and, at a later period, of Voltairism, were not slow in re-echoing these precious charges.

To have a more correct idea of Alexander than could be gleaned from the preceding remarks and discussions, we will now proceed to give a short sketch of his life, which will bring the man and the Pope into the sphere of our own mental vision, and thus enable us to form an enlightened and just judgment in regard to him; and probably it will be the best defence that we could offer for him.

In the province of Valencia, in Spain, there lived a very ancient family of the name of Borgia, or rather Borja, said to be descended from the ancient Kings of Arragon. This family, it is proper to state, had the glory of giving to the Church two Popes—Calixtus III. and Alexander II., and a canonized saint, namely, St. Francis Borgia, a general of the illustrious Society of Jesus. A sister of Calixtus, named Jane or Isabella, or most probably Jane Isabella, married Godfrey Lenzuoli, who was of an equally distinguished family, and probably even chief of the younger branch of the family of Borgia. Lenzuoli was intrusted with several important offices, and obtained from the government many marks of favor.

It is not certainly known how many children Godfrey had, but it is probable that he had several, and at least two sons, one of whom was named Peter Louis. The one who was one day to wear the Pontifical tiara was born at Valencia in 1431, and received the name of Rodrigo. It appears that Godfrey Lenzuoli added to his own name that of his wife, for it is known that Peter Louis and Rodrigo called themselves indifferently Lenzuoli or Borgia.

However this may be, Rodrigo, from an early age, gave promise of uncommon abilities and great aptitude for the management of important affairs. His father confided him to the instruction of the ablest teachers, and had him continue his studies until the age of eighteen years. He then intrusted to him some very important affairs, and some knotty cases to unravel. The young man succeeded in them so ably that he thought of continuing in a career which commenced with such pleasing prospects. But, endowed with an ardent and lively imagination, he soon quitted the profession of law to embrace a military career. In this, as in his former one, he soon distinguished himself; and it was thought that in his estimation military glory exceeded all others, when the election to the Papacy of his uncle, Alphonsus Borgia, who took the name of Calixtus III., once more changed his views.

Calixtus well knew the high qualifications and abilities of his nephew, and desired to have him near him in Rome. Rodrigo Borgia repaired to that city only with regret, overcome by the pressing solicitations of the Pontiff. This was in the year 1456. In order to furnish Rodrigo with the means of sustaining his rank becomingly, Calixtus gave him, *in commendam*, the archbishopric of Valencia. It was thus that young Rodrigo became commendatory of that archbishopric, and there was no abuse in it, unless he used its revenues contrary to the requirements of religion. Did he do so? Is it true that his conduct at that time rendered him unworthy of the confidence and favor of his uncle, who created him a cardinal in the same year, he being then only twenty-five years old? Let us examine this matter carefully.

In the first place, it is to be understood that the cardinalate, no more than the *commendam*, required that the person who assumed the obligations attached to it should be in holy orders. The commendatory, indeed, was ordinarily a secular; and there is more than one instance of cardinals who never entered into holy orders, although at present the custom is that a secular, becoming a cardinal, shall at least receive subdeaconship. But it remains no less true that both the commendatory and the cardinal were obliged to lead orderly lives, and yet Rodrigo Borgia has been reproached with having, after 1456 as well as before it, led a dissolute and scandalous life.

No candid historian denies or even questions that Calixtus III. was a pious and venerable Pontiff; he must, then, have been ignorant of the scandalous irregularities of his nephew, if they existed, in creating him a cardinal, and continuing to him his favor. Was this Pontiff deceived in him? It is in regard to this point, that is to say, to the debauchery of Rodrigo, that Burchardt (if all that is written in the *Diarium* be from his pen), Tomasi, Paul Jove, and Guicciardini cry out against the scandal, but they are far from agreeing about the charges or their enormity. Guicciardini, the least positive of the quarto, contents himself with the authority of the expressions "it is said," or "it is reported." The others do not uniformly give the name or the condition of the female who it is asserted had criminal relations with the young military officer, relations which, it is said, were afterwards continued. One of them speaks of Rose or Catharine Vannozza or Zanozza; another makes her a young girl, and still another a married woman. There is no accord among them as regards the name or the *punomen*, nor even as regards the condition or rank of this female; nor do they mention precisely who she was, where she was born, or when or where she died. And yet it is these implacable enemies of Alexander who leave us in such uncertainty on points which it would have been easy to settle, and in the proper elucidation of which they were themselves, as regarded their character for veracity, personally interested.

Let us admit for a moment that Rodrigo Borgia had by Vanozza the children it is reported he had of her, namely: first, John Francis, who became Duke of Candia; secondly, Cæsar, the most celebrated of them all; thirdly, Jeoffry, Prince of Squillace; fourthly, the famous Lucretia; and fifthly, a child whose name has not reached us. It follows from the testimony of his enemies that he had all these children more than twenty years before he sat on the Pontifical throne, and before he received holy orders, which, it appears, he did not take until 1478, when Sixtus IV. nominated him Bishop of Alba. Granting then that Alexander may be reproached with the scandalous conduct of his youth, he can be reproached with

nothing of the kind after he became an ecclesiastic. The irregularities of the military officer, if repented of and condign atonement was made for them, could not justly be attributed to the priest, the bishop, or the Pope. Such irregularities in early life have not prevented Augustine and others from becoming eminent canonized saints.

But there is another version of this matter which still more completely exculpates our Alexander. The learned Marini, in his *Dictionnaire Historique*, says that according to some respectable historians, this Pope had of Julia Farnese in his youth four sons and a daughter. Orlandini mentions the same thing in his history of St. Francis Borgia. It is to be regretted that neither of these authors mentions formally that this Julia Farnese was legitimately married to Rodrigo Borgia, but there are certain facts which leave little doubt on the subject—that is to say, provided he had any children by her at all. The historian, Philip de Commenes, nowhere in his memoirs calls the reputed children of Alexander *bastards*, and it is well known that this historian is not sparing of this epithet, even in regard to the children of princes and kings when there is reason for applying it. The tableau of the reign of Charles VIII. compiled from contemporary writers and inserted in the *Petitot Collection*, also omits this epithet.

If it be probable that Julia Farnese is no other than Vannozza, it becomes equally probable, from the reasons just adduced, that she was united to Rodrigo in lawful marriage. The interested and often deceptive testimony of Paul Jove, of Tomasi, and of others, could at most only cause some doubt on the subject. But even those doubts must cease when it is remembered that the Farneses were a Roman family on a par with the Borgias, and that an illicit union prolonged for so long a time between two members of these houses would have been morally impossible. If a Farnese had forgotten her honor, her high birth, and her virtue, there can be no doubt that an implacable hatred, a truly Italian *vendetta*, would for a long time have animated her relatives against her seducer. But it is the exact contrary of this that is shown undoubtedly by history, and even as it is given by the very enemies of Alexander. We see Cardinal Farnese, afterwards Pope under the name of Paul III., charged by Alexander with the most delicate and important missions, and devoted to this Pope at a time when there was a talk of deposing him —that is to say, when Rome was occupied by a French army. Another Farnese, Angelus Ferdinand, served in the army of Cæsar Borgia, and was slain in his service. Have we not then every reason to believe that if Rodrigo Borgia had children by Julia Farnese, their birth was irreproachable, that he was legitimately married to their mother, and that he did not enter into holy orders until after

her death, or until, by mutual consent, she had retired to a convent?

If the preceding explanation be rejected, an explanation which so naturally accounts for the conduct of Alexander, it will be necessary to admit hypotheses which will lead from one absurdity to another. The enemies of this Pope represent him as a man of rare prudence, who sought for whole years to deceive the cardinals in his regard, who walked the streets of Rome with his eyes modestly turned down, passing his days in visiting churches, monasteries, and hospitals, doing all kinds of good works; and yet they would have us believe that this consummate hypocrite, this man so cunning and so prudent, and who prepared himself for so long a time to reach the pontifical throne by putting on the appearance of every virtue, maintained an illegitimate commerce with a woman for several years, led her everywhere he went, acknowledged his children by her publicly, and finally held up to public view his own infamy; and, to crown the matter, made his scandals matters of glorification! What inconceivable contradiction! What folly, what incredible audacity! To say of him that he sought to impose on the cardinals by a feigned piety, and that at the same time he was openly living with a woman, acknowledging his bastard children by her, is to award him a letter patent for stupidity, or to consider one's readers worthy of being deceived, yea, gulled. In desiring to prove too much the enemies of Alexander have really annulled their pretended proofs; their absurd contradictions must reduce to nought their testimony.

To readers of good faith, who cannot yet bring themselves to believe how such a mass of calumnies could have been invented, we will say with the *Dublin Review*, "what is really true of Alexander VI. is what but few writers are conversant with. The common herd of them are contented to accept vulgar tradition. There is not one in a million who thinks of making serious investigations in the matter. The few persons of those who have made them in the case under consideration have seen the falsity of the accusations; and not only have they found them false, but they have seen that there is not the least reason for yielding them credence." Created a cardinal by a pious and venerable Pontiff, Alexander was sent by Sixtus IV. about a critical and important matter as a legate to Spain, his native country, where his character ought to have been well known. At the same time, and on a similar mission, France received the celebrated Cardinal Bussarion, whom Protestant writers represent as "the most learned and eloquent, as well as the oldest and discretest of the cardinals," and as a man "whose demeanor was always conformable to his high dignity." Is it credible that at the same time the same able and sage Pontiff would have em-

ployed for a similar mission a debauchee, a man who was totally depraved? And yet if the idea that is commonly formed of Alexander be just, he was at that period in the very midst of his career of vice! He was in the flower of his age, and in full possession of honors and of power. But this is not all. He had a rival, jealous of his good fortune, Cardinal de Pavia, who was interested in closely watching his conduct, who desired to have the honorable mission with which he was charged, and who sought to injure him by calumnies. What, after all, has been said of Alexander? Nothing more than has been said of Beaufort, of Wolsey, of Leo X., of the most distinguished prelates of that period—all accused like him of luxury, ambition, etc. This was precisely twenty years before he was elected Pope; and consequently, Cæsar and Lucretia, if they were really his children, were then born, and those who accuse him of debauchery tell us that this debauchery was public and notorious at this period of his life.

It is evident that the simple collocation and comparison of the pretended facts and dates reduce the calumnies to zero. Like common perjurers, the traducers of Alexander have gone too far for themselves. They have gone beyond their object, and thus have destroyed the confidence they otherwise might inspire. Even Voltaire himself saw clearly into their falsehoods, and he jeers at the credulity of those who have believed their absurd and contradictory stories. Yet strange to say, there are Catholics who still believe them, and who are attached with an astonishing tenacity to those absurd traditions which infidels themselves make objects of their pleasantries.

It remains, therefore, evident that if Alexander VI. had the children attributed to him, he had them a long time before he became Pope, and before he entered into holy orders, and that he had them by legitimate marriage. There was consequently nothing in his youth, or in his mature or old age, that could have betrayed him into a life of licentiousness or immorality.

But I go farther, and, with the *Dublin Review* and M. Chantrel, dare assert that it is by no means certain that Cæsar, Lucretia, and the others attributed to him were his children at all. It is an incontestable fact that nobody known to history heard of his being a father until after the outburst of indignation against him caused by his energetic government, although his being so ought to have been well known and notorious for at least a quarter of a century. On the elevation of Cæsar to the cardinalate—a dignity which he afterwards resigned or was dispensed from—some witnesses, no doubt in consequence of the fathership referred to having begun to be rumored, attested on oath that Cæsar and Lucretia were not Pope Alexander's children, but those of his brother.

Now it may, perhaps, be said that these attestations were false, and that these witnesses perjured themselves; but it is certain that nobody said so then; and is it not rash and unreasonable to reject testimony thus given under the sanction of an oath, because of contrary assertions made at a later time by inimical, suborned, or interested parties?

It is well known that in those troublous times it was the custom of the Popes to choose as a general some one of their relations, most commonly a nephew, possessing energy and military talents, to defend the pontifical domains against the ambitious and grasping princes that surrounded them, and who continually sought to invade them. It was also the custom to give these relations the name of *sons*, and such we can scarcely doubt was the only basis upon which the spirit of enmity supported its original suspicions and calumnies. And need it be remarked that the terms *son* and *daughter*, and their correlative one, *father*, are the ordinary terms of address between all ecclesiastics of the Catholic Church and their flocks, and that these terms are understood in their spiritual sense?

It will be seen that if we attempted to show positively that the children said to be Alexander's were not his but his brother's, we should labor under the well-known difficulty of proving a negative, a thing we will not undertake to do.

Now let us see what was the every-day life of this Pontiff who has been represented as possessed by the demon of voluptuousness. How did this debauchee, who sought the most hideous refinements of vice, pass his days and nights? We will present to our readers what has been admitted by the very writers themselves who have given such loathsome representations of him.

Alexander was sixty years of age when he was unanimously elected Pope. The habits of sobriety and labor which he had inspired in himself give little favor to the reputation for debauchery which has been ascribed to him. The energetic measures which he took against unworthy functionaries testify to his love for justice. "Under Alexander VI.," says Audin, who in this judgment followed the contemporary historians, "the poor as well as the rich could obtain justice in Rome. The people, soldiers, and citizens alike, testified great attachment to him, even after his death, because he possessed qualities truly royal. At night he scarcely slept two hours, and from the table he passed almost like a shadow without having made any stay there. Never did he refuse listening to the poor; he liquidated the debts of unfortunate debtors, and showed himself without pity for remorseless prevaricators."[1]

[1] Audin, Life of Leo X.

It would not be irrelevant, did space permit, to say something in favor of Cæsar and Lucretia Borgia,—no matter whose children they were,—if for no other reason than to show the injustice of the English poet Pope in his well-known lines:

> "If plagues and earthquakes break not heaven's design,
> Why then a Borgia or a Cataline?"

But we can the more readily pass them by, inasmuch as they—and particularly Lucretia—have already been ably and victoriously defended by such writers as Roscoe and M. Chantrel. But to return again to Alexander himself. The high estimation in which he was held by his illustrious and immortal contemporary, Christopher Columbus, who knew well his character, may be inferred from the fact that Columbus dedicated to him the journal he kept, in the form of Cæsar's Commentaries, of that wonderful voyage of his which was the most important one to civilization and science that ever was made by man. And it is much to be regretted that that journal has not descended to us.

From the 4th of May, 1493, Alexander had to adjudicate the contending claims of Spain and Portugal in regard to their respective discoveries. It was the universal belief of that period that the earth pertains to our Lord Jesus Christ, and the common, settled jurisprudence of the age was to refer to the Pope as his Vicar to make the division or apportionment of newly discovered lands, in order to prevent disputes and wars. Alexander having attentively and thoroughly studied the question, and taken the advice of his cardinals, laid down the famous Line of Demarkation by the Bull *Inter cætera*, of which the following is the substance:

"We, by the plenitude of Apostolic power, by the authority which God has given us in the person of Peter, and in our quality of Vicar of Jesus Christ, whose functions on earth we execute, give and assign by these presents forever to you and to your heirs and successors, Sovereigns of Castile and Leon, all the islands and mainlands discovered or to be discovered by you towards the west and south, in drawing a line from one pole to the other, at a hundred leagues west of the Azores in the direction already mentioned. It is, however, to be understood that this shall in nothing prejudice the possessions of Christian princes in any discoveries they may have made prior to last Christmas. The condition of this adjudication or donation is that in virtue of holy obedience to our orders, and in accordance with the promises you have made us, the fulfilment of which we cannot well doubt, you shall take good care to send to these countries and islands learned, virtuous, and experienced men to instruct the inhabitants in the Catholic faith and in good morals."

Most assuredly there is nothing here contrary to the interests of civilization. Instead of inveighing against this Bull, "it would be better," as Feller and Count de Maistre observe, "to regret that the time has passed when a single word from the Roman Pontiff was sufficient to maintain peace among kings and nations, and when his impartial voice and universally revered influence easily

removed the danger of obstinate discussions and sanguinary conflicts."[1]

It is very strange that no historian or other writer that I know of has hitherto noted the strikingly remarkable circumstance that in the adjudication which Alexander made to the Spanish sovereigns, he no doubt had largely, if not chiefly, in view the viceroyalty and tenths of the more precious riches of the new continent solemnly guaranteed to Columbus and his heirs forever, and which it is now known would have embraced the whole of America. This is still more confirmed by the fact that when afterwards, previous to the treaty of Fordesillas, His Holiness was ungently solicited by the sovereigns of both Portugal and Castile to revise—that is to say, change—the line of demarkation; far from complying with their entreaties, he, on the contrary, responded to them by a further concession to Castile, and as a consequence to Columbus, in what has been called the Bull of Extension, *Bulla de Extensione*. "When in his Bull of Partition," says Count de Lorgius, "the Holy Father declared that he had made the adjudication, or donation, by the spontaneous impulse of his own liberality, without regard to any entreaty, and acting in virtue of his Apostolic plenitude, he uttered a truth no less formal than it was imposing. So, himself respecting the incomparable donation given without any exterior impulsion, and in which he himself seemed to recognize as a Divine favor or benediction, the sovereign Pontiff remained immovable in his determination. He rejected the solicitations and the modifications proposed by Spain as he had rejected the persisting reclamations and obsequious supplications of Portugal. His decision remained as inflexible as a Divine decree. . . . . His word already existed in time, and was to be as irrevocable as what is past, or is absolutely unalterable."

To this we will add that the greatest saint as well as the greatest genius, and the greatest Pope, united in the same person, could not, in our opinion, have acted more becomingly than did Alexander in this case. Indeed, in the whole range of history, we know not of an instance of conduct more noble, more imposing, or more admirable than he displayed upon these two memorable and trying occasions.

Whence did Pope Alexander, in the then very limited state of cosmological science, obtain that knowledge which enabled him to draw that marvellous line of demarkation which touched not a foot of habitable land, and which was the only one that could be drawn which would not cross some island or mainland, is a question which I leave others to determine. Let it suffice to say that

[1] Fredet's Modern History.

that line has already been the wonder and admiration of all men capable of forming an intelligent and enlightened judgment in the matter. Let us hear what the renowned Alexander Von Humboldt, with his unfortunate anti-papal prejudices, says on the subject: "The state of science, and the imperfectness of all the instruments that could serve on sea to measure time or space, did not permit yet, in 1493, the practical solution of so complicated a problem. In this state of things, Pope Alexander VI., in arrogating to himself the right of dividing a hemisphere between two powerful nations, rendered, without knowing it (*sic*), a signal service to nautical astronomy, and to the physical theory of terrestrial magnetism."[1]

"The miraculous precision of that line," remarks Count de Lorgius, "was meant to secure to Spain, in recompense for her zeal, the exclusive possession of the new continent in its whole extent. Some Protestants have remarked that the Holy See, by this demarkation, exposed itself to the danger of putting these two rival nations in presence of each other at the same point, inasmuch as the line passed over latitudes and longitudes which no ship ever traversed, and that it is presumable that in so vast a prolongation the line would cross some land. Yes, but this line has miraculously passed through the only space in which there is no land found. In this consists the prodigy of the thing." Let it be remembered that it was intended that the adjudication to be accorded to Spain should occasion no conflicts under the reigns of the present monarchs or in future ages, and that the action of the Apostolic See "should not lead to sanguinary rivalries between Christian nations. Still, it was necessary to assign limits to the claims of the two Catholic crowns."

It is evident from what we have seen that had Alexander become a party to the changing of the line of demarkation, as it was urgently solicited by the courts of Spain and of Portugal, he would have become an accessory to the depriving of Christopher Columbus and his heirs of the vice-royalty of what is now called the empire of Brazil, with the tenths of its precious stones, jewels, pearls, gold, silver, etc. No, no; whatever his maligners may say to the contrary, Alexander VI. was not the man for such a spoliation—a spoliation which would have been very nearly if not fully a sacrilege.

It would have been well for the nations of America, both North and South, if they had the same sacred regard for the rights of Columbus that Alexander had. They would in that case, as some reparation made for the injustice done him in not giving his

[1] Humboldt, t. ii.

glorious name to this country, at least have made his birthday, the twentieth of May (which was also the day of his demise), a national holiday. And let us hope that our own dear republic, which plumes itself on its progress in civilization, will be the first to set the example, and prove to the world that the hateful reproach of republics being proverbially ungrateful is not true in her own regard as respects her conduct towards Christopher Columbus.

To return once more to our theme. It will be seen that in the defence I have made of Alexander, I have considered him only as a common man, and not even a priest, much less a Pope, and defended him on the ordinary rules of evidence. But I have not been unmindful that, if needed, I might have taken much higher ground. I could avail myself of the precept of St. Paul: *Adversus presbyterum accusationem nole recipire nisi sub duobus aut tribus testibus.* Against a priest receive not an accusation but under two or three witnesses (1 Tim., v. 19)—a precept which is as luminous as it is profoundly suggestive; which, unfortunately, is too much unheeded or forgotten in the case of some Popes, and which in the eyes of all intelligent and sincere Christians would at once have enabled me to demolish the accusations of Pope Alexander's enemies; for, be it remembered that he was not only a priest, but even a Priest of priests, as he was also a Bishop of bishops. Need I say that it is an established rule in all civilized as well as Christian society that in proportion to the dignity of the accused, so must be the amount and weight of testimony required to criminate him?

Such being the case, I think it would tax the juridical and arithmetical powers of most persons to determine the number of witnesses and the degree of credibility they in such cases would require to convict a Pope of grave immorality, to say nothing of a series of shameful and outrageous crimes.

PIUS THE NINTH AND HIS PONTIFICATE.

SINCE our last issue the Catholic world has been called on to mourn a great loss. The Bark of Peter, wherein Christ yet sits invisibly teaching the children of men, as he did of old on the shore of Tiberias, has been bereaved of her venerable helmsman, worthy successor and representative of the great "pilot of the Galilean lake," as he was of our Blessed Lord. Pius, ninth of that name and two hundred and fifty-second among the lineal heirs of St. Peter, after a long reign of nearly thirty-two years,—with all its vicissitudes of triumph, popular applause, dethronement, flight, exile, victorious return, invasion, spoliation, and final imprisonment, —has been called to rest from his labors, and receive the reward of all that he has spoken, done, and suffered on behalf of Holy Church, intrusted by divine disposition to his rule and guidance. Never, since the first High Priest of the New Law was slain by Nero, has the death of Rome's Pontiff so deeply moved the great heart, and elicited the tears of the Christian world, as in the case of Pius IX. It has stirred up the better nature, and evoked the sympathies even of those who are neither Catholics nor Christians. The infidel press of Italy and France has had the manliness to honor after death him whom it feared, hated, slandered, and outraged whilst living.

To the credit of our country it must be said, that not only our secular, but even sectarian, journals manifested their respect for his memory, and their admiration of his lofty character and many virtues. In all the great cities of the land, the funeral services were attended by large numbers of Protestants, whose reverent demeanor sufficiently showed that their presence was due not to idle curiosity but to genuine condolence with their Catholic fellow-citizens in their loss of a great and good man on whom the eyes and admiration of the world had been fixed for nearly a third of a century. In this universal chorus of praise, the harsh, discordant voices we have heard have been few, but yet enough to prevent our forgetting that the spirit of heresy, when untamed by education or other restraints, in dealing with the Catholic Church, cares nothing for truth, nothing even for that social decency which is respected even by the infidel and semi-pagan world around us. God forbid that at such a time we should stain our pages with such filth either to expose or refute it. Yet, that we may not be unjust, it is proper to state that these few breaches of social decorum have come from the Lutheran, the Presbyterian, and the (Northern) Episcopal press.

But, though this feeling of sympathy was general, yet nowhere

was it more clearly evidenced than amongst our Southern people, Protestant as well as Catholic. In Louisiana, as soon as the Pontiff's death was announced, the Supreme and District Courts, the Federal as well as the State tribunals were adjourned out of respect to the illustrious deceased. In the Superior Criminal Court, it was Judge Campbell, one of the most distinguished jurists of the country, and formerly judge of the United States Supreme Court, one of the pillars of the Episcopal Church in New Orleans, who moved the adjournment of the court, in language that was full of reverence and eulogy for the departed Pontiff, and most honorable to the manly, generous heart of the speaker. The answers of the judge in this and in the other courts were all in the same kind strain. The funeral procession in New Orleans was most imposing. It was marshalled by one of Louisiana's noblest heroes, the gallant knight, *sans peur et sans reproche*, whose name will live forever in the heart and memory of the people, not only of the Pelican State, but of the entire South. And in that same procession—oh, wondrous power of Catholic unity!—under his lead, with reverent mien, marched brave Northern men, Federal soldiers, who had subdued the South in spite of her heroic resistance, and who even yesterday were the unwilling but only upholders of a rotten, usurping government, revelling in fraud and robbery, and draining the life-blood of Louisiana. In Mobile the funeral procession was a solemn pageant, the like of which had never been witnessed since the building of that city. The citizens, Protestant and Catholic, kept it as a holy day; in the procession were men of every creed; resolutions were drafted by a Protestant pen on behalf of the citizens, expressing their grief for the death of the venerable Pontiff, their appreciation of his exalted character and spotless life; and, what was more edifying still, one or two sweet, gentle words from the lips of the amiable Bishop of that city so moved the entire assemblage that they fell on their knees, as if by irresistible impulse, to receive the blessing of the venerable Archbishop of New Orleans, who presided at the solemn obsequies. And well might the Southern people do honor to the memory of Pius IX., even apart from his high station and noble qualities. Their gratitude, like their other feelings, is warm and enduring. They could not but remember that, during their cruel struggle, a handful against a host, with all the world combined against them, HE was the only one among the princes or potentates of Europe, who, from the purest, most disinterested motives, without entering into the political question between North and South, had treated them in the Christian spirit that so eminently became the universal Father. Nor should we forget to chronicle the important fact, which has been strangely overlooked by the Catholic press of the North and West, that on the Sunday

previous to the funeral procession, all the Protestant ministers of Mobile had eulogized Pius IX. from their various pulpits. Special mention and grateful acknowledgment of this fact were made in the Mobile resolutions of which we have spoken. And we think all our readers in every latitude will not refuse to join with us in praising the big, generous, Southern heart of those ministers, who, waiving all differences of creed, were unanimous in doing honor to the memory of Rome's noble Pontiff.

It is unnecessary to enter into any details of the life of our late Holy Father, as they are already spread out for the reader on the pages of so many of our daily and weekly journals. We propose to confine ourselves to a few reflections on his Pontificate. Pius IX. was unquestionably the Pontiff of his epoch, and, as such, marked out by heaven. In every critical period of the life of the Church, God has been pleased to raise to the See of Peter the men who were fittest for the burden He designed them to bear. And when they put their hand to the work, He was ever at their side to inspire them with His wisdom, to encourage and uphold their feebleness with His grace. The Son of the Living God, whose words "Duc in altum" (Luc. v., 4), has emboldened the timid Peter, has never failed to nerve the heart and strengthen the hands of the Pontiff whom He chose to represent Him in the hour of danger. And this applies to nearly all of them; for when has the Church been wholly free from the assaults of the gates of hell? Her days of peace and sunshine have been few and only vouchsafed at intervals. But to be tossed about on the wild waves, and to be buffeted by the cruel storms of this world, is her ordinary portion. Of the early Pontiffs, though little is known beyond the fact of their martyrdom, we may justly conclude from reason and analogy that Cletus, Xystus, Soter, Zephyrinus, Anther, Eutychian and the rest had each his special mission, and fulfilled it well, as became men sent of God, though no record survives to bear them witness. Sylvester, Julius, Liberius, Damasus, and Leo the Great were chosen by Him to repress and conquer the heresies that either openly or covertly made war upon the Trinity and Incarnation. Those noble saints, the two Gregories, second and third of the name, were divinely commissioned, not only to check Iconoclasm but to save Western Christendom from the Byzantine yoke and its withering influences, to evangelize Germany and Northern Europe, and to strengthen and solidify the base of that Temporal Power which (scanty as it might be) was to prove a safeguard for the Pope's spiritual independence, and enable him to humble tyrants, to protect oppressed peoples, and establish permanently civilization in the West. So, too, God raised up those two great saints, Leo IX. and Gregory VII., to save His Church from the pestilential ravages of simony, clerical incontinence, and Cæsaro-

papism, which were laying waste the fairest portions of her vineyard, and would have ended (could God permit such to happen) by turning the comely Spouse of Christ into a decrepit handmaid of earthly princes, like the Byzantine and Russian churches.

To Pius IX. likewise there was given a mission from above, differing in some of its special features from those to which his predecessors were called, as the war waged to-day against the Church differs in some respects from that waged in the past. The purpose of "the Gates of Hell" never changes; it is only the strategy and weapons that change. The devil grows wiser with experience. As he looks upon the religious systems or shadows of Christianity which he has hitherto set up to withdraw men from their allegiance to the One, True Church, he smiles knowingly. They are weapons that have done their work well so far, but now they have lost their edge, and have become clumsy and worthless. He must provide others, and plan a new campaign. With increase of age and experience he has grown also bolder and more insolent. Man imagines and makes a daily boast of it, that he has grown in intelligence with the growth of the ages, and that this growth, or *progress*, as he calls it, has received in modern times a peculiarly wonderful development. But the devil, who is far older and wiser, seems to think differently. He deliberately mocks the supposed growth and refinement of the intelligence of our age by coolly proposing to it—what he never would have dared propose to the benighted minds of the Middle Ages—a return to that Paganism from which the Church rescued our fathers. A monstrous, shocking proposal, no doubt; but Satan understands well the world with which he has to deal. He is not going to offer again to their adoration Jove, Venus, Plutus, and Laverna, nor Thor, Woden, and Freya, under which various names he once contrived to have himself worshipped. No, he gives them Paganism without its material idols. But, as idols are symbols, he gives them instead for object of worship what they symbolized, viz., the *jus fortioris*, the might which makes right, the supreme law of brute force, the right of the senses to shake off all restraint, the right of the cunning hand to grasp all that comes within one's reach, rights typified in the idols of heathendom, and which Christianity came to teach us are no rights at all, but evil passions, that work the death of soul and body. But above all he gives them, as the chief idol of the spiritual pantheon, an emanation from his own nature, a portion of his choicest attribute, that Titanic pride, that cast him headlong out of heaven.

From this pride springs the right (so-called) to think, say, and do what we will, without caring for the authority of God or man. This is the boasted freedom of thought, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press, of which we hear so much, brave words

that in the mouth of good men may have a good meaning, but nothing of the kind among those who are loudest in repeating them. Man, they insist, is the sole judge of his belief and of his morals. Freedom of action, though a necessary consequence of this, may be actually (but not rightfully) restrained in its exercise by a superior force; but where such does not exist, as in the case of the State, freedom of action can have no limit. Hence the State is absolute in all matters of morality which depend on its good will and pleasure. The State is, properly speaking, the creator of right and wrong. This is no exaggeration, but a proposition laid down *totidem verbis* by the Bismarckian professors of Germany. The family and marriage ties have in their very name what makes them odious and inadmissible. They are bonds of restraint incompatible with freedom, and, therefore, must be got rid of. Hence the freedom of divorce and the breaking down of parental authority. The dignity and sacredness to which woman became heir through the Virgin of Nazareth are unknown, or hateful, rather, to these disciples of Satan and his neo-paganism. They may talk in fine terms about woman, her high place in society, her loveliness, and so forth. But let none be misled by this empty prattle. It is not the language that Christians use, and which springs from love and respect. It is the lying flattery of the serpent, born of lust and wild desire. It was heard before the days of Christianity on the lips of lewd poets and gay debauchees in Rome and Athens, and has the same vile meaning now as then. But the Epicureans of that day were not half as wicked and pernicious as their modern successors. The former were simply taught by their philosophy to give themselves up to a life of quiet enjoyment. But Satan has filled the latter not only with moral rottenness but also with his own spirit of restless activity. Like him, they go about seeking whom to devour. They glory in being his apostles. They must rob Christ of that world which He conquered through Peter and his fellow-fishermen. So thoroughly have some of them become possessed of their infernal master, that they have been heard to declare that the world would never be as it should, until the hateful name of virtue was abolished, and man had learned to look upon God as a personal enemy! And these atrocious blasphemies, at which the Christian shudders and weeps, were no hasty expressions uttered during midnight orgies, but deliberately written and recorded in print. To secure the rising generation, children must be corrupted as early as possible. We have known some of them to take children whose infant lips were just budding into human speech, and take a hellish delight in teaching them to pronounce the filthiest language, the most horrid blasphemies against God, His saints, and His Church, of which the little innocents were

wholly unconscious. This may be pushing a wicked principle to excess; but the principle exists, and the determination to bring as many children as possible slowly but surely under its baneful influences. Hence the theory of compulsory education by the State, which some silly people at home regard as the beneficent offspring of New England's fertile brain. It is of European origin, and Satan should get the credit of his work.

Like all Satan's works and devices, the new system by which he seeks to undo God's work and overthrow His kingdom upon earth is built upon lying and deceit. In its theory man is promised freedom—freedom from God, religion, and morality; but in practice the price of this freedom is slavery. He must become, to say the least of it, the slave of the State. For statolatry is one of the primary articles of the new creed. But is not the State eminently the type of freedom, the aggregate (so to speak) of individual freedoms, the result of popular will expressed by suffrage? No. The State is to be no freer than the individual. Its government is not what it appears on the surface. The true seat of government is in the *Vente* or Lodge, and what is there decreed sooner or later must become law. The people is proclaimed sovereign, but if it do not quietly submit to the true sovereigns who live underground, or invisible, it is as likely to be decimated by *mitraille* as any hostile army. All the pet watchwords of this system are an illusion and a snare. It boasts of its love of science; but woe to the scholar who will not follow in its wake, or attempts to avail himself of science for the support of religion and morality! To hear them declaim, one would fancy there were no bounds to intellectual freedom, but the sternest intolerance lurks beneath these fine phrases, and woe to him whose researches lead him to disagree with the conclusions laid down by organized impiety. It cries out for a separation of Church and State; but this means only that if the Church will descend from her lofty position as friend and ally of civil government, and sink to the level of its slave, she may be allowed at this price to drag out her existence in some shape for awhile, until that happy day arrive when all the forms as well as the essence of religion are to be swept away from the face of a renovated world. Secular or unsectarian education is another favorite war-cry. Does it mean that sectarian wranglings are to be excluded from the education given by the government? Far from it; it means simply that children by theory and practice are to be grounded in the notion that religion is not *objective*, and, therefore, of very little consequence, since one can be a good citizen without any religion at all, that it makes no matter what one believes, since one creed is as good as another, and that Catholicity, which teaches the contrary, is a mediæval superstition behind our enlightened age.

And this rotten abomination, this huge pile of error, crime, filth, and blasphemy is the great idol, or Pantheon of idols, if you will, of our day and generation, on which they lavish the incense of their praise, and which they seek with impious zeal to force on the adoration of unwilling peoples!

It would be an insult to the intelligence of the arch-fiend to suppose that he would call by its true name this or any other of his devices, or allow any of his disciples so to call it. The Father of Lies is too old and has learned too much of human nature not to know how much consists in a name. Three centuries ago there was a great revolt against the Church, a most unnatural rebellion against an authority that the whole world then held to be of divine institution. But this was not the foul name he taught the authors of the movement to give it. It was called the Reformation of the Church, a Protest against doctrines of men, the Gospel, and other such high-sounding names of illusive meaning. So, too, with Satan's last great plan for entrapping not only stray individuals but entire communities, and, if possible, the whole Christian society, and making them partners of his guilt and everlasting ruin. He calls it and teaches men to call it Progress, Liberalism, Modern Civilization; north of the Alps his creatures call it *Cultur*, and the war waged for its maintenance by one of the foremost commonwealths of Europe is called the Cultur-kampf, or crusade of the new civilization. When a government enters upon a crusade against its subjects at home, it is not likely to be satisfied with the pen as an agent in promoting the cause. Having heavier weapons within its reach, it naturally grasps them, and we find accordingly the whole State machinery, legislative, executive, and judicial, of the Prussian monarchy brought to bear on the propagation of *Cultur*. Fines, imprisonment, and exile await those who will not be converted to the new ideas.

This system of neo-paganism is not wholly new, but its last development is an improvement by Satanic genius on its former phases. We saw it at the close of the last century, but that was its first grand essay to get possession of the world, and partook of the awkwardness usually discernible in first efforts. Then it called itself philosophy. One day, sooner perhaps than they expected, the hopes of its adherents were realized. Plato's famous prayer was heard, and "philosophers" hold in their hands the reins of government. The world knows what followed, and yet shudders at the horrible recollection. On the banks of the Seine and Loire the guillotine, *noyades*, and *fusillades* were the favorite instruments used by "philosophy" in regenerating the people, while in our day, on the banks of the Oder and Vistula, under the milder influence of the gentle Bismarck, *Cultur* promotes its purpose by such tender means as dungeons and

confiscation. Philosophy fell, for a time at least, overwhelmed by its own imprudent violence. So dreadful had been the atrocities that marked the French Revolution, so shocked were the nations by this shameful relapse into barbarism, that good men and lovers of peace and order, as soon as they once more breathed freely, began good-naturedly and honestly to persuade themselves that a return of such horrors was impossible, and that the "philosophy" which had engendered them might lurk for awhile in secret dens and conventicles, but would never dare lift up its head or show its face again in Europe. Little did they know of the cunning and patient endurance with which Satan knows how to inspire his followers. The smouldering remains of that great conflagration were not extinguished, as men fondly imagined; they were only covered up and hidden carefully from view, but ready on the slightest opportunity to burst into a flame fiercer than ever. The defeat of this wicked crew only served to teach them a lesson of caution. They concealed themselves until they could reappear under a new disguise and with a new name. They bided their time, and their time came towards the close of the first half of this century.

This was the formidable enemy that Pius IX. was raised up by God to drag from its hiding-place, to do battle with, and with God's blessing to conquer. No sooner was he elected than the champions of Liberalism, having received their instructions from Mazzini in London, began to fawn on the new Pope, to stifle him almost with the incense of their vile adulation, to clamor for reforms. This was to be the first breach in the walls of the venerable fabric of Religion and Christian civilization. The States of the Church once gained would be a lever to revolutionize Italy, and Italy revolutionized would destroy the Papacy. In the first days of his Pontificate Pius, yielding rather to the impulses of his own kind heart than to popular outcry, pardoned many who had been exiled for political offences; most of them with generous charity he looked upon as not wholly corrupt, as capable of better things, and who from youth and inexperience had been led astray by designing men. But with these came back many who had grown old in iniquity, and stood high in Masonry, Carbonarism, and the other revolutionary sects. They all swore fidelity to their benefactor, but with few exceptions were soon faithless to their oaths. It could not have happened otherwise, for they were all entangled in the deadly toils of the secret societies, whose members dare not be faithful to father or mother, magistrate or prince, their conscience, their Church, or their God, whenever such loyalty clashes with the obedience sworn to their secret chiefs. Pius pardoned the guilty, restored them to their homes, and granted the desired reforms. He even went farther, and granted as much of a representative and constitutional government

as was possible in the Roman States. It was a hazardous experiment, but in the providence of God its disastrous issue was not without advantage. Pius had in the goodness of his heart trusted the enemies of his predecessor to the fullest extent. He virtually said, "You have repented, and I forgive; you have sworn to be loyal, and I take your word. Here are the elements of true progress and rational liberty for which you ask. I confide them to your hands; use them wisely and honestly for the good of the people. Prove by your example to the rest of Italy that constitutional government is not necessarily what they fear, a hotbed of strife, agitation, and revolution, a menace to public tranquillity and hostile to the interests of religion." And these faithless men renewed their oaths with the intention of breaking them! Why should we detail the abominable scenes that followed ere long, and made of the Holy City a pandemonium upon earth? They go to war in his name, but in spite of him, and in open defiance of his authority. They revenge on him their well-deserved and ignominious defeat. They murder in open day his minister, and under the very windows of his widow and children sing hymns in praise of the dagger that slew him. An armed mob marches to the Quirinal, points cannon at the gate, and robs the Pontiff of the last shadow of his sovereignty. Then follows a reign of terror, assassination, and anarchy, during which Pius escapes the hands of his ruffianly jailors and finds a safe refuge in Gaeta.

That Pius IX. failed in his purpose cannot be denied. But the failure was not his fault; it was his misfortune, like that of an unsuspecting lamb who should happen to fall in with wolves dressed in sheep's clothing. But it had one solid and lasting advantage. It unmasked the hollow-heartedness and hypocrisy of these men. It prevented his ever trusting them again; and, thank God! will make it impossible for any of his successors ever to run the same risk and be imposed upon in the end by the honeyed words and plausible promises of men who laugh at perjury, and know nothing of truth or honor. And thus, through the admirable, though mistaken, clemency of Pius IX., which has covered him with undying glory, it has pleased Divine Providence to bring to light and lay bare before the world the perfidy and impious schemes of Liberalism so clearly that he who does not or will not see them is inexcusable.

After his return to Rome, Pius IX. began with still more earnest zeal his warfare against the new enemy he had all along been manfully struggling with in his Letters, Allocutions, and other public utterances. Now, however, he applied more directly to the task assigned him by Providence, and gave out in most solemn tones his Apostolic voice as the successor of Peter condemning

error and confirming his brethren. What else could he do? It was not his mission to destroy these blasphemous novelties with the strong hand of carnal power, but with the gentler agency of the Word of Life. He could wield only the sword of the Spirit, and he wielded it most efficaciously. Three public Acts of his Pontificate in this respect deserve special attention.

The first is his Dogmatical Bull on the Immaculate Conception, in which it is defined that Mary, mother of God, through the merits of her Divine Son, was preserved from Original Sin from the very moment of her conception. This was not only a yielding to the ardent desire of all Catholics, who wished this point defined, nor simply a desire to honor the Great Virgin by placing on her brow a diadem that crowns and completes all her other glories. All this, no doubt, was in the Pontiff's mind, but his definition contained something of deeper significance. In one of her anthems the Church sings of the Blessed Virgin: *Gaude Maria Virgo! quia cunctas hæreses sola interemisti in universo mundo.* "Rejoice, O Virgin Mary! for thou hast destroyed all heresies throughout the world." This may be understood in a devotional sense. In Heaven the Church has powerful friends, who are always praying for her welfare—the angels and saints, especially St. Michael, St. Joseph, Sts. Peter and Paul, and others. But far above these in intensity and efficacy is the prayer of the Blessed Virgin, beseeching God that He would preserve uninjured the work of her Divine Son—the Church on earth; that He would protect it from violence without and rebellion within her borders; in other words, persecution and heresy. Infinitely higher than all these is the High Priest of the New Covenant, ever living to make intercession with the Father on behalf of His Church. But He in His infinite condescension honors His servants and friends, and above all His Holy Mother, by attributing to their intercession what can be obtained only through His Divine merits and accomplished only by His Divine power. Thus, He glorifies His friends, without violating His promise, *Gloriam meam alteri non dabo* (Is. xlviii., 11). Not only in ordinary language, but in the language of Scripture, what is done by God is attributed to the human agent through whom He does it. Thus, we read of miracles wrought by the Prophets and Apostles; whereas, none but God, properly speaking, can work a miracle. So the Church justly styles the Virgin the destroyer of heresies. But beyond this devotional sense there is another still higher, the theological sense of the anthem. Mary is unquestionably the connecting link between earth and Heaven in the great work of man's redemption. If her relation to our Saviour be correctly ascertained, the Incarnation becomes plain and intelligible, as far as mystery can be understood. And if that relation be

infallibly defined by the Church, and held to by her children, there is no room for error in teaching and explaining Christ's Incarnation. The formula contained in those few potent words which the Church so highly values, and which have become a *tessera fidei*, MARY, MOTHER OF GOD, is a key to all difficulties. It is like Ithuriel's spear; for at its touch error, however speciously disguised, forthwith must drop its fair exterior, and resume its own foul shape and hideous look. In this sense Mary destroys heresies, because her position in the New Dispensation is dogmatically incompatible with all the heresies that afflicted the early Church regarding the doctrine of the Incarnation. But this mystery involves not only the doctrine of the Trinity, but that of the Atonement, its nature and extent, original sin, grace, the sacraments, etc. Hence, as an accurate conception of Mary's place in the doctrine of the Incarnation is necessary for the right understanding of that mystery—so, too, it may be called necessary for correct appreciation of all the doctrines involved in it, and is, therefore, virtually the overthrow of all errors to the contrary. Pius had all this in view when he issued his dogmatic constitution. He knew that the cardinal doctrine of the Incarnation was nearly lost sight of by the world, and that this was one reason why neo-paganism swallows up so many victims. Every one must have some divinity, and if he abandon the true God and His Christ, he must worship idols, either material or spiritual. The educated man, who dechristianizes himself, is very apt to fall back on Humanity; and this, in fact, is a favorite idol and war-cry with the neo-pagans. He, therefore, with Apostolic voice, recalls to the mind of all, and solemnly reaffirms that great fundamental truth of Christianity, without which the world would be an abyss of despair and its history an inextricable mass of confusion, admitting of no explanations. But how did he affirm the Incarnation through the Blessed Virgin's Immaculate Conception? This is essentially connected with her maternity, for without it the latter is inexplicable. It was the first step in her life leading to the great consummation for which she was chosen as the instrument, the coming of God in the flesh to dwell amongst us. And as all the parts of her mysterious life were connected in the Divine counsels, her sacred maternity presupposes her having been spotless from her first hour of existence. In thus proclaiming this special privilege and dignity of her who was to become Mother of God, the Pontiff reaffirms not only the Incarnation, but all the great truths that cluster around it, like tendrils round the vine, and particularly the doctrine of original sin, which the world has come to despise and disbelieve, though without it man is an unfathomable mystery. He had another object in view. That virtue which pre-eminently

shone in her is woman's noblest ornament, and one of the costliest jewels with which Christianity enriched the world. It is precisely what is ridiculed, despised, and hated by the modern Pagan who boasts of civilization. The Pope reasserts Christ's doctrine on this score, and reminds woman of the high sphere to which Christ's law raised her, and of what constitutes the true glory of womanhood.

What Pius did in the second place for the good, not only of the Church, but of mankind, was the Vatican Council. Thereby he taught the world the true meaning of reason and of authority, and their mutual relations. By authority, of course, is meant *Divine* authority. For human authority, as such, has no legitimate control over Reason. Reason has a vast and almost unlimited sphere of her own, in which she may range at will. She must not leave it to soar into the region which God has set apart for His revealed truth, which must be entered with bended knee and not on the wings of investigation. If Reason disobey this mandate, its rash flight will be justly punished. It will lose the truths it has learned or may yet learn in attempting to scrutinize those which are beyond its ken. Its wings will melt away under those celestial ardors, and like Icarus it will fall from the sky into the abyss of doubt, negation, and ignorance. God is the author both of Reason and of Revelation; hence, though they differ, they cannot contradict each other. Truth is simple and essentially one; therefore, it cannot be divided against itself. If Reason were true to herself and her own interests, instead of murmuring and rebelling, she would rejoice that the world has received such an amount of revealed truth as the Church possesses. It is no encroachment on her rights, but is really for her a guide and support. When in her investigation she meets with something which seen at one time has a look of truth, seen again appears doubtful, is it not a relief and a comfort to her when she learns that Divine Revelation has pronounced upon it one way or the other? She is spared all further investigation. She has added to her stock of truth, and so far limited (which is a great gain) the extent of her liability to error. For, if hereafter she meets with propositions that are corollaries of the condemned error, she will know exactly in what category to place them. Could there be a more fitting answer than this to the wild, senseless outcry of the modern Pagans, who only exalt and magnify Reason in order that they may drag it down into the mire in which they wallow? It was the noble, just protest of him who is the divinely appointed guardian of Truth, and at the same time the protector and avenger of Reason's rights, as the Holy See has proved itself more than once. Reason has her own domain, within which she reigns, and over

which she sheds a brilliant, beneficial light, derived from her Author. Let her leave it, and her brightness fades away, and her whole territory is given up to darkness. It is as if the sun or the moon were to abandon their orbit, and go wandering at random through space. What could we expect but night and universal chaos? This is the substance of what the Vatican Council teaches with respect to human reason, its powers, rights, duties, and limits.

The same Council with a wonderful unanimity (which the world is pleased to deride, but vainly struggles to explain away) decreed that the Pontiff, when solemnly judging and deciding as Head of the Church, cannot err in doctrine or in moral teaching. This is nothing more than a development of Christ's words in St. Matthew, where He promises to build His Church on St. Peter, in order that the gates of hell might not prevail against it. Since Peter, not in his perishable person, but in his office, is the source of the indestructibility of the Church, it follows that the same office in the successors of Peter will continue to save the Church from destruction. If the Pontiff in his office were not infallible, he might help to bring about the destruction of the Church, instead of saving it. All Christendom had believed for fifteen hundred years that the successor of Peter was infallible. It had been practically acted on from the beginning, and though there were now and then a few dissentient voices, the Church contented herself with enforcing this practical view, by forbidding under the heaviest censures any appeal from the Pope's decisions to a General Council. But when the fulness of time had arrived, guided by the Holy Ghost, she defined it in the Vatican Council.

Her object was twofold. First, to show those unhappy men who call themselves Christians, and are tossed about by every wind of doctrine, not knowing what to believe, or how to ascertain the meaning of the dead letter of Scripture, which in cruel mockery is offered them by the sects as the Book of Life. What wonder is it that so many of them in disgust turn away from Christianity as a failure, and plunge into the tempting illusions of neo-paganism? Let them turn their eyes to the Church of Ages, let them linger at its portals, and from the everlasting chair of Peter they will hear a living voice, the voice of Christ speaking through His Vicar, which will reanimate and give life to that dead letter of Scripture which puzzled and perplexed them so long. It will, with sweet violence, "compel them to come in," that they may find peace and rest for their souls, and a sure pledge of salvation.

In this spirit did the Vatican Council speak to men, teaching the Catholic doctrine to the children of the Church, clearly and solemnly reiterating it for those outside, and inviting them to return to their Father's house. Some shut their ears like the

Pharisees of old, others heeded the invitation and returned to the Church of their Fathers. Amongst these was Rev. Dr. Stone, now Father Fidelis, the Passionist. When we saw the other day in the papers his beautiful funeral discourse on Pius IX., we could not help thinking what a deep underlying current of gratitude accompanied those eloquent words in praise of his august benefactor, whose sweet voice had been to him a message of heavenly peace.

But the voice of the Vatican was for others a warning, a terrible voice, and this was for another purpose. There have often been factions in the Church, created by proud men and their admirers, who frame systems of their own, and try to circulate them as a more rational view of Christian doctrine than that which is held generally in the Church. Rome hears of it and condemns them. Such men are not disposed to submit, and insist with brazen face that they have been misunderstood or misrepresented. Rome gives them another hearing. It is found that they were only playing false to gain time. They are again condemned and ordered to retract. This their pride forbids, and they fall back on the theory that the Church, not the Pope, is infallible, and that before submitting, they must know if the universal Church approves the Pope's decision. It makes no difference to them whether the whole Church thinks with the Pope or against him. All they want is to remain in the Church, and spread their errors inside of her communion. Thus did the Jansenists act, thus, too, the Febronians, the Hermesians, the Liberal Catholics, the Dollingerites and other Catholic devotees of Germany's *Cultur*. It was high time that this scandal should cease, and this unworthy, dangerous subterfuge be swept away forever. The Church felt herself constrained to exclaim with holy David, Multiplicati sunt qui oderunt me. "My foes have grown to be so many, that I can no longer tolerate the presence of domestic enemies to rend their mother's bosom while her hands are engaged in battling with those outside. Let them go out and join those with whom they have made a common cause." And the wisdom of her policy has been manifested. The Dollingerites have been thrust out and have found their proper place in the hostile camp. They are high in favor with Bismarck and his infidel host, and while they last, which will not be long, they will be his recognized allies in the open field.

Because the council declared the Pontiff *infallible*, some outside the church affected to believe, and persisted in asserting, that the definition made him *impeccable*. This, though really too absurd to need refutation, has been sufficiently answered by Catholic theologians, who have been forced to repeat over and over again what the Church teaches on this point. She teaches, that the Pontiff is not free from danger of sin in his actions, because he is always

subject to human frailty. He is not free from error in his every-day judgments about men and things that surround him, nor is he free from danger of sin if these judgments be not founded on prudence, and tempered with charity. Catholics have repeated this so often and so earnestly, that it is absolutely a waste or an abuse of Christian charity to suppose good faith in nine out of the ten, who yet pretend to believe that the Pontiff's infallibility involves impeccability. It was but yesterday that the Catholic world *en masse* rose up to confound this absurd slander, by praying for the soul of the deceased Pontiff. That prayer, if one will but consult the Roman Missal or Pontifical, meant simply this: that God would forgive him his sins, if any remained unforgiven, that He would shorten his time of expiation in purgatory, if he had any to undergo. And this testimony of the Catholic world was the more valuable because given unconsciously, without reference to the non-Catholic world, without a thought of their objections and misrepresentations, but solely as the spontaneous dictate of Catholic belief.

The last great act of Pius was the promulgation of the so-called Syllabus. That it was good and needed is plain from the angry storm of opposition and vituperation it has raised among the enemies of God and man throughout Europe. Our own anti-Catholic press, political and religious, blindly re-echoes the mad outcry, though we strongly suspect that some editors, if questioned, would not be able to tell whether the Syllabus be a man or a thing, a state paper or a new implement of warfare. It is a *résumé* of the chief errors of the neo-paganism of our day, with their condemnation. Those men who yet retain the Christian spirit, though outside of the Church, will find in it nothing to displease them, nothing that is not in exact conformity with the teaching of the Gospel, if they will only examine it with candor and impartiality. But such men are very few, and too often know nothing of the Syllabus, save from the slanders and misrepresentations of its enemies. It was intended principally to save Catholics from falling into the current errors of the day; but we feel sure that there is no one outside of the Church, if he believe honestly in the New Testament as a standard of morals for individuals and commonwealths, who will not recognize in the Syllabus the very teaching of Christ and his Apostles—if he can only bring himself to read it without prejudice, and forget for a few moments what has been taught him from the cradle, viz., that nothing good can come out of Nazareth.

The Pope's enemies revenged themselves on him in the same way that armed iniquity usually revenges itself on the defenceless just man who has the courage to rebuke it. They determined to hurry the execution of an iniquitous plan, long before formed, to seize the Roman State, to dispossess Pius of his sovereignty, and

hen to expel him or hold him prisoner as might suit their pur-
ɔose. Part of the programme was carried out after the Franco-
talian campaign of 1860, with the connivance of that Imperial
ıypocrite, Napoleon III., who inherited nothing of his uncle's
grandeur but his gigantic faculty of lying. Romagna and the
Marches were wrested from their rightful sovereign by dark deeds
ɔf underhand plotting, hypocrisy, and open violence, the prelude
ɔf what was yet to come. Naples, Tuscany, Lombardy, Venice,
ınd the smaller principalities had already, by fraud or conquest,
allen under the yoke of the infidel government of Piedmont.
Rome was hemmed in on every side as by a wall of fire. Still the
Piedmontese dared not seize their coveted prey, so long as France
orbade it. But the long-expected hour came at last, and the ruler
ɔf France gave the word. Napoleon III. at the moment of his
setting out, not for Berlin,—as the knave, dupe of wilier knaves,
magined,—but for Sedan, exile, and the ruin to which the curse of
Christ's Vicar was irresistibly forcing him, withdrew from Rome
:he handful of soldiers that had hitherto sufficed to keep the Pied-
montese from carrying out their criminal designs. As soon as the
ıews came of the disastrous losses of the French armies, Victor
Emanuel wrote, or was forced to write,—for the wretched man
was no free agent,—a brazen-faced letter to the Pope, in which that
degenerate scion of the saintly house of Savoy had the hardihood
:o ask the Father of the Faithful to surrender his States for the
good of religion and of Italy; in other words, to commit perjury
ınd injustice, and betray the Holy See, of which he was not the
ɔwner but keeper and guardian, for the aggrandizement of Pied-
mont. The Pope replied to the royal whited sepulchre with a
letter of mild rebuke, in which the dignity of the sovereign and
the majesty of the man so happily blended as to extort the admi-
ration even of his enemies and habitual revilers, such as the London
Times. Before the answer was received, Victor Emanuel sent sixty
thousand men to seize by force what he knew never would be sur-
rendered. The venerable walls of Rome were bombarded by Bixio
and his Piedmontese hordes. The Pope, after a feeble resistance,
meant only as a protest against violence, capitulated to prevent the
unnecessary shedding of blood in his defence. The enemies of
God and man had won the long-coveted prize. Rome was theirs,
and neo-paganism was to be enthroned in her ancestral home.
But those iniquitous conquerors were not satisfied with their tri-
umph. They would not be true to their instincts, if they did not
seek to add falsehood to violence. To hoodwink the non-Catholic
world—or perhaps in contemptuous mockery of its well-known
credulity—the attempt was made to legalize the high-handed rob-
bery, by pleading the good will and consent of the vanquished and

despoiled. A farce, called an election, or *plebiscite*, was hurried gotten up, and the result was what its authors chose to make it French, German, English, and even American correspondents *who were in the secret*, wrote home glowing accounts of the unanimity of the Roman people in rejecting Pius IX. and adopting the sway of Victor Emanuel. Some amongst us may have believed it, because sectarian bigotry loves to believe anything to the Pope's disadvantage; but surely not all could be so easily duped. There are too many of us who know all about the returning boards of South Carolina and Louisiana, and their predecessors and counterparts in New York, Philadelphia, and other large cities. And it is quite natural for them to suspect that possibly there may be Andersons, Packards, Corbins, and Chamberlains, though with names of more euphonious sound, on the banks of the Tiber. Italy, we are constantly told, is making rapid strides in the path of modern progress; why should she not possess this notable feature of the new civilization? It is enough to say that the voting was held in presence of the conquering army; it was conducted by Piedmontese officials or their partisans. Yet we must not overlook their generosity. In manipulating the returns, they kindly and, of course, most disinterestedly, made over to Pius IX. some few hundreds or thousands of votes which he never received. For it is well understood that no Catholic in Rome insulted his sovereign and Father by going to the polls. Robbed of his temporal patrimony, to avoid all appearance of compromise with iniquity, and to maintain his spiritual independence, the Holy Father had no alternative but to retire into voluntary seclusion, or rather forced imprisonment, in the Vatican.

It has been made a matter of serious accusation against Pius IX. that he shut himself up in the Vatican. His Piedmontese jailers and the correspondents of the anti-Catholic press throughout the world, give out that he was perfectly free, and that he was only playing the part of "prisoner" to impose upon the Catholic world, rouse their sympathies, and help the collection of Peter's pence. Even one whom we formerly held to be a good and honorable man, William Howitt, has put his name and signature to this malicious falsehood, and done what he could to give it currency. In the first place, the Catholic world is not so simple and stupid, so easy to be imposed upon, as these wise ones imagine or pretend. And if it were, it does not need the gratuitous proffer of help from the infidel and the heretic to get rid of its delusion. There are thousands of intelligent Catholics from America, Great Britain, France, and Germany who have visited Rome or lived in it for the past eight years, and who know all about it, and who have a sincere conscientious love and respect for truth, which William Howitt and his fellow-cor-

respondents never had or have thrown to the winds. All of these are a sufficient guarantee, if we needed any, for the fact that Pius IX. was, as his successor is now, virtually a prisoner. Leo XIII. has received no written mandate to keep within the walls of his palace, but if he came out and showed himself in public, he would be insulted and outraged, and perhaps his life endangered. And this would be done nominally by a mob, but a mob relying on the connivance, aye the encouragements of Rome's Piedmontese rulers. They proved it the other day. When they ascertained that Leo XIII. was to be crowned in the Vatican Basilica, King Humbert or his counsellors sent through the Prefect of Police a message to the Vatican, notifying the Pope that if the ceremony were performed in public the government could not prevent hostile demonstrations. In other words, the Lodges had agreed to get up a riot in the church during the ceremony, and the government, through the official guardian of the public peace, notifies the Pope that it cannot prevent it or protect him. What an attitude for a civilized government! It has an army in Rome of thirty thousand men, besides gendarmes and police in great numbers, and declares that it cannot protect a feeble old man from a handful of its own devoted friends and supporters. If King Humbert and his Prefect of Police were telling the truth, it would be a confession that there was no government in Rome. But it was not the truth. It was a barefaced falsehood. "We cannot prevent it" meant simply "We WILL not prevent it." What are civilized nations to think of a government that promotes and encourages rioting and disturbance of the public peace? The same day the police looked on approvingly while the mob broke the windows of an American lady, the Countess Teodoli, who had illuminated her windows in honor of the new Pontiff's coronation.

But why dwell on particular cases? What was the object of the Piedmontese in coming to Rome and making it their capital, for which it was in every way unsuited? It was not to unite Italy. This was only the lying pretext. It was to drive out the Pope; to rob him of his temporal power, with which, having lost their faith, they thought the existence of his spiritual power inseparably connected. It was to abolish the centre of Christendom, to pave the way for the abolition of Christianity itself. This they deny; and the non-Catholic world, though it half suspects the truth, out of blind hatred for our religion, overlooks the fact. They say, not in words, but in fact: Let Christianity perish if we cannot get rid of the Pope in any other way. But deny or conceal the fact as they will, it is true and unquestionable. In a moment of candor it has been confessed by the godless conspirators themselves. Here is what one of the foremost among them said at the

opening of the "Democratic Congress," held at Milan, in the beginning of 1873:

"Rome is not a mere territorial conquest. We do not know what to do with a few inches of land more or less. Its chief importance lies in the moral triumph the fall of the Eternal City gives to Italy, and which will inevitably cause the *destruction of the spiritual power of the Pope*, the monastic orders, and all the worn-out phantasmagoria of a religion which has no longer any right to exist. The Ministry tells us, in order to justify its policy of conciliation, that Rome is the capital of Christendom. Granted, and it is precisely for this reason that we should hasten to suppress the religious orders in Rome, till we can go further; *for there must be no longer a Christendom nor centre of Christianity, and it is our glory and our happiness to do away with this its last trace, which is a stain on the civilization of Europe.*"

The speaker was Benedetto Cairoli. Is not this the new Premier of the Piedmontese (or, as they falsely call it, *Italian*) Government? If not, he is his brother. The Cairoli brothers are all of the same political opinions—all Atheists; hearty haters of the Pope, because they know him to be the head of Christianity, and—to give the Devil his due—all of them men of singular courage and a bravery worthy a better cause. What chance will Leo XIII. have under a man who has come to Rome and holds the reins of its government for the purpose of destroying Christianity?

Pius IX. died in prison, conquered by a hostile army, stripped of all his power, and wholly at the mercy of his enemies. Was his mission on that account a failure? Was the Divine purpose for which he was raised up frustrated? By no means. His great duty of unmasking and condemning Liberalism has been performed. How far he has conquered it will be shown in years to come. His wise words, his noble endurance, his lofty example, cannot be lost, and must yet produce fruit. Gregory VII. died in exile; conquered in human eyes, but really the conqueror, as time showed. The contemporaries of great Pontiffs are not always able to see the glorious results with which events passing before their eyes are pregnant. Who in the days of Pius V. understood how fully he had crushed the naval power of the Turkish Empire, and rendered the religion and civilization forever safe against the danger of being buried under the darkness of Ottoman sway. It is only now that we can understand what an important part in the history of the world belongs to the battle of Lepanto, in whose waters the pride and power of the Mussulman invader was buried, never to rise again. In beholding the results, we are compelled more and more to admire the heroic Pontiff. He stood almost single-handed. The Catholic princes of Europe, distracted by petty jealousies, looked on with cold, cowardly indifference. France, like the Protestant states of Germany, was ready to join at any time with

the Turk, or at least to encourage him—to use him in order to humble and injure Austria. And it may be remarked, parenthetically, it would be well for those who are fond of tracing God's vengeance on France for the last ninety years to the sins of Louis XIV. and Louis XV., to look a little farther back, and remember the diabolical statecraft of Francis I. and subsequently of Richelieu.

So, too, coming generations will appreciate, better than we can, the work of Pius, and peoples yet unborn will praise and bless his name. As the good seed of word, deed, and example sown by the saints on earth grows apace, and with it their glory in heaven, so will the good seed, sown by the teachings, magnanimous deeds, and painful sufferings of Pius, grow with the ages, and add to his glory before angels and men. But God has been pleased to glorify His chosen High Priest even during his life and in his death. He gave him, as the Psalmist says, *longitudinem dierum*—a length of days unprecedented in the annals of the Church, a reign that exceeded that of all his predecessors, not excepting the twenty-five years of the first among them, St. Peter. He glorified him also in the sight of his enemies, by humbling them, by showing himself not only the protector of His servant, but also the avenger of his wrongs. The Divine words, *Nolite tangere Christos meos*, were not only a command, but a warning and threat; and those who in defiance of it dare lay hands on the Lord's anointed seldom live and die happily. Pius lived to see almost all his enemies disappear from the face of the earth. Some of them, like Cavour and Napoleon, died and "made no sign." To human eyes they went unrepentant, with the brand of anathema yet hot upon their brow, before the awful Judgment-seat. Some few, like Victor Emanuel, La Marmora, and others, were happily for themselves conquered by the terrors of approaching death and judgment; and in their last hour they begged pardon of God and the Pontiff, whom they had so cruelly outraged. But some were made visible tokens to the world of God's vengeance. The direst enemy that Pius ever had—the lying emperor who on the same day sent one message to the Pope, assuring him of protection, and another to Cialdini ordering the massacre of Castel Fidardo—was not long after himself shamefully defeated, dethroned, and driven out to die in ignominious exile. The base Achitophel (Von Arnim), who conducted the negotiations between Pius and Bixio's invading host and betrayed his trust, was soon after disowned, persecuted, and cast out into perpetual banishment by his haughty master in Berlin. And Bixio—the truculent Bixio—who set out on his Roman expedition with the boastful menace that he would throw the cardinals into the Tiber, what was his fate? His bones were picked up by his travelling companions on a barbarous coast, and to this day it is

uncertain whether he was devoured by cannibals or by wild beasts. Nations, we are taught by Revelation, are punished for the sins of their rulers. And how have the nations fared, whose rulers helped to dethrone Pius IX.? Look at France. When Napoleon's horrible perfidy first became known to Pius, the shock was too great for him, and he actually shed tears. A French prelate, who witnessed the scene, exclaimed afterwards, in a tone of prophetic indignation, "As sure as there is a just God above us, those tears will yet be expiated by the life-blood of France." The Prussian war and its disastrous results; the Commune, which reigned and was overthrown yesterday, but may reappear to-morrow; the abject submission, since then, of McMahon and his cabinet to some of Bismarck's threatening mandates—all these have sufficiently verified the bishop's prophecy. Again, look at England, whose infamous Russells, Mintos and Palmerstons fostered disorder and revolution in the Roman States, and by their intrigues paved the way for Mazzini's reign of terror and anarchy. What is now her condition? Stripped of her power and prestige, and with all her bullying and bluster the laughing-stock of civilized nations—an object of pity and contempt, even to the Mussulman!

We have no space to speak as we should wish of the Pope's many virtues, that have endeared him to his children, and made his name venerable even to those who are outside the Church. But we cannot help calling attention to one in particular, his wonderful charity towards his worst enemies. In denouncing error, evil doctrine, the pestilential theories of the day which are dressed up so plausibly as to impose even on some of "the household of Faith," his language is stern, severe, and uncompromising. But while severe with error or wrong-doing, he was meek and gentle with the person of him whose teaching or action was wrong. Never, in private conversation, did he allow an angry word to escape him against those who had outraged him by falsehood, perjury, contumely, or even open violence. This surely exhibited him as the true servant and imitator of his Divine Master, "in whose mouth was found no guile; who, when He was reviled, reviled not; when He suffered, threatened not." (1 Pet. ii., 23.)

Our American Church is under many obligations to Pius IX. He was always her special Father and Benefactor. To him we owe all but one of our ten Archbishoprics, and at least three-fifths of our sixty odd Episcopal Sees and Vicariates. Our American college in Rome (with the possible or probable confiscation of which Ulysses S. Grant instructed Minister Marsh not to interfere) was also his munificent gift. And all amongst us, clergy or laity, who have had the honor of being admitted to his august presence, can testify to the tender, loving solicitude he always manifested for whatever

concerned the growth and welfare of the American Church. He also, as we all and even our Protestant fellow-citizens can bear witness, took a lively interest in the material prosperity and progress of the American people. And that interest was heartfelt and sincere, not the stereotyped, hollow, conventional language of modern diplomacy. We therefore owe him a special debt of gratitude, and ought to cherish and honor his memory with special affection.

We have lost Pius IX., but God has put in his place one whose name has already become a familiar word on the lips of Christendom. For what special purpose Leo XIII. has been raised up by Providence, we know not. Time alone will reveal it. In his portrait may be discerned a peculiar sweetness, tempered with an expression of sadness, which presages perhaps the suffering of the martyr, and the calm, meek spirit of resignation which is to accompany it. His name is of happy augury, for it indicates strength, the royal energy that conquers, the powerful voice that strikes terror into the beasts of the field. Besides, it recalls the memory of the many Leos who have been among the greatest Pontiffs of the Church. Quid dulcius melle, et quid fortius leone? as was said in the answer to Samson's riddle. May Leo's Pontificate unite the sweetness of honey with the strength of the lion! May he have sweet, persuasive words for his children, and even for his enemies, blended with inflexible rigor and indomitable strength in defending the rights of the Church, and condemning the errors that belong to the false impious civilization with which Satan is now making his last effort to delude mankind and overthrow Christianity!

BOOK NOTICES.

THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD AND THEIR RELATIONS TO CHRISTIANITY, CONSIDERED IN EIGHT LECTURES, FOUNDED BY THE HON. ROBERT BOYLE. By *Frederick Denison Maurice, M A.* Fifth edition. London: Macmillan & Co. 1877. Received from, and on sale by, Claxton, Remsen & Haffelfinger, Philadelphia.

This work is one of many that have issued from the fruitful pen of the author. The fact that it has passed through five editions shows that it has not failed to excite the attention of thoughtful scholarly minds in England, and to influence them, it is to be presumed, to a greater or less degree. It evinces, as the name of the author, indeed, would lead one to expect, learning and research. The first part of the book is made up of an acute and laborious analysis of the fundamental ideas of Mohammedanism, Brahminism, Buddhism, the Old Persian belief, the Egyptian, the Greek, the Roman, and the Gothic. The second part is an attempt to exhibit the relations which the ideas considered by Mr. Maurice to be fundamental and distinctive of these religions respectively bear to Christianity. The practical purpose which he had in view, as stated in the first Lecture, was to answer certain questions which he believed had arisen in the minds of "philosophical men," and "the general society of England," in regard to efforts to "diffuse Christianity abroad." These questions he states in the following form: "Was the gift of Christianity worth bestowing? Were we really carrying truth into the distant parts of the earth when we were carrying our own faith into them? Might not the whole notion be a dream of our vanity? Might not particular soils be adapted to particular religions? Might not the effort to transplant one into another involve the necessity of mischievous forcing, and terminate in inevitable disappointment? Might not a better day be at hand in which all religions alike should be found to have done their work of partial good, of greater evil, and when something much more comprehensive and satisfactory should supersede them? Were not thick shadows overhanging Christendom itself, which must be scattered before it could be the source of light to the world?"

The necessity of answering these questions which, according to Mr. Maurice, than whom scarcely any one could have a better opportunity of knowing, had come to be extensively asked in English society, shows the extent to which rationalism has eaten out of their hearts a firm belief in Christianity, and replaced it with vague skepticism. This was perceived by him, as the following remarks show. We quote them because it puts in concise form questions which are unsettling the minds of thousands of persons here in America as well as in England, who, denying or discarding the authority of the Church to teach them, are entirely at sea as regards their belief:

"Faith, it is now admitted, has been the most potent instrument of God to the world; has given to it nearly all which it can call precious. But, then, it is asked, is there not ground for supposing that all the different religious systems, and not one only, may be legitimate products of that faith which is so essential a part of man's constitution? Are not they manifestly adapted to peculiar times, and localities, and races? Is it not probable that the theology of all alike is something merely accidental, an imperfect theory about our relations to the universe, which will in due time give place to some other? Have we not reason to sup-

pose that Christianity, instead of being, as we have been taught, a revelation, has its root in the heart and intellect of man, as much as any other system? Are there not the closest, the most obvious, relations between it and them? Is it not subject to the same law of decay from the progress of knowledge and society with all the rest? Must we not expect that it, too, will lose all its mere theological characteristics, and that what at last survives of it will be something of a very general character, some great ideas of what is good and beautiful, some excellent maxims of life which may very well assimilate, if they be not actually the same, with the essential principles which are contained in all other religions, and which will also, it is hoped, abide forever?"

To any one grounded in the true faith, these questions would sound strangely did he not encounter them in one form or another among those who stand outside the Catholic Church. In his mind they can produce no disquiet. They do not exist at all in his mind *as* questions, and when propounded by others, impress him only as negations of the truth expressed in the form of queries. But this is not the case with a Protestant. However firmly he may hold to the opinions he has adopted, they are only opinions, and fall back upon his own individual judgment, whether he is conscious of it or not, as their foundation. Religion is, and, in the necessity of the case, must always be with him, essentially a matter of speculation, superficial or profound, philosophical or the reverse, according to his mental gifts and prevailing habits of thought. These remarks find confirmation in the statement respecting the general existence of these questions in the public non-Catholic mind in England. They will be found, says Mr. Maurice, "in much of the erudite as well as popular literature of this day; they will often be heard in social circles; they are undoubtedly floating in the minds of us all."

The questions propounded, therefore, are of direct concern to non-Catholics who yet cling to a belief in Christianity as divinely revealed; they are of concern to Catholics only as questions which they may have to meet and answer in the form of objections to their faith, and which it is important that they should be prepared to answer intelligently and convincingly.

The fact that these questions *are* questions to-day in the minds of "Evangelical" Protestants, shows the entire absence of any real foundation or basis in their belief. Their religious ideas are mere speculations, built upon nothing more substantial than their own deductions. Hence, as a matter of course, their religious notions are in a constant state of flux and reflux, realizing the picture of St. James—waves of the sea, moved and carried about by the wind. When one of them has worked out, by a process of ratiocination, from the materials furnished him by history, by his own analysis of passages of Sacred Scripture, or of the wants and needs of mankind, an answer that satisfies for the time being his own conception of the nature of the problems that are presented in a serious consideration of man's present condition and future destiny, that answer is satisfactory only to himself, and to himself only for a time. The acuteness of others, and his own reflections, soon make some weak point or flaw in the answer apparent, and he has to go over his whole work anew. His labor is truly a Sisyphean one and equally barren of permanent results.

The work before us bears indications of this. It shows learning, thought, and careful sifting of what Mr. Maurice considers mere accidents of the religions discussed, from what he regards as essential and fundamental to those relations. Then, following this, the latter part of the work consists of a laborious attempt to show how the ideas consid-

ered fundamental to the religions which he subjected to his analytical process, all attain higher and more complete expression in Christianity. For all this we give Mr. Maurice credit. But at the end of the book we have to ask, Has anything been proved? And to this question we doubt whether any reader, however careful, will be able to find any other answer than a negative. We have the author's opinions and speculations, first about Mohammedanism, Judaism, Brahminism, Buddhism, the religions of the ancient Persians, Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans, and then about Christianity, and the relation in which Christianity stands to these religions, but they are speculations only—nothing more.

Had the object of the work been simply literary or philosophical, this would not be ground for condemnation, but its object was to resolve doubt, to dispel skepticism, to answer questions which Mr. Maurice, speaking for the Protestant Christians of England, declares trouble the "minds of us all," which are entertained by minds of the deepest earnestness, and which questions, until answered, render it "impossible," says Mr. Maurice, "that we can with sound hearts and clear consciences seek to evangelize the world." What then shall we say of a work which undertakes to answer these questions by a process which, in the nature of the case, comprehends in itself nothing stronger, broader, firmer, or deeper than Mr. Maurice's own personal conceptions of what other religions were or are, and what Christianity is, which comprehends nothing more of certainty than that which a fallible individual, however able or learned, however diligent in research, however acute in his investigations and searching in his analysis he may be, can arrive at. No wonder, therefore, his conclusion concludes nothing.

These remarks may be considered by some too sweeping and severe. That they are not, it is easy to prove. In the first place, Mr. Maurice's method of discussion is one that cannot, in the nature of the case, conclude anything. He takes the different religions of the world and studies them analytically, and by a process of abstraction arrives at what he regards as their respective fundamental ideas. He shows that in each instance these fundamental ideas were incomplete, and needed other complementary ideas to supply that in which they were wanting; and not only that, but that even so far as those ideas were true they were lacking in reality, deficient in living power, and therefore could not satisfy the needs nor heal the deepseated wounds of humanity. He then subjects Christianity to a like process, and shows that it supplied the several deficiencies of these several religions, and consistently asserted its claims to belief on the ground that it was not a revelation of abstract truths, but of truths as living realities; that it exhibited itself as a living power, active in delivering men from the bondage of error, and competent to accomplish that which it was striving to effect. But when we come to inquire what *are* the truths which Christianity has revealed, we have as answer only Mr. Maurice's conception of those truths, and against that conception any and every other Christian, or person calling himself a Christian, has equal claim of right (be that claim well or ill grounded) with Mr. Maurice to set up another and a different conception. When we inquire for some living *authority* to tell us with certainty what those truths are, when we ask where does the authority to teach, which Christianity claims to possess, reside, where is the seat and centre of the power which it exercises on earth, how does it exercise that power, through what channels and by what means does it work? we are left entirely in the dark. Mr. Maurice, in fact, impliedly admits that he *cannot* answer them. He seeks refuge in hopes as

to what the future will bring forth, or in general statements that may be interpreted in different senses.

He speaks of Christ as having come to establish a kingdom, but that kingdom is no actual fact as yet on earth; it is something still to come; "that the old Gospel that the Son of God, the Deliverer of Man, has appeared and will be shown hereafter to be the Lord of the universe." But then he draws this picture: "To look out upon the world and see a valley covered with the dry bones of different systems, to hear them clashing together as they might be joined to each other, and then to be told, 'It is all in vain; there is no voice which can bid the breath enter into these bones; perhaps it might have come from Christians, but it does not; they, too occupy part of this valley; they have become dry bones, very dry, indeed; clashing always, never uniting'—such an announcement as this, however softened by thoughts of the past or the future, must be a very mournful one."

Mr. Maurice has a source of consolation and support under the weight of this conception. He finds no relief from it in the Church as a living reality, an actually existing kingdom of God on earth, possessing the power to give these dry bones life and bring them together by its vivifying energies; but actually finds it necessary (we could scarcely believe our eyes when we read) to turn to Buddhism as the witness of a truth which is to lift Christians out of the discouragement or rather despair into which, through forgetfulness of what Christianity reveals, they have fallen.

"The third great religion of the world," writes Mr. Maurice, "comes in to check this despondency. 'We are but ill provided with a theory,' say the Buddhists; 'we have tried many, and little fruit has come of them. But this we are assured of, you Christians may not have heard of it, but there is a quickening, life-giving Spirit which is meant for humanity, which all may possess together, which alone can bring a universe out of chaos, unity out of division.'"

"Wonderful testimony," exclaims Mr. Maurice, "to be borne from the ends of the earth, from such a strange medley of strange people, so different in their thoughts, so incoherent in their utterances!" But Mr. Maurice fails to see that so far as the "strange medley of strange people" which compose the Buddhists, have a conception of the truth which he finds, or thinks he finds, in their religion, it is vague, formless, and lifeless, a mere abstraction. Nor need he have gone to "the ends of the earth" to find this truth, not simply a "testimony" to it, but a living, authoritative proclamation of it, and, still more, a living, actual realization of it in the divine fact of the universality and unity already existing, having ever existed since Christ established His kingdom on earth, and destined through all ages to continue to exist, in the one Holy Catholic Church.

But let us hear Mr. Maurice further. "Is not the report of" this "wonderful testimony like the sound of that rushing mighty wind which was heard on the day of Pentecost, not indeed itself the promised Power, but the type and herald of it? Does it not say that we, too, might have cloven tongues to declare, in different tones and measures, according to different thoughts, habits, and apprehensions of men, the same wonderful works of God, and that these tongues might be of fire if only the living inspiration were confessed and obeyed by us?"

Mr. Maurice alas! has no idea that the mighty Power of which these cloven tongues of fire were the type and outward sign, is to-day living and working in the Church; proclaiming to-day, not "in different tones and measures," though in different languages, the same truths, needing no

change "according to the different thoughts, habits, and apprehensions of men," but universal in their adaptation to men, however different in "thoughts, habits, and apprehensing;" confessing to all men far and near, whether in England, Ireland, France, or Germany, or "at the ends of the earth," the same are unchanging and unchangeable, true faith, declaring ever "the same wonderful works of God."

In the continuation of the passage above quoted, Mr. Maurice shows how near one can be to the truth, and yet how far from it. Referring still to the "testimony" which he finds in Buddhism, he asks, "Does it not bid us remember that with this spirit of peace, and love, and a sound mind we have been sealed; that the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Ghost, which was to be the blessing, the permanent blessing, of Pentecost, has been bestowed upon us; that we hold this spirit, not as the Buddhist's dream, but our own right—to be, therefore, the witness of our independence, flowing from no source whence it may be replenished—but as the very bond of our dependence and childhood, as the spirit of adoption, whereby we are to cry Abba, Father; as the power whereby we can ask and receive a new life day by day? If so, there is cause enough for humiliation in all of us, for despair in none."

These are eloquent words, and coming from the mouth of a Catholic, and with a Catholic meaning, they would be true, and express actually existing realities. But Mr. Maurice utters them in no such sense. They represent to him not existing facts; they are in his mouth but word pictures of a beautiful dream. The "spirit of peace and love, and of a sound mind," "the spirit of adoption" comes to men, according to Mr. Maurice, not through the Church, her sacraments, and the obedience of faith we owe to her, but to each directly and immediately from heaven. As for the Church, it is in his view, so far as it is an actually existing fact in the world, disunited and broken into countless fragments, having no unity and no power to produce it. Christians must form a union among themselves, and by the power of this union the *disjecta membra* of the Church may in the end, perhaps, be brought together. "The broken limbs of the world," he says, "may yet be united, if the broken limbs of the Church be united first."

These words might seem to imply a consciousness, on Mr. Maurice's part, of the necessity, after all, of an actual visible unity of the Church. They are not intended by him to be so construed. They are employed to express his sense only of the importance of a unity of sentiment and feeling among individuals who make up the membership of the invisible "body," of which the Church, as he believes in it, entirely consists. With like confusion, and error of thought and language, he speaks of Christ as the Head of the body, the Church, and yet speaks of the "rebellion" against the spirit not only of individual Christians, but of the "whole Church" (!) and of the necessity of a "renewal of the spirit" "in us and in the whole Church." This terrible error runs through the whole book. Its author has no sense of the truth that Christ is the soul of the Church, ever abiding in it, and by His constant indwelling presence ever vivifying and preserving it, keeping it unbroken in its unity, unspotted in its sanctity, and in continual perfect conformity with the Holy Spirit, whose home it is, from which, it is true, the Holy Spirit goes forth continually to warn and reprove mankind, and keep alive in their minds the knowledge of God, that he may draw them into the Church, and there replenish them with the sevenfold graces which He bestows upon the members of Christ's Body. With the exception of a few pages at the conclusion of the book, from which we have made the foregoing quotations, there is no reference to the Church,

and there is no reference whatever to, or recognition of, the sacraments, powers, and functions of the Church. The whole consideration of Christianity is conducted as though the Church had no actual visible existence on earth, nothing whatever to do with the regeneration and redemption of men in any real way—a mere abstraction, existing only in thought and idea.

The very relation of the Old Testament Dispensation to the New is so misconceived that the latter is made by Mr. Maurice to stand out in contradistinction, instead of fulfilment, of the former as regards an actual divine kingdom in the world. "The Old Testament," it is said, "was especially the witness of God's government of *the earth*. The New speaks of the *kingdom of heaven*. John the Baptist said the kingdom of heaven was at hand. Our Lord illustrated its principles in every discourse and every miracle; His Apostles invited men to enter into it; in their Epistles they unfolded its nature to those who had believed the message and sought the privilege. This kingdom they described as one of righteousness, peace, and joy; the eye could not see it, but it was most real. It was a kingdom for the heart and spirit of man. . . . It was called the kingdom of God because communion with Him is the great blessedness of it." These words can be interpreted in a Catholic sense, and in that sense are true; but it is not in that sense they are used. The kingdom which Mr. Maurice thus pictures in glowing words, is no city set on a mountain that cannot be hid. It is a city that not only can be hidden, but is hidden away from the eyes of men, so that it cannot be seen, an invisible body joined to an invisible Head, and Christ its Head dwells afar off in heaven, and is no longer personally present on earth; nor is there on earth any real representative of Him clothed with His power and authority, specially delegated to carry on His work.

The Church, therefore, after all, to Mr. Maurice's mind, is an abstraction. Turning over a few pages of his book, we find him speaking "of the broken limbs of the Church," and then putting the question: "But are these the limbs of a great system?" . . . "Holding this opinion of herself," he says in answer, "the Church has been either *held artificially together, the children within her groaning under the bondage to which she has subjected them*, those without hearing in her invitation a message not of *deliverance* but of *heavier slavery;* or else, these *artificial joints and fastenings being removed*, she has split into fragments, upon which those who are clinging to them feel they can less and less depend, which offer to heathens an excuse for adhering to the tradition of their fathers, be it ever so dreary, till those who bid them leave it are agreed what they should adopt in its place." In view of the picture Mr. Maurice has drawn of the disintegrated condition of Christendom as he conceives it—a true picture indeed of Protestantism—it is no wonder that he takes refuge in the figment of an entirely invisible Church, and dreams of a unity of sentiment and feeling to be brought about hereafter by the agreement of those who are now contending as to what opinions and traditions men should adopt.

It is scarcely necessary to say, after having seen the erroneousness of Mr. Maurice's idea of the Church, that he ignores in his book the priestly office of Christ and the functions of the Church as continuing that office through all ages. In fact that side of Christianity is almost entirely kept out of view; and so, too, the extent to which sacrifice entered into the different religions of ancient heathendom is not at all referred to. Mr. Maurice, it is true, occasionally uses the word "priest," but it is employed rather in the sense of teacher than of one who offers sacrifice.

As a matter of course the work falls short of its intention and purpose—"proving the Christian religion against Atheists, Theists, Pagans, Jews and Mohammedans." It is well written as regards style; it bears the marks of research and of patient thought; it contains many beautiful ideas eloquently expressed, but its whole conception of Christianity is defective and false. It is simply the author's *idea* of Christianity, formed not from a consideration of it as it has ever manifested itself to the world as a divine abiding fact, residing in the Church and by the Church constantly exhibited, to be apprehended by men in the obedience of faith, but formed by his own inferences from and reflections upon the words of a book, which whatever be the treasure it contains, is the property of the Church, by her to be dispensed to those who will hear her.

The work, regarded as a volume of disquisitions upon the fundamental ideas of Mohammedanism and the religions of heathendom, past and present, is interesting; as an exhibition of the real practical relations of Christianity and those religions it has little or no value.

A History of England in the Eighteenth Century. By *William E. H. Lecky.* Vols i., ii. New York: D. Appleton & Co. 1878.

The English historical school from the days of Gibbon and Hume has been imbued with the rationalistic spirit of historical criticism. With the exception of Dr. Arnold, we know of no English non-Catholic historian that has not carried out his work in this spirit. Not even the lofty ideal which Cicero attaches to history has been followed, nor the rather ambiguous but suggestive definition of history as philosophy teaching by example. The action of Divine Providence is scarcely, if ever, recognized; and the true idea of history, as the showing forth of the incarnation of our Lord, with its continuation in the Church, would be met with a smile of pity or contempt. The great cycles of history move in obedience to the Divine counsels. Events are to be viewed in their relation to the Church. The rise, progress, and fall of the great monarchies of ancient times were ordained in reference to the coming of Christ, and the subsequent changes in the world's history are related to His reign, and to His Church, which is the central fact and significance of the world. Without Christ and the Church, history is unintelligible and inexplicable. Nor is this a fanciful theory. It is the doctrine of Holy Writ, which records on every page the Divine dealings with man in all his relations, social, personal, and civil. "By ME, kings reign, and lawgivers decree."

The ancient pagan historians were quick to acknowledge the hand of God, even in the ordinary course of human affairs. Of a more reverent spirit than our modern historiographers, Thucydides, Plutarch, and even Livy who was suspected of skepticism, abound in by no means superstitious acknowledgments of the Divine power and wisdom that guides human events. It is now well ascertained that the great minds of Greece and Rome were not under the slavery of the vulgar mythology, but held to monotheism. They were fully penetrated with a belief in the Providence of the Supreme God, and this belief preserved them from falling into the gross materialism of their modern successors. Even the myths of the founding of Athens, and of Rome, imply the controlling and shaping power of the Supreme Being. The historical criticism of the ancients may have been lacking in some technical excellencies, but its reverent spirit challenges our admiration. The history of the Divine guidance of the Jewish people must certainly be studied as an evidence, if not a parallelism, of God's supervision of all the his-

torical races, or races to which he gave a particular destiny and mission. The Christian school of history always proceeded upon the acknowledgment of this principle, and the vast genius of Bossuet gathered as into a diadem the gold and precious jewels of the Divine guidings and counsellings in all the ages of man's history, and this magnificent crown he cast at the foot of the throne of the Most High, in imitation of the angels who thus testify that to Him "belong glory, honor, power, and benediction forever and ever."

It is clear that this noble and sure theory of history would impart to the historian a clearness of intellectual vision, a purity of moral judgment, and a deep sense of responsibility. He would feel that he was recording the action of God upon a people, either in their exaltation or their humiliation. He would trace national ruin, the decay of morals, the triumph of infidelity, and the other woes that are permitted to afflict a people, to their true source. Nor could that be considered a narrow view which is sanctioned by the example of the Scriptures and developed by the great historians of the human race. The fact is, there is no history worthy of the name that does not proceed upon this principle. We can never understand the life of nations, except as they are studied in their relations to the Divine law. We can never appreciate the power of secondary and incidental causes and influences, without the profound conviction and acknowledgment of the First Cause himself, humbly recognized as the Ruler of nations, the King of kings, and the Lord of lords.

Bayle and the Encyclopædists introduced the false modern school of historical criticism. Hume, by denying the principle of causality and the supernatural, brought history down to the level of a catalogue, or a list of groceries. Gibbon, in the famous fifteenth and sixteenth chapters, introduced a shallow criticism of Christianity, and fostered a habit of petty fault-finding that kept English history at a low level for many a year. Dr. Arnold broke from the crippling and false system in his *History of Rome*, which eloquently and plainly has for its noble thesis the Divine Providence in Roman history. Of late years, materialistic hypotheses have been gaining ground, and the spirit of mere natural science has triumphantly asserted its wide-reaching power in the spiritual domain of history. The irrepressible Dr. Draper writes history from a physical standpoint. The reasons of things are purely corporeal. Climate shapes destiny. The facial angle determines whether a man shall be a Fenelon or a Danton. Soil has much to do with religious aspirations, and snow has an effect upon the love of liberty. If Draper had lived in the middle ages he would have been an enthusiastic searcher after the philosopher's stone and the *elixir vitæ*. As it is, he is quite as great a visionary, with his climatic influences and cranial protuberances. He belongs to the school of materialism. The other school which stands near to this, though without its pronounced grossness, is intellectualism or rationalism, of which school Mr. William Lecky is one of the ablest exponents. It claims supreme importance and dominion for reason in the domain of natural science and theology, and deprecates any Divine interposition as an invasion of the powers of human intellect. It is condemned by the Vatican Council.

The extreme development of this school in England is due to the undogmatic and irrational tone of Protestantism, which has given general license to human reason without means of check. When the Bible is subjected to the wit of every peasant, it is not to be wondered at that the secular processes and outcomes of history should escape like free and independent criticism. History cannot expect to be better treated than

the Scriptures. The abnormal and absurd enlargement of the rights of private judgment—the cardinal doctrine of Protestantism—has carried destruction into every department of literature, science, and criticism, not to speak of its utter annihilation of religion. The spirit of the *Westminster Review* is far more active, aggressive, and diffusive than the orthodox know or would believe. Mr. Lecky represents a sort of intellectual Christianity, or Deism, and it would be difficult to exempt him from the charge of downright infidelity, to which his books on the *History of Morals* and *History of Rationalism* exposed him. The fact is, that such men do not clearly know their own minds. A Deist, rejecting revelation, is thrown upon his own mind to form some conception of the Supreme Being, and to construct some ethical code. This being tedious and unsatisfactory work, he quickly recurs to the writings of philosophers, and soon swings from Anthropomorphism to Pantheism, or, perhaps, ends in Nihilism. It is to be feared that Atheism engulfs most theorists upon the nature and attributes of the Deity. Modern Rationalism has smashed Paley's "watch" into pieces, and most philosophers admit the inconclusiveness of the current physical and metaphysical proofs of the existence of God. Dr. Newman and Dr. Brownson fairly admit that inner consciousness, the profound belief of the human race, and the absolute certainty of God's existence affirmed to the human intellect by a sort of intrinsic necessity, are the real arguments and irresistible conclusions for the being of God. But no sooner is this course of argumentation presented than a hundred philosophers spring excitedly to their feet and protest vehemently against it. A philosopher in vague search of God is an absurdity. He should begin with God, as the *primum philosophicum.*

Lecky, in his *Morals,* claims to be eclectic. But his utilitarianism is apparent in his sanction of Hobbes, who does not discriminate between virtue and vice, and in his approval of the unutterably mean system of Bentley, that we are virtuous in order to be happy; or vicious, if the like result is attained. But this is too long an introduction to the book under review. Lecky is acceptable to many by reason of an honest bluntness, which carries with it the conviction that, if wrong, he is sincere.

Mr. Lecky has chosen the eighteenth century—a rather unfortunate choice for a popular historian, for his history is not so interesting as Lord Stanhope's. We could wish that he had taken up England in the sixteenth century, if it were for nothing else than to take the absurd conceit of Englishmen out of their part in the Reformation; for Lecky is not carried away with Protestantism, though of course he prefers it to the Catholic Church, for its "encouragement" of intellectual freedom—an encouragement, alas! which has precipitated so many into the slavery of skepticism and infidelity. It is probable that, as Mr. Lecky always writes with a well-defined purpose, he has selected the eighteenth century as the one in which the principle of the Reformation had the fullest and fairest play. All traces of Popery were banished the kingdom. Jacobinism was struggling in the last gasps. The feeling of the people was never more loyally Protestant. The Established Church had never greater authority, or was more beloved by the people, as witness the Sacheverell affair. The influence of the French infidels was scarcely felt among the masses; in fact, Protestantism's palmy days were placed in England in the eighteenth century. Yet the conclusion, not forced upon, but demonstrated to the reader of the book is, that Protestantism, by which the author fallaciously means Christianity, was unworthy of the

love and reverence of the people, and failed to exercise an appreciable influence upon their morality or intelligence.

The opening chapters are mainly political, and deal with questions which to our readers have but little interest, but which we notice have elicited much comment from the British reviews. The revolution which dethroned James the Second has been regarded by Protestants as a glorious assertion of the rights of conscience, and a testimony to the indefectible Protestantism of the English people. The author shows that religion entered only in a very incidental and special way. The decline of the yeomanry, restrictions on the political influence of the commercial classes, subserviency of the judges, the English hatred of foreigners, the popular slander of the illegitimacy of the Prince of Wales, and a dozen other causes, outside of the Protestant feelings of the country, carefully traced by Mr. Lecky, are shown to have been instrumental in the deposition of James. These chapters deserve careful reading, as they set in very clear light the profound error and absurdity of the widely spread and credited statement that the English revolution in 1688 was the war of Protestantism against the "Papal Beast." Orangeism is active in perpetuating and bepraising an illusion. The author thus speaks of the position of Catholicism in Europe (p. 291). The extract gives our readers a fair illustration of his style:

"Catholicism can never be looked upon merely as a religion. It is a great or highly organized kingdom, recognizing no geographical frontiers, governed by a foreign sovereign, pervading temporal politics by its manifold influences, and attracting to itself much of the enthusiasm which would otherwise flow in national channels. The intimate correspondence between its priests in many lands, the disciplined unity of their political actions, the almost absolute authority they exercise over large classes, and their complete detachment from purely national and patriotic interests, have often in critical times proved a most serious political danger, and they have sometimes pursued a temporal policy eminently aggressive, sanguinary, unscrupulous and ambitious." . . . The reader will detect no fewer than five misstatements in this extract. The Church is treated in the same offhand style throughout both volumes. Mr. Lecky's eminent intellectualism has not enabled him to understand the Catholic faith. It is true that the Church is not national, because she is Catholic. She recognizes no nation, and objects to the word national as applied to any of her decrees. The Council of Baltimore was directed to change the word "national" to plenary. A political writer like Lecky would be in favor of a national Catholic Church, such as Protestantism has always been, and is striving to become in this republic with its clamor about recognizing God in the Constitution—the first step towards constituting the Protestant Church of America. The real opposition of the world to the Church is, that she refuses to become national and secular. If England had not been so intensely national and suspicious of Papal influences, she would be Catholic to-day.

Mr. Lecky's treatment of the sectaries of the eighteenth century is much fairer than his treatment of the Church, though there is a subdued sarcasm throughout his remarks. The extravagance of the early Methodists, the witch mania, and the delusions of Wesley are described in graphic language. The chapters on Ireland are valuable as evidences of the natural fairmindedness of the author when treating of merely secular themes. We are, of course, not surprised at the unfairness which the Church has to encounter, for we have long since despaired of fair play at the hands of non-Catholic writers. There is a blinding

fatality, possibly resulting from satanic influence, that attends a Protestant author when speaking of the Church. "They have eyes, and see not."

In his remarks on Religious Legislation (p. 289), the author with a boldness and scorn which merit high praise, arraigns England on a charge which has never been brought, or at least substantiated by any Protestant writer against a Catholic government. The Spanish Inquisition, painted in the darkest colors by the most rabid of controversialists, is a tribunal of mercy and justice as compared with English religious persecution, depicted by Mr. Lecky. He shows the systematic degradation of Catholics, socially and politically; their condition under Anne, the horrible penal laws, and the social and political consequences that could not fail to result from the barbarous and anti-Christian code. This section of the book is of profound interest, as showing the spirit of martyrdom in which our forefathers practiced and upheld the Divine faith.

The chapters devoted to national manners and habits are highly entertaining, and leave the impression that England in the eighteenth century was not far advanced in civilization. The gross immorality of the court of the Georges and of high society generally we learned from Thackeray, whose authority, however, in *The Four Georges*, was bitterly objected to; but here comes Mr. Lecky with cumulative evidence. Our opinion is, that the utter decay of faith in England in the nineteenth century is more to be lamented than her immorality in the eighteenth, but as both causes are intimately conjoined, it is with the greatest apprehension that we view her future.

The book is excellently printed and bound.

ELEMENTS OF GEOLOGY. By *Joseph Le Conte*, author of *Religion and Science*, etc., and Professor of Geology and Natural History in the University of California. 8vo., pp. 570. Appleton, 1878.

THE ANCIENT LIFE-HISTORY OF THE EARTH. By *H. Alleyne Nicholson, M.D., D.Sc. M.A.*, etc., Professor in the University of St. Andrews. 12mo., pp. 378. Appleton, 1878.

We place both of these books together for a very obvious reason. They both treat on geology; because the second, as the author says, "is an attempt to treat palæontology more especially from its historical side, and on its more intimate relations with geology." So pursued, the study of the ancient life of the earth forms an essential part of geology. This science is certainly one of the most important and beautiful which can engage the human mind. It is important especially on account of its bearings on revealed religion. Religion, it is true, comes from above and points out to us the road leading to heaven, while geology comes from beneath and discourses of the earth which we tread; and yet they come in contact, inasmuch as geology also has its history of creation to tell, which, in the early days of the science, seemed to clash with that told in the very beginning of the Bible. Surely, however, there can be no real contradiction, for the simple and often repeated reason that truth can never contradict truth, and that the same God of truth by whose inspiration Moses wrote, is also the author of the geological record brought to light so recently. Thus geology, correctly treated, is of great usefulness to religion; but it is also of fascinating interest; it reads in parts like a fairy tale, and many of its truths are stranger than fiction.

Our first impulse was to welcome a new book on this progressive science from Prof. Le Conte, not only on account of his high authority in his subject, but also because we are assured of his reverence for re-

ligious belief from a previous work of his on the harmony between religion and science. And we can say, after examining his book, that our expectations have not been disappointed. He gives as his reason for writing a new book on geology when so many already exist, that works which give due prominence to American geology are either so extensive as to be suited only for specialists, or on the other hand too elementary. His aim has been to furnish intelligent students and general readers a means of acquiring a scientific general knowledge of geology. And we find in his book a full, interesting, and judicious treatment of his subject. He divides it into three sections, under the heads of dynamical, structural, and historical geology, corresponding respectively to physiology, anatomy, and embryology in organic science; the analogy, however, ceasing in this, that while organic science culminates in physiology, geology culminates in the historical part, to which all the rest is subservient. He sums up his definition of geology as "the history of the evolution of the earth and its inhabitants," and he makes evolution a leading idea about which many of the facts are grouped.

What he says (p. 164) of the spheroidal shape of the earth, may serve as a proof of his caution in drawing conclusions. He dissents from many distinguished physicists who regard that shape as a demonstration that the earth was once a fluid ball, and he explains clearly how its actual shape is just what would result from rotation, even if the earth had been always solid, with its aqueous and atmospheric agencies at work. Still he admits that there are many other reasons for believing that it was once in an incandescent fluid condition.

Remembering how common was the belief that the interior of the earth is fluid, we are struck at the fickleness of geology when our author (p. 80) brings forward as the most advanced geological theory, that our earth is entirely solid. We are pleased to see that on entering on the subject of the antiquity of man, he promises to receive none but thoroughly reliable evidence, remarking that there has been recently too much eagerness to accept facts which overthrow established beliefs. His conclusion is "that we have as yet no certain knowledge of man's time on the earth. It may be 100,000 years, or it may be only 10,000 years, but more probably the former than the latter." Therefore, according to our author, nothing is *certain* as regards geological evidence,—it *may* be only 10,000; others who have examined the matter fully say that 6000 are sufficient, and to this number, based on the Bible narrative, we will by all means still adhere.

We will quote without comment his words on the last page, regarding the character of primeval man: "We have seen that the earliest men yet discovered in Europe or America, though low in the scale of civilization, were distinctively and perfectly human, as much so as any race now living, and were not in any sense an intermediate link between man and the ape. Nevertheless, we must not forget that the cradle of mankind was probably in Asia. . . . The intermediate link, if there be any such, must be looked for in Asia."

But little space remains to us for Prof. Nicholson's book. It is certainly a work of merit, written in a clear and interesting style, and a worthy companion for Prof. Le Conte's.

What he says of evolution is worthy of remark. His judgment is that "the evidence of palæontology is in favor of the view that the succession of life-forms on the globe has been to a large extent regulated by some orderly and constantly acting law of modification and evolution" (p. 372). . . . "On the other hand there are facts which point clearly to the existence of some law other than that of evolution, and probably of a deeper and more far-reaching character" (p. 373).

Neither work contains anything irreverent toward religion; both authors indeed may be sincerely religious men; yet, as far as we have seen, neither ever refers the wonders and beauties of creation which they describe to the Creator. Professors of science need not indeed make themselves preachers; but it is an unfavorable sign of the times that the fashion should prevail of studying the impressive works of God without ever referring to their Author.

. . . "The fire, or the wind, or the swift air, or the circle of the stars, or the great water, or the sun and moon. . . . With whose beauty if they, being delighted, took them to be gods, let them know how much the Lord of them is more beautiful than they, for the first Author of Beauty made all those things." (Wisdom, xiii., 2, 3.)

THE FALL OF RORA. The Search after Proserpine and other Poems, Meditative and Lyrical. By *Aubrey De Vere.* Henry S. King & Co. London, 1878.

We look upon Aubrey De Vere as the greatest of the Victorian poets, and in the present volume he substantiates this judgment in two of the noblest sonnets upon the poetic function and power:

"The College of the Priests is with us still;
Still on our low and sin-defiled ground
The borders of their sacred vestments sound;
But where by caverned wood or crested hill,
Or cedar-girded mountain citadel,
Where are the high-commissioned Prophets found?
The Unanointed Order, not uncrowned,
For whom the curtain unremovable
Of Time, transparent grows;—to whom is given,
When mighty Nations rage in anarchy,
Bending with arm outstretched and potent rod,
To part the waves of that rebellious sea;
To warn all Rulers of the ways of heaven,
And sternly monish kings that know not God?

"I asked; and it was answered me—The Praise
And Burden which to these did once belong
Is now committed to the Lords of Song;
For, throned above earth-mist and Time's poor haze,
Their spiritual spheres they build and raise;
And those eternal Truths on which are hung
The fates of mortals, lurk their leaves among;
And what exalts a nation, what betrays.
Therefore the People cleave to them; and all
To whom the World, not Truth and man, are dear,
Abhor them and suspect; despise, yet fear;
And will not bid them to their festival,
Unless, like Balak's wise and wicked Seer,
They merge the Prophet in the Sorcerer."

The "spiritual sphere" which Mr. De Vere has built and raised is luminous with the finest rays of Catholic piety. He belongs to what at one period of criticism was rather slightingly spoken of as the Lake School—the return to nature after the hysterics of Byron and the jingling rhymes of Scott. Mr. De Vere owes much to the spirit and method of Wordsworth, and the hazy but eminently poetic genius of Coleridge; but he has a "sphere" in which none of the great Lakists moved—the sphere of Catholic truth. With bolder originality than Tennyson, with clearer philosophic insight than the famed Browning, and with a "lusciousness" of epithet that not even the Hellenic Swinburne can approach, De Vere, as we said, easily surpasses his contemporaries, who lack that profound religious feeling without which no true poet can "move harmonious numbers." The "In Memoriam," which is claimed

to be an outcome of deep pietistic feeling, is vague and unsatisfactory, even in the most famous passages, *e. g.*, the opening, "Strong Son of God," etc., and the stanzas descriptive of the memories of Christmas and the New Year. Tennyson lacks the universality of a great poet, and the shocking bigotry and narrow-minded prejudice of his drama of "Queen Mary" did much to wither his scanty laurels. De Vere has drunk deep at the fountains of Catholic inspiration. Compare his treatment of the Waldensian persecution, which forms the subject of the *Fall of Rora*, with Tennyson's treatment of a like theme in Queen Mary. The Catholic poet, without yielding a single jot of his faith, treats his theme with a largeness of heart and a sympathy for the unfortunate victims of religious persecution, that find no acceptance with the Laureate; yet it is an historical fact that the suppression of the Waldenses, who, *pace auctoris*, were infected with Albigensian anarchical theories and anti-Christian doctrines, was as urgent a political necessity as the repression of certain Protestant enthusiasts under Queen Mary.

Wordsworth, in his famous Sonnet on the Sonnet, complains that Milton composed too few specimens of that kind of poetry which thoughtless critics have termed a poetical nonentity. In the Sonnet here present in great beauty and luxuriance, we think Mr. De Vere without an equal in English literature, not even excepting his great master. A writer in this REVIEW has abundantly shown the author's dramatic genius in *Alexander* and *Thomas a' Becket;* and the high place which he assigns him in the drama belongs also to him, in our judgment, in his power as a sonneteer. We have here seventy sonnets, on the widest range of subjects, all instinct with true poetic fervor, and abounding in the delicate and peculiar grace of rhyme and metre, of which the sonnet is susceptible. We subjoin this exquisite one on the Cathedral at Milan;

> "With steps subdued, silence and labor long,
> I reached the marble roofs. Awe vanquished dread;
> White shone they as the summit of Mont Blanc,
> When noontide parleys with that mountain's head.
> The far-off Alps by morning tinged with red,
> Blushed through the spires that round in myriads spring;
> A silver gleam the wind-stirred poplars flung
> O'er Lombardy's green sea below me spread.
> Of these I little saw. In trance I stood
> Ere death, methought, admitted to the skies;
> Around me like a heavenly multitude
> Crowning some specular mount of Paradise,
> Thronged that Angelic Concourse robed in stone;
> The sun ascending, in their faces shone!"

Space does not permit us to more than refer to the religious and philosophic character of the poem entitled "A Wanderer's Musing at Rome." In "The Search after Proserpine," the poet finds the usual difficulty of *accommodating* English verse to the exactions of the Greek choruses, strophes, antistrophes, etc., a difficulty which confronts the English poet with nearly as great obstacles as the French, though De Vere is much more successful in this species of poetical composition than was Racine.

THE CHURCH AND THE GENTILE WORLD AT THE FIRST PROMULGATION OF THE GOSPEL. Considerations on the Catholicity of the Church soon after her birth. By the *Rev. Aug. J. Thébaud, S. J.*

Readers familiar with the older books are struck with their wealth of erudition. The reason is that, as Bacon says of reading men, the old

authors were "full" of learning, and they put into their books all that they knew. Scaliger's works are replete with his multifarious learning. Old Burton crams his book on "Melancholy" with the quaintest lore. The learning of the old masters is encyclopædic. Muratori, in Italian; La Harpe, in French; and Herder, in German, illustrate the idea. The old classic writers were even more voluminous, and a glance at the vastness of the literary labors of St. Augustine appals the modern student. Varro, *doctissimus Romanorum*, wrote extensively and copiously, and his lost works provoke the half-indignant regret of the scholar to this day. The Socratic axiom to express what you know, finds its full exemplification in those magnificent old writers, who put into their books the accumulated study and thought of their lifetime. How we smile at the divisions and sections, and wonderingly speculate upon the careful toil and patient labor they bestowed upon, perchance, their afterward neglected works!

Disraeli, the old bookworm, father of the present English Premier, has a sympathetic passage in his *History of the Literary Character* on the tender love which the old writers had for their books. Nowadays, a writer cares little about the productions of his pen, and, judging from many samples, we doubt whether he brings to his high task the learning and erudition so conspicuous in the pages of the earlier authors.

These remarks are suggested by the reading of Father Thébaud's book. His rare and ripe learning fairly overflows in the pages He brings to his subject the Muses, *Manibus lillia plenis*. What wealth of deep and far-brought learning is here! What clear and exultant views of the Gentiles as not excluded from the all-embracing Church!

The author begins with the patriarchal age, leading us back to the first fathers of the race and their intercourse with God. He next introduces us to the Mosaic dispensation, the inner spirit of which and its prophetic character he fully sets forth. We regret here that, with a pardonable violation of rhetorical unity, he does not throw the light of his learning upon some vexed Pentateuchal problems. But very likely he refers his readers for the scientific treatment of such themes to his work on Gentilism. It is much to the credit of our readers—we hope that none of them read the *Westminster Review*, which has a *corps* of writers that, imbued with the German rationalizing spirit, let no occasion pass to comment upon the Catholic and Christian exegesis of the Scriptures. We would that all could read the admirable development of the prophetic portion of Holy Writ as shown forth in Father Thébaud's book. We recall few chapters in any work on Scripture equal to the second chapter (§ 8, 9), wherein the author explains the prophecies of Isaias touching the future benediction of the Gentiles. Daniel, who seems to be an object of special spite on the part of anti-Christian writers, is here seen in all the glory of his sublime vision.

It is rather ungracious to animadvert upon some verbal mistakes in the book; mistakes which only a captious critic might notice. Sincere and reverent courtesy, pre-eminently the characteristic of the French gentleman, will be quickly understood by Father Thebaud as the only motive inducing us to point out some grammatical constructions, perfectly justified in French, but, in our queerly constructed language, inadmissible. It is falsely said that no Irishman, Scotchman, or Frenchman can ever learn the proper use of *shall* and *will*, *would* and *should*—and these auxiliary verbs are inadvertently misused in several instances. Another rhetorical blemish is the long sentence, a grace and beauty of French writing, but an obscurity in English. There is no such word as

Mussulmanism (p. 500). Our criticism is merely verbal. The tone and spirit of the book are admirable, and its rich stores of learning recall, as we have said, the days of really erudite authors.

De Deo Creante Prælectiones Scholastico-Dogmaticæ quas in Collegio SS. Cordis Jesu ad Woodstock, maxima Studiorum Domo Soc. Jesu in Fœd. Americæ Sept. statibus habebat A.D. MDCCCLXXVI–VII. *Camillus Mazzella, S. J.*, in eodem Collegio Stud. Præfectus et Theol. Dogm. Professor. Woodstock, Marylandiæ, ex-officina Typographica Collegii, 1877. Large 8vo., pp. 935.

This volume treats of God as Creator of all things, and especially of angels and men. It is one of the most important in theology, and if rightly understood, simplifies and renders more intelligible weighty matters that remain to be discussed in the portion of theology that treats of God as our redeemer. From an incorrect conception of what is called "man's natural state," of the supernatural state to which Adam was elevated, of his fall and sin, flow most of the errors concerning our restitution to that forfeited estate, through Christ, His grace, the full extent of His redemption, etc. The learned author handles his whole subject in a masterly way, with an admirable blending of the scholastic and polemic methods. He is not content with simply laying down the doctrines of the Church as promulgated in the canons or decrees of her councils, and then defending them from the objections of heretics. This, as he well observes (Pref., p. 6), is giving the student to understand what Catholic truth *is not*, rather than what it *is*. Hence he tries to explain accurately and philosophically the true idea of each dogma and of its single parts. In this he follows St. Thomas and Suarez as his principal guides. And this portion of his book we principally recommend to our readers, because it is not found generally in theological works current amongst us. But by perusing the scholastic side of Father Mazzella's book, we do not overlook, much less disparage, its polemic or controversial side. This, too, is worthy of all praise. In treating of creation, he not only overthrows the old stereotyped objections, but solidly refutes the latest objections of natural science, falsely so called, the anti-Christian systems of modern geology, framed not in the interest of philosophy and science, but forged as wicked weapons against God and Christ.

Father Mazzella begins by laying down the true notion of *creation*, then proves that God *was* the world's Creator, and then examines *how* this creation was effected. And it is in treating this last question that he shows his thorough acquaintance with the latest discoveries, as they stupidly call them, of the irreligious science of our day. But in this part of the volume he examines also other questions, of which no mention, or scarce any, is to be found in the compendiums of theology used in our seminaries. He discusses the act of creation, whether it be transient or immanent, whether it was necessary and *ab æterno* or of God's free will and in time (*cum tempore*), whether it was shared in by the whole Trinity, whether the creative power be communicable to a creature or not, how far God is represented (*aliqua Dei repræsentatio*) in the world he has created, whether and in what sense God is the *causa exemplaris* and *finalis* of the world, etc. Then follows the doctrine of the Church regarding angels, with which are interwoven many subtle and interesting questions which will have, to say the least, the charm of novelty for many of our clergy and students of theology. He then passes to the creation of man, his elevation to the supernatural state, his fall; and this gives the author room to explain the genuine doc-

trine of the Catholic Church on original sin and its consequences, so little understood and so foully perverted by the Reformers, by Bajus, Jansenius, and others. Finally, the teaching of the Church regarding purgatory, hell, and the general judgment is established and vindicated. It would be well for those who try to persuade others that there is no hell, because they themselves wish there were none, to read Father Mazzella's chapters on hell, the nature of its pains, and its eternity.

The work is too large to be used in the ordinary curriculum of our seminaries; but it will prove invaluable to the clergy who desire to revise their theological course, and bring to perfection that knowledge of which the seminary or college provided only the elements. If they will only procure the book and begin its perusal, they will congratulate themselves and thank us for having called their attention to such a valuable storehouse of theological science. The style is what such a book calls for, clear, lucid, and intelligible.

Repertorium Oratoris Sacri. A Monthly Publication. Vol. i., Nos. 1, 2, 3. New York and Cincinnati. Pustet, 1877.

We commend this publication to the attention of the reverend clergy. It contains clear and admirable divisions of the best specimens of sermon writing. The pastor of a large and laborious mission often finds no time to devote to the composition and the study of sermons, and, in consequence, he is often obliged to fall back upon trite and commonplace thoughts, into which he cannot throw much fervor, and which, too, are perfectly familiar to his congregation. There is no form of oratorical composition that so exactingly demands freshness of treatment and style as the sermon. The lamentable but none the less common distaste to dry sermons, which characterizes the masses of hearers, must be met and overcome, on the Catholic preacher's part, by a studied effort to present the word of God in a pleasing and effective manner. "The devil cometh and taketh the Word out of the heart." It is for the priest to defeat Satan with the weapons which he employs in conveying his own word, the word of lasciviousness, of triviality, and of death.

The homiletical literature of the Church is rich and abundant, but, unhappily, it is out of the reach of many priests, with whom the formation of a library is a matter generally of much time, because it is a matter of much expense. Few can afford the purchase of a library of patristic theology which is mainly in the form of sermons. And even if a priest has St. John Chrysostom, St. Basil, St. Cyprian, St. Augustine, and St. Bernard, who hold the highest oratorical rank in the Church, he may not have the leisure which the study of these great minds demand. Lacordaire shut himself up for five years over the works of St. Augustine alone. The theological accuracy of Father Thomas Burke came from the prolonged and accurate studies prescribed and enforced in his order.

Most priests have found out the comparative unavailability of the French and the Italian preachers. They are too diffuse and too ornamental. One of Segneri's sermons would seem interminable to an American congregation. The lordly style of Bossuet and the rounded periods of Bourdaloue are instinctively felt to be out of place amongst ourselves. The pulpit oratory most relished by our people is that which partakes of their general characteristics. They want plain, direct, and interesting talk. The pompous and inflated style, condemned by every canon of taste, in every kind of composition, is peculiarly detestable to a common sense and practical people like ourselves.

It were well if all Catholic preachers sedulously cultivated the art of

extemporaneous speech in its best sense and use. The reading of a manuscript is fatal. Our people scarcely tolerate it in a lecture. In the pulpit it is looked upon as out of all harmony with the surroundings and the function of the sacred orator. The labor of committing to memory is painful and at times impossible. A modest consciousness of one's own ability and of the dignity and authority of the sacred ministry, combining with a thorough belief in the responsiveness and interest of the audience, should assure the extemporaneous preacher at least of passable success. He cannot fail to preach effectively, who, after meditating carefully upon the points which he intends developing, will ascend the sacred rostrum, and out of the abundance of his heart speak the Word in truth and justice. The publication before us is very suggestive, and above all fresh in sermons comparatively unknown. We have several books of a like character: Schouppe's *Adjumenta Sacri Oratoris*, and a ponderous compilation entitled *Panorama des Prédicateurs*, but though of smaller size than either of these, the *Repertorium* is much more convenient and available.

Books of this kind, however, should not be suffered to supersede the careful study of the old Fathers, and private exercitation in sermon composition. A pastor will use these books as subsidiary to his own range of experience and thought, and look in them for suggestions that will enable him to carry home to his people his own knowledge of their special spiritual wants and condition.

Les Jesuites-Martyres du Canada. Montreal, 1877. (The Jesuit Martyrs of Canada.)

This work is a translation, by Rev. Father Felix Martin, S. J., of the "Relation Abrégée de Quelques Missions des Pères de la Compagnie de Jesu dans la Nouvelle France, par Père Francois-Joseph Bressani, S. J." (A brief Account of some Missions of the Society of Jesus in New France —Canada), a work which was published by the author in the Latin language in the year 1653. The object of the work, as we learn from Father Bressani's preface, was to give reliable information concerning the then wilderness of Canada, its climate, geography, and zoology, concerning its indigenous inhabitants, the missions among them, and the hardships and tortures and martyrdoms to which the holy Fathers were subjected. The work is therefore divided into three parts, of which the first, entitled *Nature*, treats of the character of the savages and of their country; the second, entitled *Grace*, treats of the conversion of the savages, chiefly the Hurons, the means employed and the difficulties encountered; and the third, entitled *Glory*, details the martyrdoms of those saintly men, Fathers Noué, Masse, Jogues, Daniel, Lalemant de Brebeuf, Garnier, Chaband, and of the final destruction of the missions by the Iroquois in 1650.

The work is extremely interesting in all its parts. The author himself had been a missionary in Canada from 1642 until 1650; had fallen into the hands of the Iroquois, and had experienced personally the cruelty of their tortures, the marks of which he bore upon his person till the day of his death. The description which he gives of the country of Canada, of its geographical position, his remarks upon the climate, upon the customs and habits of its inhabitants at that early epoch, and above all the biographical notices which he presents, are, as Father Martin truthfully remarks, so many memorials of the early history of the continent, the original records of which one loves to study. In the author's

exceedingly interesting narrations, not the least interesting, by any means, is his account of his own sufferings, written, as he informs us, by one who "has not a whole finger upon his right hand, and who cannot prevent the blood which trickles from his wounds from soiling the paper on which he writes." "Each night after they had made me sing," he says in another place, "and had tormented me as I have said, they would pass many minutes in burning my nails or my fingers, so that there remains to me only one finger that is entire, and from it they tore the nail with their teeth. One night they pulled off a nail, on the morrow they cut off the first joint, and the next day the second. On six occasions they burned nearly six. To my hands alone they applied fire and the knife more than eighteen times, and I was obliged to sing during these punishments. Nor would they cease to torment me for longer than an hour or two at least." Horrible as these tortures were, they were but the precursors of yet more terrible ones, through all of which God preserved his life, returned him to Italy, where he composed this work, charming in its lovely simplicity, humility, and in the saintly piety it breathes in its every page and line.

Father Martin has done a good work in exhuming from oblivion the lives and labors of the early French missionaries, who verily took their lives in their hands when they sought the forests of America to proclaim the tidings of salvation to their wild and savage inhabitants. In addition to this work, we notice he has published separately the lives of Father de Brebeuf, the apostle to the Hurons, and of Father Jogues, the apostle to the Iroquois,—the beatification of both of whom is at present an object of great desire on the part of our brethren in Canada.

DELLA VITA DI GESU CRISTO. Libri Tre di *Vito Fornari.* Libro secondo. Firenze. G. Barbera, Editore, 1877. 8vo, pp. 551.

Not having seen the First Book of this Life, which forms the introductory or preliminary to the whole, we cannot say exactly what was the special purpose of the author in writing. The volume before us contains the Life of Our Lord from His birth in the flesh up to His glorious resurrection. The author shows a thorough acquaintance with the Gospel, and, when necessary, explains away its antilogies or apparent discrepancies between one evangelist and another. The book is carefully, elaborately, and even elegantly written. But the elegance is sometimes misplaced. It too often has an ambitious, affected air, which will not please all readers. By dint of what Silvio Pellico calls "le pompose loquele," trifles, or at least what would appear to best advantage in simple narration, are exaggerated and unduly magnified. But what we miss most in the book, and what should not be wanting in a book treating of such a subject, is that unction which is found in all the saints and other holy persons, even comparatively unlearned, who have written on the life of our Lord. The whole work reads as if it were a production of the cold, humanitarian school of our day.

The author is more of a philosopher than a biographer, and there is a great deal of philosophical reflection scattered through the book. If not occasionally inaccurate, it is highflown and often *outre.* His illustrations are far fetched, and in our humble opinion more than once wanting in reverence. What makes him imagine that the differential calculus is yet to play an important part in theological science (p. 8), is beyond our comprehension. The author's good will and theological orthodoxy, in spite of some loose passages, are sufficiently guaranteed by the approbation of the Archiepiscopal tribunal of Florence.

THE COMPLETE OFFICE OF HOLY WEEK, according to the Roman Missal and Breviary, in Latin and English. New edition, revised and enlarged. New York: Catholic Publication Society. 12mo., pp. 562.
The Same, in smaller type. Same Publishers.

Nothing contributes more to the intelligent devotion of those who assist at the ceremonies of the Church than a manual of this kind. Instead of gazing with empty wonder on what he can only comprehend vaguely and by guessing, the bystander is enabled to accompany the Church in her services and devotions with full understanding of all that she says and does. And of all the many and varied ceremonies of Holy Church, there are none that need more, and will better satisfy an intelligent observer, than those of Holy Week. Here, side by side, with the sublime pathetic songs of David and Jeremy, and the inimitable simplicity of the gospel narratives of the Passion, we find prayers and rites that recall the liturgy and symbolism of the Church in her earliest period. To enjoy all this, as the devout, rational Christian may and should enjoy it, there can be no better guide and help than the book before us.

The two editions vary only in the size of the type; but even the smaller one is in good, readable print. It may not be amiss to state that the compiler has availed himself throughout of the authorized Douay version. In this, of course, he has done no more than his duty. But it is a duty too often neglected by the caprice or carelessness of those who publish devotional manuals for the use of the laity, and may yet have to be enforced amongst us by special church legislation.

CANTUS PASSIONIS D. N. I. CH. Secundum Quatuor Evangelistas, depromptus ex Officio Hebdomadæ Sanctæ, quod curavit Sacr. Rituum Congregatio et divisus in tribus fasciculis, quorum primus continet verba Chronistæ, secundus, partem Christi, tertius, partes Synagogæ Secundo fasciculo adduntur Lamentationes Tridui Sacri et tertio additur Præconium Paschale Sabb. Sancti. Folio. Red and black print. Pustet, New York and Cincinnati.

The fame of Pustet's magnificent editions of Missals, Processionals, Rituals, Vesperals, and other liturgical books is as wide as the Church. The extreme care which the composition and printing of such books demands is equal to the beauty of the form in which they appear. Considering the limited circulation such works necessarily have, the extraordinary pains they exact, and the truly sumptuous elegance in which they are adorned, it is surprising at what low prices they are sold.

The title of the Passion Chant sufficiently indicates its character and excellence. It is a model of typographical beauty. To the chant proper are added the Lamentations for Holy Week and the Paschal Chant for Holy Saturday. The REVIEW trusts that it will reach all its subscribers before Holy Week, and thus call attention to this magnificent edition of that beautiful and pathetic chant that will sound in the Church on Palm Sunday and during the Triduum.

THE KNOWLEDGE OF MARY. By *Rev. J. D. Concilio*, Pastor of St. Michael's Church, Jersey City, author of *Catholicity and Pantheism*. New York: Catholic Publication Society Company, 1878. 12mo., pp. 315.

The author writes with zeal and fervor and with a command of the language that does him credit. But sometimes he writes too hurriedly, as when he speaks of *moments* in the Incarnation. His book was intended to honor the Queen of Angels and of men, and will have that effect to some extent. Why then should he quarrel with Father Faber,

between whom and himself there can be no real difference of opinion? Or why should he mention things which should be utterly removed from the Christian mind, when this holiest of virgins is present to its thoughts. It would be well for all our writers to keep their pious zeal within bounds, and never to lose sight of that warning drawn by St. Bernard, with happy alteration of one word, from a verse of the Psalmist: Honor Reginæ judicium diligit.

ST. JOSEPH'S MANUAL, containing a selection of Prayers for Public and Private Devotions, with Epistles and Gospels for Sundays and Holidays. Compiled from approved sources, by *Rev. James Fitton.* Boston: Thomas B. Noonan & Co., 1877. 12mo., pp. 830.

This excellent prayer-book was compiled some forty years ago by the venerable Father Fitton of the diocese of Boston, and has enjoyed popular favor ever since. In this new edition several improvements have been made. One of the best features of the book is the large legible type in which the devotions for hearing Mass are printed. The only blemish in the book is that occasionally prayers from the French are too literally translated, and *vous, votre,* becomes *you, your,* even in addressing the Deity. This is not English. The second person singular must be used in prayer to God, His Holy Mother, and the Saints.

MINIATURE LIVES OF THE SAINTS FOR EVERY DAY IN THE YEAR. Edited by *Henry Sebastian Bowden,* of the Oratory. New York: Benziger, 1877. Two vols., 16mo.

The plan of this little work is excellent. On every alternate page there is the life of a saint, and on the next to it is mentioned the characteristic virtue of that, an exhortation, a maxim of the saint or of some Holy Father or spiritual writer, an anecdote to serve as illustration, and finally a text from Scripture. Thus we are taught practically that the saints are given us not only for our admiration, but as models for our imitation.

WHAT CATHOLICS DO NOT BELIEVE. A Lecture delivered in Mercantile Library Hall, on Sunday evening, December 16th, 1877, by Rt. Rev. P. J. Ryan. Fourth edition. St. Louis: P. Fox, 1878, pp. 43.

We have seen nothing in a long time to surpass this admirable, eloquent, and at the same time clear and lucid exposition and refutation of the false creed, that our enemies have wickedly invented and impudently attempted to impose on us as the genuine creed of the Catholic Church. It is so short and such pleasant reading, that nothing could be fitter for general circulation. It would be a wholesome thing if read and reflected on by honest, intelligent men outside of the Church.

THE PROVIDENTIAL MISSION OF PIUS IX. A Discourse, delivered at the Requiem Mass for Our Holy Father, Pope Pius IX., in the Cathedral of Baltimore, February 18th, 1878. By *Rev. John J. Keane.* Baltimore: John Murphy, 1878. 8vo., pp. 31.

A solid and eloquent discourse, in which Father Keane, since promoted to the See of Richmond, unfolds the mission of our late Holy Father, and proves how well he discharged the duties of his exalted office.